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In the last few years, the issue of "rights" for victims of crime
has become influential in shaping criminal law and procedure. In
1982 alone, California voters approved a "Victim's Bill of
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Rights" that made substantial changes in California law,1 and the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime issued its final re-
port, recommending numerous changes in the criminal justice
system. 2 The influence of the victim's rights "movement" ap-
pears to be creating a new era in American criminal law and
procedure.
This article examines the impact that current victim's rights
proposals and programs will likely have both on the criminal pro-
cess and on victims, and explores the rationales offered in sup-
port of these proposals. The discussion focuses on whether
changes in the criminal law and criminal process are desirable for
those who have already been victimized. The article also makes
some observations on whether these changes have any salutory
effect on the goal of crime prevention. Part I examines the in-
creasingly public structure of the criminal process and presents a
brief history of the victim's rights movement. Part II proposes a
theory of victimization which emphasizes its highly individual and
experiential nature. Part III outlines a composite victim's rights
proposal. Part IV looks at the proposed changes in the legal pro-
cess bearing on the guilt stage of the trial and examines the use-
fulness of these changes to victims. Part V then explores whether
victim participation at sentencing can be justified in terms of
traditional rationales for the criminal sanction, on due process-
like grounds, or on individually based, existential grounds. Fi-
nally, Part V discusses the problems created by the issue of resti-
tution to crime victims.
I. THE ORIGINS OF VICTIM'S RIGHTS
A. The Historical Role of the Victim in Criminal Law
The available historical work in the field of the criminal law
reveals a steady evolution away from the "private," or individual,
sphere to the "public" or societal one. In Europe and England
after the collapse of the Roman Empire, the victim and the crimi-
nal process were intimately linked. No formal government struc-
ture existed; thus, "criminal justice" largely depended on self-
1. See note 87 infra.
2. See note 71 infra.
3. The author draws on her experiences as both a public defender and a victim of a




help or the help of kin.4 The blood feud constituted the major
enforcement mechanism, both in England and on the continent:5
The victim, or his or her kin, exacted vengeance against and re-
payment from the perpetrator or his kin.6 At the same time, how-
ever, a rudimentary public enforcement mechanism, "outlawry,"
existed both on the continent and in England.7
As English society became more organized, and feudal lords
began to assert dominion over others, the law of the blood feud
became more refined and subordinated to "public" interests. It
became unlawful to begin a blood feud unless an effort was made
to extract a sum of money from the offender.' At the same time
that use of the blood feud was declining as the primary vehicle
for enforcing criminal law, monetary compensation to victims or
their kin ("bot" and "wer"), and fines payable to the king
("wite"), developed into a complicated system of tariffs that care-
fully set out the value of every sort of injury imaginable.9 This
system of compensation would appear to be solicitous of a vic-
tim's right to restoration from the wrongdoer, but in practice,
victims seldom received compensation.' 0
4. 1J. GOEBEL, FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR 15-21 (1937); Berman, The Background of
the Western Legal Tradition in the Folklaw of the Peoples of Europe, 45 U. Ci. L. REv. 553
(1978).
5. See, e.g., 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, at 449-51 (2d. ed. 1899); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 60 (1883); Berman, supra note 4, at 554-55.
6. Berman, supra note 4, at 557; see also 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 341. But even
the blood feud had certain social rules and rituals: In the "law" of homicide, for exam-
ple, not all lives were of equal worth; thus a blood feud might require the deaths of
several persons, or the expropriation of cattle or more assets, to atone for the loss of a
single individual. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 5, at 450; Berman, supra
note 4, at 556-57.
7. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 5, at 450. Under the idea of out-
lawry, a person who broke the law could be attacked by the entire community in which
he lived. Because the lawbreaker was considered to have gone to war with the commu-
nity, the community's response was to go to war with him-to banish him, pursue him,
kill him, ravage his land, burn his house. Id. at 449. Thus, even in pre-modern Western
society, a public as well as private form of reaction to crime existed.
8. Id at 451. A killer, for example, was given a year to pay the victim's family the
value of the victim's life, generally determined by a complex set of class-based rules,
before the family could begin the blood feud. Id The kin of the killer were exempt
from the feud unless they had harbored him. Id.
9. Id at 449, 451.
10. The crime tariffs were oppressive. Pollock and Maitland observed:
From the very first, it was an aristocratic system; not only did it make a distinc-
tion between those who were "dearly born" and those who were cheaply born,
but it widened the gulf by improverishing the poorer folk. . . . When we
.Ap-ril 1985]
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In England, as the kings gained and solidified authority, the
concept of "the king's peace" prevailed, and criminal acts were
seen by the legal system as offenses against the crown rather than
against the individual."' Outlawry was transformed from a pun-
ishment to a process for compelling the attendance of the ac-
cused at trial. 12 Severe punishments, such as the taking of life
and limb, were placed solely in the hands of the king and his rep-
resentatives.' 3 Minor crimes were punished chiefly by monetary
fines instead of the wite,14 and damages to victims or their fami-
lies were determined and assessed by a tribunal rather than a sys-
tem of tariffs.15
As early as the thirteenth century in England, the law of fel-
ony appeared to serve the feudal system and the lords far more
than it did the victims.' 6 The lords' consolidation of power, the
greed of kings, and the need for a coherent system of laws trans-
formed criminal law from a mixture of public and private law, to
law of an exclusively public nature.' 7 A similar shift from a mixed
system to an exclusively public system took place on the conti-
nent.1 s As English criminal law became more public, victims lost
some discretion once they initiated a prosecution,' 9 but still re-
reckon up the causes which made the bulk of the nation into tillers of the lands
of lords, bot and wite should not be forgotten.
Id. at 460. While the system "outwardly reconciled the stern facts of rough justice with a
Christian reluctance to shed blood," id., Pollock and Maitland submitted that the de-
mand for money instead of life was essentially delusive, because few persons were likely
to pay, and most were outlawed or sold into slavery. Id at 460-61.
11. Id
12. Id at 457-58; 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 429-33.
13. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 457-61.
14. Id. at 458.
15. Id. at 458-59.
16. For example, willful homicide became a capital offense, and the kin of the slain
lost their right to wer and to compensation. Only later was a statute specifically enacted
to create a claim for damages in homicide cases. Id. at 459. A felon's lands went to the
king; his chattels were confiscated. Id. at 465-66.
17. Id. at 454-64; 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 102. Although this summary obvi-
ously simplifies a complex historical change, it does so to emphasize that the focus and
function of criminal law shifted substantially from the individual to the state. See also
Greenberg, The Victim in Historical Perspective: Some Aspects of the English Experience, 40 J.
Soc. IssuEs 77 (1984).
18. Berman, supra note 4, at 553-54.
19. See Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 PAST & PRESENT 96, 102 (1983); Langbein,
The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 317-23 (1973).
But see Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165, 167-80 (1983)
(English private prosecution in eighteenth and nineteenth century was largely
discretionary).
940
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tained an important role in the process through the unique Eng-
lish system of "private" prosecution.20 Private prosecution
initially appears to demonstrate a solicitude towards victims ab-
sent in every other system, 21 but in fact, it was not very beneficial
to the victim. 22 By the nineteenth century, the British system of
private prosecution had little to do with concern for victims of
crime.23 In England today, serious cases are reviewed and some-
times prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecutorions, and
20. See Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View From the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. Ci. L. REV. 1, 47-51 (1980) (larceny victims had discretion both in bring-
ing charges and in determining whether larceny would be a capital offense). But see id. at
55-56 (although victim or private accuser was called prosecutor and played an "essential
role" in prosecuting, prosecutor had official support of constables and justices of the
peace; the coroner handled homicide cases).
21. See Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution 52 Miss. LJ.
515 (1982); Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inac-
tion, 65 YAL LJ. 209 (1955). Although the idea of having private prosecutions in the
United States has been proposed as a remedy for victims of crimes, see Goldstein, supra,
at 558-61; Comment, supra, and there are occasional "private prosecutions" or instances
of private aid to district attorneys, private prosecution has never really played a promi-
nent part in American criminal justice.
Goebel and Naughton's history of the development of a criminal justice system in
colonial New York notes the system was a mixed one of public and private prosecutions,
depending on the location of the prosecution. Officials frequently brought formal accu-
sations, however, and the office of the attorney general conducted many criminal prose-
cutions in the name of the Crown by the 1700s. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAw
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YomK 329 n.14, 330-31, 337, 619-21 (1944) (in East-
hampton, offenses were prosecuted on complaints of injured persons or informers; in
New York City, the sheriff filled role of law enforcement official and prosecutor; the
Attorney General's power increased throughout 1700s as direct representative of the
Crown's interests). Public prosecution developed throughout the colonies, apparently,
and certainly was firmly in place by the time the English were debating the issue.
22. By the nineteenth century, the expense of conducting investigations and of
bringing private prosecutions placed a heavy burden on victims, Kurland & Waters, Pub-
lic Prosecutions in England, 1854-79: An Essay in English Legal History, 1959 DUKE LJ. 493,
512, and while compensation and reward schemes were used to encourage prosecution,
they frequently were insufficient, id The poor could not prosecute at all. Id. at 515.
Moreover, in serious cases the constable had played an important role, and the coroner
had become largely responsible for prosecuting homicide. Langbein, supra note 20, at
55-56. Finally, the severity of criminal penalties in England for hundreds of crimes-
death or transportation-effectively foreclosed any chance for victims to obtain tort
damages. See also note 10 supra.
23. Kurland & Waters, supra note 22. The English debates leading up to the insti-
tution of the public prosecutor's office are mostly silent on the burden private prosecu-
tion placed on crime victims. Instead, the conflict centered on abuse of authority and
loss of lawyers' jobs and the need for coordination and effective prosecution. See id. at
528-60. The English use of private prosecutions to enforce criminal statutes for most of
England's history may simply have been a peculiar result of inertia, vested interests that
had grown over time, and suspicion of authority. Id. at 561-62.
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police prosecute most of the other cases.24 Historically then,
even in England, the victim has gradually ceased to be a signifi-
cant actor with a formal role in the criminal process. 25 But the
fact that the victim's role in the process steadily lessened over
time does not necessarily justify the lack of a formal role for vic-
tims today.
The apparent visibility of the criminal process and the unlike-
lihood that most victims can successfully pursue the offender
through tort law26 may be partially responsible for the current
view that the victim should have a greater role in the criminal
process. The following section will discuss the rise of this view in
American criminal law and procedure.
B. The Role of the Victim in Recent American Criminal Law
The American system of criminal law and procedure has re-
24. See, e.g., R.JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OFJUSTICE IN ENGLAND 214 (7th ed. 1977)
(people are usually "content" to leave the conduct of the prosecution to the police);
Hay, supra note 19, at 180 (fewer than three percent of English prosecutions are con-
ducted by private individuals; about nine percent of shoplifting cases are prosecuted by
retail stores). But see Proposed Independent Prosecuting Service: The Prosecutor's Viewpoint, 48J.
CRIM. L. 302 (1984); Independent Prosecutors, 134 NEW L.J. 1001 (1984) (both criticizing a
government proposal to create a centralized national prosecution office). For a recent
discussion of the English criminal process, see Hughes, English CriminalJustice: Is it Better
Than Ours?, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 507 (1984).
25. Of course, crime victims retain a private right of action in tort against
criminals. Today, just as in the fourteenth century, the tort right to compensation in
damages theoretically addresses the harm to the individual, while criminal prosecution
theoretically addresses the social or public harm of criminal acts. In theory, the law has
recognized the harm that victims have suffered and has provided a mechanism for re-
dress. The separation of the treatment of individual claims from that of societal claims
for criminally caused harms, and the resulting separation into the private and public
spheres, however, creates the appearance that the law virtually ignores victims of crimes.
See R. REIFF, THE INVISIBLE VICTIM: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEM's FORGOTrEN RE-
sPoNsIBILrrY xi (1979) ("Society-sensitive to the issues of social justice for the of-
fender-spends millions of dollars on programs for offender-oriented court reform and
rehabilitation. On the other hand, society fails to protect crime victims, degrades them
socially, and refuses them aid."); M. HYDE, THE RIGHTS OF THe VICTIM 4 (1983) ("for
the most part, victims are the innacent and neglected element in the criminal justice
system"); Goldstein, supra note 21, at 519 ("the victim has been left to play a distinctly
secondary role" in the criminal justice system). And while in theory the tort system
provides redress for the individual, in fact victims often have no hope of recovery be-
cause many identified offenders are unable to pay damages. See notes 311-324 infra and
accompanying text.
26. Those who do find a "deep pocket" can and do pursue the offender in actions
for civil damages. See Rios, Drunken Driving Y/ictim and Family et $11 Million, San Jose
Mercury News, Sept. 24, 1983, at IA, col. 3; S.F. J4ry Gives Burgled Homeowners $400,000,
San Francisco Chron., July 28, 1983, at 2, col 2,
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flected a tension between social and individual approaches to
crime prevention:27 Liberals have focused on isolating and cur-
ing perceived social causes of crime; conservatives have concen-
trated on perceived individual wickedness as the cause of crime.28
From the post-World War II period to the mid-1960s, liberal the-
ories were ascendant, with respect to both the social welfare ap-
proach to crime prevention and offenders and the classic liberal
ideology of protecting the individual from the overreaching
power of the state.29  Liberals emphasized the social origins of
crime-poverty, alienation, lack of education, discrimination-
and sought to remedy these perceived causes of crime.30 They
advocated rehabilitation, rather than punishment, of convicted
criminals.3 1 And they sought to protect the constitutional rights
of the accused, finding a responsive majority in the United States
Supreme Court.32 Some of the liberal experiments failed, 3 and
27. Perhaps it is the influence of the crime control ideology, see notes 47-51 infra
and accompanying text, that causes us to rely so heavily on tinkering with law enforce-
ment and the conviction process to eliminate crime. Perhaps it is that the costs of doing
so remain hidden, while the costs of other crime prevention methods are more obvious
and direct. It is far easier for legislatures to enact "tough" penalties than to consider
what might be done to prevent crime generally. Another reason why we focus on the
criminal justice system may be that it not only has a "unique visibility," but it also pro-
vides a powerful apparatus for the support of a particular ideology. J. REIMAN, THE
RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PISON 162-63 (2d ed. 1984). That ideology "con-
veys the message that there are no dangerous crimes unique to the wealthy" and that it
is the poor who are responsible for crime. Id. at 166. It conveys the image of equal
treatment of rich and poor, however, to avoid any charge of class bias, and it "conveys
the message that crime is not the result of the deprivations of poverty but rather of
individual moral failings." Id. The implicit ideology of criminal law focuses on individ-
ual offenders, diverting attention from the evils present in the social order and in estab-
lished institutions. Id. at 144.
28. See Kelman, Criminal Law: The Origins of Crime and Violence, in THE PoLrrcs OF
LAw 214, 220 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); see also R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 3-4 (1970).
29. See, e.g., Bayer, Crime, Punishment, and the Decline of Liberal Optimism, 27 CRIME &
DELINQ. 169, 172 (1981) (the main current of liberal thought is optimistic, focusing on
social roots and psychological bases of crime as remediable); Currie, Crime and Ideology,
WORKING PAPERS May-June 1982, at 26 (in the 1960s, public debate about crime was
dominated by a liberal vision that linked violence to social disadvantage and held out
promise that "social rehabilitation programs" would reduce the crime rate); see also C.
SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227-30 (1978) (reflecting main-
stream liberal ideology and solutions throughout). See generally R. CLARK, supra note 28.
30. See Bayer, supra note 29; Currie, supra note 29.
31. See Bayer, supra note 29, at 179-86; see also F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE RE-
HABILIrATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PoLcv (1981).
32. The Warren Court's concern for the rights of the accused and its selective in-
corporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights amounted to a "revolution" in criminal
procedure. See L. BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAw, AND POLrTICs (1983); Allen, The Judicial
Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518.
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some never had a chance of succeeding as the funds and interest
that supported programs disappeared. 4 Nevertheless, some
remnants of liberal programs remain today, including the appli-
cation to the states of important provisions of the Bill of Rights
by the Warren Court. 5
Concern for victims of violent crime-at least "innocent" vic-
tims of violent crime-was also on the liberal agenda and took
the form of advocacy of "victim's compensation" statutes in the
early and mid-sixties.3 6 The impulse behind the enactment of
victim's compensation statutes was largely humanitarian and
"liberal": A social welfare argument pervades the victim's com-
pensation literature of that era.3 7 By the mid 1970s, many states
had adopted some form of victim's compensation program, 38 and
law journals published numerous articles on the subject.3 9
33. Indeterminate sentencing is a prime example of a failed experiment. Based on
a rehabilitative approach to the criminal sanction, the indeterminate sentence could not
withstand criticism of rehabilitation itself as a proper function of the criminal sanction.
See text accompanying notes 247-248 infra; see also C. SILBERMAN, supra note 29, at
504-05.
34. See Bayer, supra note 29, at 170-79; Curtis, The Conservative New Criminology,
Soc'y Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 8, 12-13; Silver, Crime and Conventional Wisdom, Soc'y
Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 9, 17. Longitudinal studies of social welfare programs instituted in
the 1960s reveal that at least one program, Head Start, has had a salutory effect in re-
ducing crime rates. See Science and the Citizen, Head Starts, ScI. AM., Mar. 1981, at 82
(commenting on Schweinhart & Weikart, Young Children Grow Up: The Effects of the Perry
Preschool Program on Youths Through Age 15, in THE HIGH/SCOPE EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
FOUNDATION (1980) (preschool-age students who participated in enrichment program
had lower arrest rates up to age 15 than members of control group)).
35. Satzburg, Foreward: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the
Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. LJ. 151 (1980).
36. Penal reformer Margaret Fry first proposed victim's compensation in 1957. See
Fry,Justice for Victims, in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM: READINGS IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM
COMPENSATION 54-56 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1975)[hereafter cited as READINGS].
Fry's efforts led directly to the establishment of victim's compensation programs in New
Zealand and Great Britian. The Journal of Public Law published a symposium on victim
compensation in 1959. The Minnesota Law Review followed suit in 1965. In 1965 Cali-
fornia became the first state in this country to adopt a victim's compensation program.
See S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 153 (2d ed.
1970).
37. See note 358 infra.
38. As of 1970, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York had
adopted victim's compensation programs. See Governmental Compensation for Victims of Vio-
lence, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 158-93 app. (1970). Wisconsin adopted its first compensa-
tion statue in 1975. See 1975 WIS. LAWS ch. 344, § 3. Minnesota enacted its victim's
compensation statue in 1974. See 1974 MINN. LAws ch. 463, § 3. New Jersey adopted
victim compensation in 1971, Alaska in 1972. See 1971 NJ. Laws ch. 317, § 1; 1972
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 203, § 1.
39. See, e.g., Compensation to Victims of Personal Violence: An Examination of the Scope of the
Then the liberals began to lose momentum and initiative in
dealing with the problem of crime. The disappearance of liberal
influence has several possible and related explanations. First, the
"crime rate" kept climbing, seemingly refuting liberal theories of
crime prevention.4 0 Second, crime, in the American mind, was
often associated with race.4' The liberals' arguments for racial
equality created a political paradox that prevented them from
confronting the relationship between race and crime42 and the
ever-present national fear of interracial crime.4 3 Third, the fact
that many "crime prevention" techniques historically had been
used to oppress blacks and other minorities made liberals cau-
tious: The techniques of crime control were also the techniques
of oppression.44 Finally, liberal rhetoric failed to overcome the
reality and fear produced by photographs and news reports of
riots, burning cities, and vicious and barbaric crimes.45
The decline of support for liberal approaches and the inability
of liberals to solve the apparent paradoxes created by their be-
liefs left the crime issue to the conservatives.4 6 Conservatives
pointed to the failures of liberal programs and emphasized that
crime was a matter of individual choice and wickedness. They
adhered to the "crime control" model of criminal justice4 7 that
Problem, 50 MINN. L. REV. 213 (1965) (symposium); Governmental Compensation for Victims of
Violence, supra note 38, at 1 (symposium).
40. See M. FLEMING, OF CRIMES AND RIGHTS: THE PENAL CODE VIEWED AS A BILL OF
RIGHTS 15 (1978); E. VAN ALLEN, OUR HANDCUFFED POLICE: THE ASSAULT UPON LAW
AND ORDER IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 35-36 (1968); J. WILSON,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME 4 (1975). All of these works contain conservatively oriented
chronicles of rising crime rates. See also Currie, supra note 29 (rising crime rate of 1960s
made liberal vision "a shambles").
41. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 29, at 159-61.
42. Id
43. "No single event ticks off America's political schizophrenia with greater cer-
tainty than the case of a black man raping a white woman. . . . Racism and sexism and
the fight against both converge at the point of interracial rape, a baffling crossroads of
an authentic, peculiarly American, dilemma." S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL:
MEN, WOMEN & RAPE 230 (1975).
44. See INSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA 58-77 (L. Knowles & K. Pewitt eds.
1970). When Furman v. Georgia was decided by the Supreme Court, some of the Justices
relied on the obvious racial discrimination in death penalty cases to strike down Geor-
gia's death penalty statute. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242- 57 (Douglas,J., con-
curring); id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring).
45. See Bayer, supra note 29, at 178-79.
46. The crime problem became "an official Republican campaign issue" by April of
1968. L. BAKER, supra note 32, at 210 (1983); Currie, supra note 29, at 26-27.
47. I will be using Herbert Packer's description and definition of the crime control
model when I refer to it throughout this piece. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
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emphasizes "efficiency" in the criminal process. 48 The model en-
visions a summary process, much like an assembly line, with reli-
ance placed on administrative rather than judicial
decisionmaking. 49 Central to the ideology of the crime control
model are "the presumption of guilt"50 and the belief "that the
criminal process is a positive guarantor of social freedom."'"
The conservatives thus complained that the courts were "hand-
cuffing" the police52 and that swift and sure punishment was the
only practical solution for the crime problem.53 They also in-
voked the part of nineteenth century liberalism-often ignored
by the post-World War Il liberals-that rested on the premise
that the individual is entirely rational and responsible for his or
her actions. 4 Today, refusing to acknowledge the possible social
causes of crime, 5 or dismissing those causes as insoluble,56 con-
SANCTION 149-73 (1968). The rhetoric and ideology of "crime control" (or "law and
order") have changed little since Roscoe Pound first lectured on the issues of criminal
justice sixty-one years ago. See R. POUND, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN AMERICA (1945). Then,
as now, the complaints were that the courts were "soft on crime" and that the crime rate
had the good citizens of the nation terrified, yet the procedural protections afforded
defendants then were far fewer than those available now.
48. H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 158.
49. Id. at 160.
The model, in order to operate successfully, must produce a high rate of appre-
hension and conviction. . . . There must then be a premium on speed and
finality. . . . [E]xtrajudicial processes should be preferred to judicial
processes, informal operations to formal ones. . .. The model that will oper-
ate successfully on these presuppositions must be an administrative, almost a
managerial, model.
Id. at 159.
50. Id. at 160 ("presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to
deal effectively with large numbers").
51. Id. at 158. Packer observes that the values contained in the crime control
model are grounded "on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by
far the most important function to be performed by the criminal process. The failure of
law enforcement to bring criminal conduct under tight control is viewed as leading to
the breakdown of public order .. " Id.
52. One conservative book attacking the Warren Court's decisions used this phrase
for its title. E. VAN ALLEN, supra note 40. The law enforcement and conservative com-
munities launched a number of stinging attacks on the Court after it decided Miranda.
See L. BAKER, supra note 32, at 200--05.
53. See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 157-63 (1975) (arguing that
offenders are not caught or punished as a result of court decisions and that police and
trial court judges are thwarted by laws and appellate decisions that favor defendants).
54. Van den Haag, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, Soc'Y, Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 11.
55. E. VAN DEN HAAO, supra note 53, at 155-57.
56. See Wilson, Thinking About Crime, ATm. MONTHLY, Sept. 1983, at 72 [hereafter
cited as Wilson, Thinking]; Wilson, Thinking About Thinking About Crime, Soc'y, Mar.-Apr.
1977, at 10.
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servatives place most of the responsibility for crime and crime
control on the "criminal justice system" and particularly on the
courts .5
According to the conservative argument, deterrence often
doesn't work,-" rehabilitation doesn't work, 59 and retribution 60
and incapacitation 6 are the only tenable justifications for punish-
ment of criminals. Throughout the 1970s, "tough" sentencing
laws passed legislatures with regularity.62 Yet even with record
numbers of persons in prison,63 and later with the reappearance
57. Van den Haag asserts: "The probability of convicting the guilty is greatly re-
duced in the U.S. by (a) delay, (b) the exclusionary rule, and (c) literally endless appeals
allowed defendants from state to federal courts." E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 53, at
164.
58. One conservative author has been unwilling to abandon deterrence theory, en-
tirely, however. See Wilson, supra note 56, at 72-84.
59. See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 53, at 184-91 (arguing that rehabilitation
is impossible without retributive punishment and that rehabilitation does not affect re-
cidivism rates).
60. When the California legislature enacted determinate sentencing after almost
60 years of indeterminate sentencing based on a rehabilitation premise, the determinate
sentencing law began: "The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of impris-
onment for crime is punishment." CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1984); S. KAD-
ISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 205 (4th ed.
1983).
61. Renewed interest in incapacitation has resulted in "habitual offender" or "ca-
reer criminal" statutes in many states. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 999b-h (West
Supp. 1984) (establishing "career criminal" program); CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 667, 667.5,
667.7 (West 1982) (increasing sentences for "habitual offenders"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.080 (Baldwin 1984) (providing that the jury determine whether the offender is a
"persistent felony offender" and allowing imposition of life imprisonment on such find-
ing); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West 1981) (making life imprisonment without
possibility of parole a possibility for people convicted of a prior felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.10 (McKinney 1975) ("persistent felony offender" may be sentenced to a minimum
of 15-25 years or a maximum of life imprisonment).
62. The oft-cited example is the change in California's indeterminate sentencing
law in 1976, when the penal code was revised to declare "that the purpose of imprison-
ment is punishment." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1984). Governor James
Thompson of Illinois recently wrote that "[tihe tough sentencing laws I fought for in the
General Assembly and which are now law ... are not the primary causal factor in prison
overcrowding." Thompson, Introduction: Illinois' Response to the Problem of Prison Crowding,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 203,204. Those "tough sentencing laws" became effective in 1978.
Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 237;
see also B.JACKSON, LAW AND DISORDER 25-26, 151-54 ("tough on crime" postures used
by New York gubernatorial candidates in the 1970s; legislators respond to the level of
fear and anger transmitted to them by their constituents).
63. In 1970, there were approximately 196,000 persons incarcerated in prisons in
the United States, or 97 prisoners per 100,000 in the population. In 1980, there were
approximately 321,000 prison inmates, or 142 prisoners per 100,000 people. By 1983,
the number of prisoners had grown to 455,000. Since the beginning of 1983, the prison
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of the death penalty,64 the "crime rate" continued to increase.6
In part, conservatives attributed this failure to control crime to
the courts. Conservatives had never truly accepted the Warren
Court's concern for the rights of the accused: The exclusionary
rule and Miranda requirements particularly irritated them, be-
cause they firmly believed that these rules interfered with effi-
cient law enforcement and crime control.66 In their view, the
courts were letting desperate criminals loose on "legal technicali-
ties" and preventing the police from protecting the innocent
public, and therefore were to blame for the high rate of crime.
Yet the Bill of Rights speaks of restraints on the state's power to
act against the individual, and the procedural protections adopted
by the Warren Court sought to remedy the imbalance of the
power of the state against the individual accused of a crime. The
"discovery" of the crime victim provided an individual to substi-
tute for the state on the side of the scales opposite the accused,
thus making it appear that the balance was more "equal." 67
While law enforcement officers and prosecutors have long un-
derstood the symbolic value of the victim, the politicization of the
population in this country has increased by approximately 222 inmates per day. See
Bencivenga, Book Review, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 14, 1984, at 18, col. 1.
64. After nearly a decade in which no one was executed in the United States, the
Supreme Court upheld Georgia's death penalty statute. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976). The pace of executions did not accelerate, however, until 1983, after the Court
decided four cases that arguably overruled its decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305 (explaining the
Court's doctrinal retreat from death penalty cases); Press, Rate of Executions Picks up in
U.S., Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 15, 1984, at 3, at col. 2 (six persons executed between
1977 and 1983, five executed in 1983, and nineteen executed as of November 8, 1984).
65. The crime rate has, for the moment, decreased slightly. Explanations for the
slight decrease in index offenses vary enormously, depending on ideology. Criminolo-
gists have observed that the aging of the population accounts for much of the decrease,
while political conservatives attribute the phenomenon to tougher law enforcement and
penalties.
66. See Gross, Some Anticrime Proposals for Progressives, 234 NATION 137 (1982) (after
1980 election, President Reagan made "sweeping attack" on ideology of 1950s and
1960s and proposed that the exclusionary rule be reformed, preventive detention stat-
utes be enacted, and longer prison terms be imposed). See generally L. BAKER, supra note
32.
67. In 1968, for example, Van Allen wrote: "What good are our police. . . .if a
court like the U.S. Supreme Court continues to put what is tantamount to a premium on
lawlessness while it in effect penalizes the victim. . . .We have seen what the criminal-
protecting U.S. Supreme Court decisions have done to the cause ofjustice. They have
made the criminal's rights superior to those of their victim." E. VAN ALLEN, supra note
40, at 119. Most of the political rhetoric of the late 1960s and the 1970s, however,
focused on public fear of crime-a "future victim" posture-and largely overlooked the
symbolic value of past victims.
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symbol is of more recent origin. The complaint of officers and
prosecutors that the courts "never think about the victim" when
deciding cases in favor of defendants made "intuitive" sense: A
violent crime involves at least two persons, but the focus seemed
to be only on the one least "deserving" of attention or regard-
the offender. Although for quite some time this argument had
been only sporadically raised, by the middle of the 1970s different
groups began to focus their attention on the victims of particular
crimes. For example, the women's movement did much to em-
phasize the plight of rape victims in the legal process,68 while the
more recently formed group, "Mothers Against Drunk Driving"
(hereinafter referred to as MADD), brought the victims of drunk
drivers to public attention.69 The success of these groups con-
cerned with particular crimes and crime victims served to high-
light the general importance of "victims" as an effective political
symbol.70 Conservatives thus began rhetorically to paint "the
victim" as a sympathetic figure whose rights and interests could
be used to counterbalance the defendant's rights, and called for a
new balance to be struck by courts and legislatures.71
As a result of the convergence of these factors, the subject of
"victim's rights" has received enormous political, media, and
68. As the women's movement gained strength, focus on deconstructing the my-
thology of rape grew in both medical and legal circles. See, e.g., Berger, Man's Trial,
IWomans Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) ("[lIt is
fitting that the 'rediscovery' of rape should coincide with the growth of the Women's
Movement. . . . Women have. . . played a key role in lobbying for reforms in the law
of rape."); Rape: "The Ultimate Violation of the Self," 133 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 436, 437 (1976)
("Recent attitudinal shifts have been largely due to the initiative taken by countless num-
bers of women who have begun to sensitize our medical, social and legal institutions
about the extent to which cultural biases have determined the maltreatment of the [rape]
victim.").
69. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
70. The forces of "law and order" have been quite receptive to the lobbying by
groups representing specific classes of victims. For example, the California rape shield
statute, CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West 1974), was titled the Robbins Rape Evi-
dence Law after its co-sponsor, conservative Republican Senator Alan Robbins. The
name of liberal Senator George Moscone, a co-author, is not associated with the rape
shield law in California. Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill
1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1554 n.15 (1975).
71. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT
(1982)(recommendations for action by governmental agencies) [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE]; N.Y. STATE COMPENSATION BOARD, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CRIME VICTIMS,
in 5 VICTIMOLOGY 428 (1980) (recommendations similar to those of the President's Task
Force); Task Force on the Victims of Crime and Violence, Executive Summary: Final Report
of the APA Task Force on the Victims of Crime and Violence, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1985)
(recommending, inter alia, greater victim participation in criminal process).
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legal attention. 72 Both Congress 73 and the states74 have enacted
victim's rights legislation, the President's Task Force on Victims
of Crime has published its final report,75 and groups such as
MADD and "Parents of Murdered Children" continue to receive
national attention.76 Victim's rights proponents have succeeded
in inducing the adoption of preventive detention laws in at least
nine states.77 Victim's rights advocates have played a role in
bringing about other changes in criminal law and procedure.78
Partly as a result of victim's rights advocacy, the number of laws
requiring mandatory restitution to victims by offenders has also
increased.79
72. See, e.g., L. FORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS (1980); M. HYDE, supra note 25; R.
REIFF, supra note 25; Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense
Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587 (1982); Goldstein, supra note 21; Harland, Monetary Reme-
dies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 52
(1982); R. ELIAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM: CRIME VICTIMS AND COMPENSATION IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1983) (empirical study of victims and victim com-
pensation programs in NewJersey and New York); Burgess & Holstrom, Coping Behavior
of the Rape Victim, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413 (1976) (stages of coping with the event);
Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations, 133 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY
408 (1976) (discussing reactions to victimization of rape victims); Reactions to Victimiza-
tion, 39J. SOC. ISSUES 1 (1983) (collection of articles and studies dealing with effects of
criminal victimization and of victimization by disaster or disease). See generally Victimology,
ajournal, started in 1976, which specializes in criminal victimization topics.
73. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1502,
1512-15, 3579-80 (1982)).
74. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 12-28-1, 12-28-8 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-1IA-7 (Supp. 1984).
75. See TASK FORCE, supra note 71.
76. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) was founded in 1980 by a California
woman, Candy Lightner, after her daughter was killed by a drunk driver. See Lightner to
Speak in Palo Alto, Peninsula Times Tribune, May 17, 1984, at E-1, col. 4. MADD now
has at least 258 chapters nationally and approximately "300,000 supporters." President's
Message, 3 MADD NATIONAL NEWSLETTER I (Spring 1984).
Bob and Charlotte Hunninger of Cincinnati, Ohio, founded "Parents of Murdered
Children" in 1978, for the purpose of providing support for parents whose children had
been killed. See Miller, Read This if You Have Kids, SanJose Mercury News, Apr. 17, 1984,
at IB, col. 1.
77. ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 22(2), (3); CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(e), (g) (as amended on
June 8, 1982); COLO. CONST. § 19(1)(b); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § Ila; Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 8(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(b)(2),
(c) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1 (1980).
78. The California initiative passed in 1982 instituted radical changes in California
law. See note 87 infra. And in New Mexico, for example, a murder victim's mother has
been successfully lobbying for changes in criminal procedure similar to those contained
in California's victim's rights initiative. See Outrage: Crime Victims Strike Back, broadcast by
KPIX in San Francisco (Apr 13, 1984); see also Frymer, Documentary Details Crime Victims'
Outrage, San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 18, 1983, at 9C, col. 1.
79. See notes 315-317 infra; see also Schmalz, Crime Victims Seek a Greater Voice, N.Y.
950
VICTIM'S RIGHTS
Most of the victim's rights activity has been far from dispas-
sionate, and currently, the victim's fights "movement" has a de-
cidedly conservative bent.80 Although "victim's rights" may be
viewed as a populist movement responding to perceived injus-
tices in the criminal process, genuine questions about victims and
victimization have become increasingly coopted by the concerns
of advocates of the "crime control" model of criminal justice.
The phrase "victim's rights" has been used by the conserva-
tives to invoke two symbols that tend to overwhelm critical analy-
sis of proposals made in the name of victims. In the criminal law
context, the word "victim" has come to mean those who are
preyed upon by strangers: "Victim" suggests a nonprovoking in-
dividual hit with the violence of "street crime" by a stranger.
The image created is that of an elderly person robbed of her life
savings, an "innocent bystander" injured or killed during a
holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape victim. "Victims" are not
prostitutes beaten senseless by pimps or "johns," drug addicts
mugged and robbed of their fixes, gang members killed during a
feud, or misdemeanants raped by cellmates. Nor does the mean-
ing of "victim" encompass the computer corporation whose
trade secrets are stolen or the discount store that suffers petty
pilfering. In short, the image of the "victim" has become a
blameless, pure stereotype, with whom all can identify.
This image also takes two temporal forms. "Past victims" are
those who have already been victimized and who give concrete
meaning to the symbol. It is the past victim who, through lurid
newspaper stories, "crime scene" shots on newscasts, and
anguished statements, is drawn upon to provide the popular im-
age of "victim." "Future victims" are those necessarily unidenti-
Times, Mar. 6, 1985, at 17, col. 2 (describing recent lobbying efforts of crime victims in
New York).
80. Conservative Republicans were the progenitors of Proposition 8, California's
victim's rights initiative. Galante, Exclusionary Rule Struck in California, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 18,
1985, at 11, col. 1. Proponents of the sweeping constitutional amendment, mainly con-
servative Republicans, said the initiative was meant to stop California's traditionally lib-
eral Supreme Court from giving defendants greater rights under the state constitution
than they enjoy under the U.S. Constitution. Id. And, in In re Lance W., a divided Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that Proposition 8 effectively abolished independent state
grounds for the exclusion of evidence seized by the police. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. Adv.
Sh. 3d 873, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985). See also Turpen, The Criminal Injustice System: An
Overview of the Oklahoma Victims' Bill of Rights, 17 TULSA LJ. 253 (1981) (the Oklahoma
District Attorneys Association drafted the state's victim's rights legislation; lobbying by
district attorneys, law enforcement officers, and "citizens" through petition led to even-
tual passage).
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fled persons who have not yet been mugged, robbed, assaulted,
raped, or burglarized, but who may become victims at some fu-
ture time. Past victims may be said to represent individual and
private interests, while future victims represent the public's fear
of crime and its interest in crime control. Proponents of the
crime control model confuse the images of past and future vic-
tims by exploiting the public's emotional identification with the
anguish of past victims simultaneously with its fear of crime and
victimization. 8 '
"Rights" is also a powerful rhetorical device, particularly in
American history and culture.8 2 The term suggests both freedom
from something and freedom to do something: It suggests a cer-
tain vision of independence and autonomy.83 In the American
political context, the word almost automatically raises suspicions
of oppression or deprivation and has been called into service by
disparate groups seeking power, entitlements, equality, or lib-
erty, often with great success. Hence, the terms "civil rights,"
"women's rights," "gay rights," "the right to life," and "the right
to work" pervade the current political lexicon. Similar force at-
taches to the concept of "victim's rights." The term has come to
mean some undefined, yet irreducible right of crime victims that
"trumps" the rights of criminal defendants.84 Although the rhet-
oric of proponents of "victim's rights" vacillates between notions
of "past victim's rights" and "future victim's rights" without ex-
planation or clarity, the term's predominant meaning in the polit-
ical context has become that of "future victim's rights." 85
Unfortunately, the symbolic strength of the term "victim's
rights" overrides careful scrutiny: Who could be anti-victim?
Thus, liberals find themselves caught in yet another apparent
paradox: To be solicitous of a defendant's rights is to be anti-
81. See notes 170-184, 214-225 infra and accompanying texts.
82. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 181-82 (1959); Berlin, Two Concepts
of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 165-66 (1970).
83. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 58-59 (1973).
84. See texts accompanying notes 181, 220-229 infra.
85. The rhetoric in support of Proposition 8 repeatedly emphasized the fear of
future victimization and the handcuffing of law enforcement by the courts. By contrast,
the text of Proposition 8 mentions victims in only 3 of its 21 substantive provisions: Sec-
tion 3(b) provided the victim a "right to restitution," section 6(a) promised the victim a
"right to a hearing" at sentencing, and section 6(b) provided the victim a right to a
hearing at parole proceedings. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 app., 651 P.2d




victim.8 6 As a result, "victim's rights" has produced an emerging
structure of criminal law and procedure that closely resembles
the "crime control" model so antithetical to liberal thought.
Based on a simplified concept of "victim" and an unarticulated
concept of "rights," the changes in the criminal process pro-
posed or spawned by the victim's rights movement are the same
changes that have long been advocated by conservatives.8 7 Ironi-
cally, these changes may do little to help even the very narrow
category of past victims who give meaning to the symbol. More-
over, the symbolic manipulation of the victim successfully avoids
a more serious debate about how the criminal justice process
should be structured and disguises the truly revolutionary nature
of the reforms proposed. Whether the reforms have anything to
do with victims, and whether they are desirable, are unanswered
questions. Upon examination, many of the reforms appear to fail
under either line of inquiry.
II. A THEORY OF THE IMPACT OF CORE CRIME ON VICTIMS
Before exploring what role if any a victim should play in the
criminal law process, it is necessary to explore what it means to
be a "victim." Although a subspecialty of criminology called
"victimology" has existed for approximately 35 years, 8 little in-
formation about the experience or psychology of crime victims is
available. 9 Instead, the study of"victimology" has focused more
86. At least one liberal explicitly ignored the contradictions in trying to regain the
momentum liberal programs had enjoyed in the 1960s by asserting that "[a) logical next
step would be a Victim's Bill of Rights, which could provide for witness compensation,
protection against reprisals, prompt return of confiscated property, progress reports on
the prosecution of offenders, free legal services and restitution payments by the criminal
or, failing that, by the government." Gross, supra note 66, at 139 (emphasis added).
87. The California referendum, for example, effectively abolished the right to bail
in noncapital cases, CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28(c), attempted to abolish the fourth and
fifth amendment exclusionary rules, id- at art. 1, § 28(d), increased minimum mandatory
sentences, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1982), and attempted to abolish plea
bargaining, id. at § 1192.7. The act also requires restitution to victims, CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 28(b), provides for victim participation at sentencing hearings, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1191.1 (West 1982), and allows victims to oppose parole of offenders, id. at § 3043
(adult offenders); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1767 (West 1982) (juvenile offenders).
These changes seem to reflect reforms advocated by conservatives. See note 66 supra.
88. Hans von Hentig is usually credited with founding this subspecialty in H. VON
HENTIG, THE CRIMINAL AND His VicTIrM: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME (1948).
See also S. SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND His CRIMINAL, A STUDY IN FUNCTIONAL RESPONSI-
BILrrY 39-59 (1968). See generally VIc'riMOLOGY (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1974). The
victimologists now have their own scholarly journal entitled Victimology.
89. Explicitly recognizing the relative lack of psychological studies of the conse-
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on sociological questions-for example, who is likely to be vic-
timized, what is the incidence of victimization, and what are the
outcomes of social services for victims. Thus, while we may as-
sume many things about crime victims, few of us know much about
the experience and its effects.
It is difficult to assign any role to victims in our criminal sys-
tem without some appreciation of the experience of the victim
and the psychological consequences of victimization for the indi-
vidual. This part proposes a unifying theory of the individual ex-
perience of victimization as it relates to the individual90 and
discusses the psychological effect of violent crime9 ' on victims as
a result of the victims' sudden confrontation with the existential
issues of mortality, meaning, responsibility, and isolation.92 If
this theory is correct, and recent research supports many of its
propositions,9 3 it indicates that many current victim's rights pro-
quences of victimization, the Journal of Social Issues has published one symposium on the
effects of various types of victimization, see Symposium, Reactions to Victimization, 39J. Soc.
IsSUES 1-227 (1983), and another exclusively addressing the effects of criminal victimiza-
tion, see Symposium, Criminal Victimization, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 1-115 (1984); see also Fischer,
A Phenomenological Study of Being Criminally Victimized: Contributions and Constraints of Qualita-
tive Research, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 161 (we know more about reported fear of crime and
indices of fear than experience of victimization); Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 131 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974) (literature on rape provides little inforna-
tion on physical and psychological effects of rape).
90. The basic theory this piece proposes is not original, but rather follows closely
the concepts and analysis developed by Dr. Irvin Yalom. See I. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL Psy-
CHOTHERAPY (1980); see also R. MAY, DISCOVERY OF BEING: WRITINGS IN EXISTENTIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY (1983); R. MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE: A SEARCH FOR THE SOURCES OF
VIOLENCE (1978) [hereinafter cited as R. MAY, POWER]; R. MAY, THE MEANING OF ANm-
ETY (rev. ed. 1977); R. MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF (1953); R. MAY, LOVE AND WILL
(1969); B. BETrELHEIM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS (1979); V. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH
FOR MEANING (3d ed. 1984); K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PAM (1976).
91. Throughout the piece, I will discuss only the effects of "core" crimes on vic-
tims, because the effects of other crimes are unlikely to be as severe in most instances
and because the victims of core crimes provide the symbol that gives force to the entire
victim's rights movement.
92. Objective writing does not, and perhaps cannot, capture the nature of exper-
iences relating to death, meaning, freedom and responsibility, and existential isolation
as well as perhaps fiction or poetry can. What follows is an effort to sketch a simple
analytical framework, rather than an effort to impart a complete understanding of these
issues.
93. See, e.g., Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 89 (rape victims experience acute
stress reaction to life-threatening situation; fear of death is the primary component of
the experience of rape); Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, A Theoretical Perspective for Understanding
Reactions to Victimization, 39 J. Soc. ISSUES 1 (1983) (studies indicate that victimization
causes the destruction of the assumption of invulnerability and the loss of a sense of
meaning and of control); Silver, Boon & Stones, Searchingfor Meaning in Misfortune: Mak-
[Vol. 37:937
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posals are problematic at best and may actually be psychologi-
cally destructive to the victim.
For many years mental health professionals assumed that psy-
chological disturbances experienced by victims of disasters had
their source, in part, in the individual's preexisting emotional pa-
thology. 94 But studies of prisoners of war,95 survivors of the Hol-
ocaust, 96 and victims of "natural" disasters97 indicate that this
assumption is inaccurate.98 These studies of victims are particu-
ing Sense of Incest, 39 J. Soc. IsSUES 81 (1983) (studying whether finding meaning aided
incest victims in coping with experience).
94. See K. ERIKSON, supra note 90, at 184. This assumption persists to some extent
today. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association notes
that "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders" caused by severe trauma are influenced by prior
adjustment: "[P]reexisting psychopathology apparently predisposes to the development
of the disorder." 3 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL 237 (1981). But this somewhat glib conclusion has been contradicted by some
prominent psychiatrists. Bettelheim, for example, rejects the hypothesis that reactions
to extreme trauma are necessarily defined by preexisting emotional problems. B. BET-
TELHEIM, supra note 90, at 28-35. And the evidence from studies of Vietnam veterans
suffering from the disorder is inconclusive as well. See M. MACPHERSON, LONG TIME
PASSING: VIET NAM AND THE HAUNTED GENERATION 192-93, 197-207 (1984); see also Ly-
ons, More Vietnam Veterans Are Turning to Therapy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at Cl, col. I
(American psychiatrists refused to believe that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder existed at
all for a long time, despite studies and speculation dating back to World War I that war
and other catastrophes leave deep traumatic scars).
95. See, e.g., R. LIFrON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1961)
[hereinafter cited as R. LFTON, THOUGHT REFORM]; see also R. LIFTON, HOME FROM THE
WAR (1973).
96. See, e.g., B. BETrELHEIM, supra note 90, at 24-33, 105-11. By making the compar-
ison and noting the similarities, I do not wish in any way to trivialize the monstrous
horror of the death camps, nor the long-lasting consequences of the camp experience
for survivors.
97. Kai Erikson's study of the effects of a flood that destroyed several small towns
in West Virginia and killed many people contains the same themes as do other studies of
extreme experiences. See K. ERIKSON, supra note 90. Accounts of other forms of disas-
ter-no matter how relatively horrifying to outsiders-also reflect reactions of loss,
grief, fear, and disorientation in the aftermath of the experience. See R. LFroN, HISTORY
AND HUMAN SURVIVAL 117-94 (1970) (detailing reactions of Hiroshima survivors); Quan-
strom, Burning Memories, San Jose Mercury News, Sept. 26, 1983, at IA, col. 3 (detailing
reactions of neighborhood in San Diego, California, five years after a jet crashed).
98. In some instances, prior experiences do impede recovery from a disaster.
When an individual "has undergone too severe or too frequent early traumatic exper-
iences" and later experiences sudden and severe trauma, recovery from the later experi-
ence may be extremely difficult. See F. FROMM-REICHMAN, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
PSYCHOTHERAPY 93-94 (1959). But even "normal" people depend on dissociation of
traumatic events to master their existence. Id. Although a recent study of rape victims
indicated that pre-assault psychological symptoms were the most likely predictors for
long term retention of symptoms, the relationship diminished over time. Sales, Baum &
Shore, Victim Readjustment Following Assault, 40J. Soc. ISSUES 117, 122-23 (1984). More-
over, the authors found that other variables influenced manifestations of symptoms at
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larly relevant because the recent literature on rape indicates a
degree of common experience between rape victims and other
disaster victims.99 Anecdotal evidence' 00 and other studies'0 1
also suggest that a similar community of experience exists among
victims of other crimes.
A. Psychological Issues Raised by Victimization
Sudden victimization can lead to extreme trauma.'0 2 Kai Erik-
son has defined extreme trauma as "an assault on the person so
sudden and so explosive that it smashes through one's defenses
and does damage to the sensitive tissues underneath."'' 0 3 What I
term the "core crimes" of homicide, rape, kidnapping, robbery,
and aggravated assault are the crimes feared most; the effects of
these crimes on individuals would appear to fall within the defini-
tion of extreme trauma. Core crimes threaten our existence,
various times. Id. at 129. Cf R. LIFrON, THOUGHT REFORM, supra note 95, at 86 (per-
sonal responses, while similar, depended "largely upon" character traits, "emotions and
identities developed within [the person] during. . . entire previous life"); Lyons, supra
note 94, at 21, col. 1 (Veterans Administration estimates that 350,000 to 400,000 Viet-
nam veterans suffer from disorder in some form: "'every patient is different' ").
99. Compare Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations, 133
AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 405 (1976) (rape is traumatic external event that breaks balance of ego
adaptation and environment, resulting in guilt, phobic reactions, anxiety, and depres-
sion), with K. ERIKSON, supra note 90, at 156-57 (medical terms for conditions present in
93% of flood survivors include depression, anxiety, phobia, post-traumatic neurosis;
Erikson's terms include confusion, despair, hopelessness).
100. Strikingly common themes run through confidential conversations that I have
had with crime victims and their families. Although each person with whom I have
talked has had various behavioral responses to the crime and its aftermath, all of these
people experienced feelings of fear, anxiety, and loss of security or control. Many have
asked why they were victimized; those who have not explicitly asked "why," devised their
own explanations for their victimization. Most have attempted to find some meaning in
the event, whether by blaming themselves or by searching elsewhere. A few have be-
come totally isolated from others. But all have limited their activities in one way or
another.
101. The sexual assault victims with whom I have spoken experienced reactions
similar to those reported in formal studies. Some of the victims had specific fear reac-
tions to the location of the assault, and others experienced a more generalized fear reac-
tion. All but one had moved from the area where the assault had taken place. Similar
reactions were found by Scheppele and Bart. Scheppele & Bart, Through Women's Eyes:
Defining Danger in the Wake of Sexual Assault, 39J. Soc. ISSUES 63 (1983). See generally K.
ERIKSON, supra note 90; Metzger, It Is Always the Woman Who Is Raped, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 405 (1976); Maganini, Crime Victim Aid Plan Suffering From Neglect, San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 17, 1983, at 1, col. 5 (statements by assault, mugging, and rape victims
about experiences); Rape, Stanford Campus Report, Jan. 27, 1982, at 5 (anonymous in-
terviews with two victims of sexual assaults).
102. B. BETrELHEIM, supra note 90, at 28.
103. K. ERIKSON, supra note 90, at 253.
April 1985] VICTIM'S RIGHTS
either literally, as in homicide, or indirectly, as in assault, and
remind us of the fragility of life. The intrusiveness of these
crimes threatens and denies a victim's "personhood," subjecting
the victim to devastating psychological consequences. In short,
these violent crimes create an "urgent experience that propel
one into a confrontation with one's existential 'situation' in the
world."' 1 4 The more extreme the experience, the more likely the
resulting psychic damage.10 5 The crimes of robbery, rape, kid-
napping, and attempted murder directly force victims to confront
their own mortality, an experience that "has the power to pro-
vide a massive shift in the way one lives in the world."' 10 6
The terror of death, however, "is of such magnitude that a
considerable portion of one's life energy is consumed in the de-
nial of death." 1 7 Thus, many people engage in "death denial"-
the belief by an individual that while others can die, he or she is
immune to death.1 0 8 In the context of criminal victimization, this
104. I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 159.
105. Bettelheim has observed that the worst situation for an individual is "[w]hen
we are abandoned and immediate death is possible and likely. . . .Then the effects are
catastrophic. The combined sudden breakdown of all. . . defenses against death anxi-
ety projects us into .. .an extreme situation." B. BETrELHEIM, supra note 90, at 11 (empha-
sis in original). In his study of Westerners imprisoned by the Chinese and subjected to
"thought reform," Lifton found that four years after the experience, "my subjects still
bore marks of both fear and relief. The fear was related to. . .the fear of total annihila-
tion." R. LIFTON, THOuGHT REFORM, supra note 95, at 238.
106. I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 159. Studies of the impact of near-death exper-
iences have not concentrated as much on victims of violent crime as they have on acci-
dent victims, unsuccessful suicides, and people with terminal illnesses. Some of these
studies indicate that positive changes may result from the experience-that realization of
the previous nature of life may sharpen one's awareness, see id. at 33-38, result in a
change in priorities, and lead to enhanced relationships with others, id. at 35. This may
not be as true for crime victims, however. A failure of crime victims to benefit from their
confrontation with death may be an effect of being labelled a "victim" or may be a result
of a lack, caused by society's intense ambivalence toward crime victims, of any social
support. See notes 139-147 infra. Whether crime victims experience an enhanced appre-
ciation for life because of their confrontation with death is an open question at this time.
107. I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 41.
108. See Perloff, Perceptions of Vulnerability to Victimization, 39J. Soc. IssuEs 41 (1983)
(nonvictims tend to underestimate likelihood or frequency of negative life events and
appear to maintain illusion of unique invulnerability). Dr. Yalom borrows from Tol-
stoy's Death of Ivan Ilych to illustrate the belief in special protection from death and harm:
The syllogism he had learnt from Kiezewetter's Logic: "Caius is a man, men are
mortal, therefore Caius is mortal," but certainly not as applied to himself. That
Caius-man in the abstract-was mortal, was perfectly correct, but he was not
Caius, not an abstract man, but a creature quite, quite separate from all
others. . . . It cannot be that I ought to die. That would be too terrible.
I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 117-18 (quoting L. TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND
OTHER STORIES 131-32 (1960)).
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denial is related to the belief that although violent crime happens
to others, it won't happen to oneself. Actual victimization shat-
ters these assumptions, and the lack of control that a victim feels
during an assault deprives her not only of her belief in invulnera-
bility, but also of her sense of control and autonomy in the
world.10 9 In this way, victimization forces individuals to confront
their own mortality, but because people cannot sustain the expe-
rience of pure death anxiety for long, the anxiety may be dis-
placed, denied, or repressed. 110  As a result, fear of
revictimization, 111 feelings of helplessness, 1 2 loss of a sense of
control over one's destiny, and lack of security"-' become "typi-
cal" reactions to an intrusive confrontation with death. Indeed,
survivors of disasters may conclude that life owes them some-
thing," 4 or may commit suicide in response to death anxiety." 5
And victims of violent crime respond similarly." 6
109. Scheppele and Bart found that women who had followed "the rules of rape
avoidance" were more likely to have severe reactions to the assault than those who knew
that they were in a dangerous situation at the time of the attack. To be assaulted when
one has taken all appropriate measures to avoid assault is a horrifying reminder that one
is not in control of one's fate. Scheppele & Bart, supra note 101, at 76-78. The severity
of the reaction to being attacked in "safe circumstances" is related to the loss of control,
not just of the attack itself, "but for the future as well." Id. at 79. Peterson and Selig-
man suggest that criminal victimization may increase feelings of helplessness or rein-
force already existing learned helplessness, for "when uncontrollable bad events precede
helpless behavior, and when the helpless individual expects future responding to be
futile, it may well be that learned helplessness is operative." Peterson & Seligman,
Learned Helplessness and Victimization, 39 J. Soc. IssuEs 103, 107 (1983).
110. See R. LiFrON, THOUGHT REFORM, supra note 95, at 148-49 (apparent resisters
to thought reform used denial and repression as coping strategies); see also I. YALOM,
supra note 90, at 44-45.
111. See Krupnick, Brief Psychotherapy with Victims of Violent Crime, 5 VICTMOLOGY
347, 348 (1980). Once the illusion of invulnerability is shattered by an assault, victims
may even overestimate the likelihood of another assault. Tyler, Assessing the Risk of Crime
Victimization: The Integration of Personal Victimization, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 27, 45 (1984).
112. See Peterson & Seligman, supra note 109.
113. See Scheppele & Bart, supra note 101.
114. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 29, at 19-21.
115. Suicide paradoxically "relieves" death anxiety by giving the individual ulti-
mate control over his or her own death. I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 122, 197-99. Nu-
merous rape victims, Vietnam veterans, and survivors of Hiroshima have responded to
their victimization with suicide attempts or successful suicides. See, e.g., T. BENEKE, MEN
ON RAPE 164 (1982) (suicide attempts by rape victims are not uncommon); M. MACPHER-
SON, supra note 94, at 239 (detailing suicide rates of Vietnam veterans); R. LIFrON, supra
note 97, at 117-94 (discussing suicide as a response to the nuclear attack on Hiroshima);
see also Stipp, Cancer Threat Seen for Vietnam Vets in Study of Deaths, Wall St.J.,Jan. 29, 1985,
at 42, col. 6 (suicide rate among Vietnam veterans in Massachusetts is 58% above the
expected rate).
116. One recent study of 94 sexual assault victims found that 91% of women who
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Victimization can also lead to a shift in psychological perspec-
tive from believing that one is "at home in the world" to believ-
ing that the world is a frightening or indifferent place. This shift
is closely linked to the confrontation with one's own mortality,
and ultimate-and inevitable-isolation from others.' 17 The ex-
perience of being a victim makes all things and all other people
seem unfamiliar and frightening. This unfamiliarity creates a
sense of "dread"-and a feeling of nothingness-that is horrify-
ing and objectively indescribable."" The support of friends and
relatives may help to mitigate a victim's sense of dread and isola-
tion by helping the victim begin to feel secure in the world again.
But to feel at home in the world, to dispel dread, the victim may
also seek to find meaning in the experience.
The question "for what?" 1 9 exemplifies the search for the
meaning of existence that in turn allays death anxiety: Because
"death anxiety frequently masquerade[s] as meaninglessness,' 120
victims will often try to come to terms with their own mortality by
attempting to find meaning in their victimization or in life itself.
But noninstrumental violence is terrifying precisely because it
has no apparent meaning in the ordinary sense of reason orjusti-
fication. "Why?" or "Why me?" are questions associated with
meaning that victims frequently ask of themselves and others.12 1
were raped in a "safe situation"-at home with the doors locked, for example-suffered
from either a "diffuse" fear reaction-a view of numerous situations as dangerous- or a
"total fear" reaction-a life characterized by constant, "almost unbearable" fear.
Scheppele & Bart, supra note 101, at 78. These extreme reactions are not surprising
given the intrusiveness of the crimes described; such an invasion could easily shatter the
victim's illusion of invulnerability and her confidence in her ability to control life.
It is not atypical for a victim of a sexual assault to state, "I wish he'd killed me" or
"if it happens again, I hope I die." See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 43, at 406; see also
Frazier & Borgida, Rape Trauma Evidence in Court, 40 AM. PSYCH. 984, 990 (1985) (a re-
cent survey found sexual assault victims five times as likely to attempt suicide as non-
victims); Dowd, Rape: The Sexual Weapon, TIME, Sep. 5, 1983, at 27, 28 ("Studies show
that. . . suicide attempts are fairly common after rape.").
117. See I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 356.
118. Id. at 43. This form of dread--of fear of nothingness-causes the world to
become foreign. It is a sensation of falling, of not perceiving, of being lost. It is more
than anxiety or panic in the classic meaning of those words; it is, indeed, dread.
119. P. TILLIcH, THE COURAGE To BE 111 (1952). Tillich sees death and meaning
as separate existential issues, but acknowledges that the question of life's meaning is
related to the consciousness of mortality. Id. at 170. See also B. BErrELHEiM, supra note
90, at 4.
120. I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 466.
121. The questions asked by the crime victim may range from the simplest inquir-
ies to the anguished cry ofJob. They may transcend causal explanations or attributions,
encompassing the search for life's ultimate meaning. Human suffering seems to demand
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Crime victims may seek meaning to their victimization either ret-
rospectively by blaming themselves or others, 122 or prospectively
by collapsing into helplessness, 23 feeling a duty to help other
victims,' 24 devoting themselves to remedying an evil,' 25 or seek-
ing to live their lives more constructively. 12 6 But making assump-
tions about victims based on their initial attributions of meaning
to the event is difficult, because an individual's attribution of
meaning to an event may change over time: 127 A meaning that
was once adequate to explain the event may be inadequate in
an explanation and, as Frankl observes, a victim's search for meaning in the aftermath of
the event may operate at two levels: On one level is a search for meaning in one's own
suffering; on the other level is a search for meaning to human suffering in general. V.
FRANKL, supra note 90, at 178-88. Not all victims consciously pursue meaning, however.
See Silver, Boon & Stones, supra note 93, at 94.
122. Most commonly, victims will blame the perpetrator, but they also frequently
blame the police for failing to protect them and blame society for creating the circum-
stances leading to the crime.
If the word "attribution" is substituted for "blame," the questions of meaning be-
come more apparent. See Miller & Porter, Self-Blame in Victims of Violence, 39 J. Soc. Is-
SUEs 139 (1983) (self-blame is defined as attribution; control and meaning are supplied
for victims through attribution).
123. See Peterson & Seligman, supra note 109.
124. John Walsh, the father of a boy who was abducted and murdered in 1981, has
worked diligently and successfully to publicize the need for effective law enforcement in
locating missing children and to obtain federal support for a national system for locating
abducted children. See Anderson, Missing Children's Center Gets Funding, San Jose Mercury
News, Apr. 19, 1984, at 2A, col. 5. Many rape victims eventually become involved with
rape crisis counseling. Moreover, one of the factors motivating the founders of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving was a desire to help families of victims.
125. Although much publicity has been given to Mothers Against Drunk Driving
and their "tough" policies against drunk driving, some relatives of victims may choose
to remedy what they perceive to be a greater evil. The daughter-in-law of a homicide
victim, for example, chose to start a group to oppose the death penalty because "[w]e
simply wanted to prevent violence from being added to violence." See Deans, Murder
Most Foul, But Vengeance Kills the Soul, SanJose Mercury News,July 17, 1983, at 4C, col. 1.
126. A near-death experience can result in a reorganization of priorities and a de-
sire to concentrate on what one finds to be meaningful. See I. YALOM, supra note 90, at
33-35. Occasionally, however, crime victims will identify with the aggressor and court
danger or enter a criminal life. Scheppele & Bart, supra note 101, at 71 (one rape victim
became a prostitute, thief, and drug abuser; another carried a knife and "became pro-
miscuous"). The case of Patricia Hearst, who was kidnapped, tortured, and raped, only
to be convicted of armed robbery, may be the most widely known example of the phe-
nomenon of identifying with the aggressor. Ideologically the "perfect" victim symbol,
Ms. Hearst received remarkably little sympathy for her plight.
127. Just as with other traumatic events, such as the loss of a significant and loved
other person, there are stages of recovery and reintegration. See Burgess & Holmstrom,
supra note 89, at 981, 982-84 (1974) (acute phase during first several weeks after sexual
assault; long term reorganization took place at different rates for different victims); see
also B. BETrELHEIM, supra note 90, at 36 ("Personal integration, and with it achievement
of meaning, is a highly individual, lifelong struggle.").
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light of new experiences or reflection. Finding some meaning,
however, is important in helping an individual understand and
accept even the most extreme experiences. 2
Taking individual responsibility for the experience may help
the victim to find meaning, because responsibility, if defined as
the choosing or creating of one's experiences, 129 is related to
meaning and autonomy in life. Responsibility in this sense
means being "the uncontested author of an event or a thing,"'' 3 0
and "[tlo be aware of responsibility is to be aware of creating
one's own self, destiny, life predicament, feelings, and. . . one's
own suffering."'' 31 How a person perceives and defines an event,
a thing, or another person, ultimately depends on his or her
awareness of responsibility or authorship. 3 2
Assuming responsibility for a traumatic experience is a pro-
cess requiring an assertion or reassertion of control in one's life.
Responsibility initially requires an individual to accept that the
criminal event occurred. But a frequent first reaction to trau-
matic experience is a denial that the event occurred at all, in part
to avoid the death anxiety produced, but also in part to avoid
128. B. BETrELHEIM, supra note 90, at 34-35; V. FRANKL, supra note 90, at 121-23.
A study of father-daughter incest victims found that, even after an average time of
twenty years since the crime, over 80% of the victims responding stated that they were
still searching for an understanding of the experience. See Silver, Boon & Stones, supra
note 93, at 99. Those victims who had found at least some meaning coped with life
significantly better than those who could not find any meaning, id. at 93, even though
the search for meaning might not have produced a totally sufficient explanation for
them.
129. See I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 218-21.
130. J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 633 (1956).
131. I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 218. Dr. Yalom adopts Sartre's definition. Id In a
section titled "Responsibility Awareness American Style-Or, How to Take Charge of
Your Own Life, Pull Your Own Strings, Take Care of Number One, and Get 'It'," Yalom
quotes an exchange between an EST (Ehrhard Sensitivity Training) trainer and a partici-
pant that illustrates "that one is responsible for being mugged." Id. at 256.
EVERYTHING THAT YOU EXPERIENCE DOESN'T EXIST UNLESS YOU
EXPERIENCE IT. EVERYTHING A LIVING CREATURE EXPERIENCES IS
CREATED UNIQUELY BY THAT LIVING CREATURE WHO IS THE SOLE
SOURCE OF THAT EXPERIENCE. WAKE UP, HANK.
Id. at 257 (quoting L. REINHART, THE BOOK OF EST 142-44 (1976) (emphasis in
original)).
132. While this concept of responsibility sounds very abstract, it actually exists
even at an everyday level: You see a friend on the street, you smile and say hello, but the
friend does not acknowledge you. You respond by deciding that the friend is angry with
you, or did not notice you, or is preoccupied. How you saw the friend was a matter of
choice: You may have missed her sad expression or failed to see that she was looking in
another direction.
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acknowledgement that such a horrible thing could be a part of
life. 133 Yet until the victim acknowledges the actual experience as
hers or his alone-that she was raped, that he was mugged-the
victim is virtually powerless to be free from the rapist or the mug-
ger,13 4 or to take responsibility for, and thereby reassert control
over, the event and the direction of her or his life.13 5
Unfortunately for many crime victims, American culture dis-
courages this kind of personal responsibility and instead empha-
sizes another type of responsibility-"blame" and fault finding.
By blaming others, the victim escapes responsibility. By blaming
the victim for his plight, 136 society further discourages the victim
from taking responsibility for the event. Accordingly, the societal
emphasis on innocence as a prerequisite to being a "real" victim,
taken in combination with the confusion between "innocence"
and "responsibility,"'' 3 7 make it very difficult for a victim to avoid
displacing the criminal event from her experience. Moreover,
the inability of other people, even those close to the victim, to
accept the crime victim's experience can further isolate the victim
133. Burgess & Holstrom, Coping Behavior of the Rape Victim, 133 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY
413, 416 (1976) (some women denied the event; some dissociated the experience; some
suppressed it). One sexual assault victim captured this phenomenon perfectly: "You
don't want to believe it happened . . . . It's so unreal that you don't want to believe it
happened or that it can happen." Rape, supra note 101, at 5, col. 3.
134. See note 131 supra.
135. Robert Lifton's formulation of responsibility postulates that adjustment oc-
curs in three phases. The first is "confrontation," a recognition of the impact of exter-
nal forces and of the potential for choice. The second is "reordering," an exploration of
existential guilt and a testing of new ideas and behaviors. The third is "renewal," the
choice of an ideological path. R. LiFTON, THOUGHT REFORM, supra note 95, at 463-67.
136. See W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (rev. ed. 1976). Blaming victims for their
plight tends to make them feel guilty. The trap of blame and guilt creates a bond be-
tween the victim and the event that may come to dominate the victim's life, making it
impossible for the victim to live independent of the criminal event. See notes 268-275
infra and accompanying text.
137. In discussing innocence, Rollo May distinguishes between two kinds of inno-
cence. One is "authentic innocence'-"a quality of imagination . . . [F]rom this inno-
cence spring awe and wonder . ... It is the preservation of childlike attitudes into
maturity without sacrificing the realism of one's perception of evil, or as Arthur Miller
puts it, one's 'complicity with evil.'" R. MAY, POWER, supra note 90, at 48-49. Naivete
characterizes "pseudoinnocence," the second kind of innocence: "It is childishness
rather than childlikeness . . . . [which leads us to] make a virtue of powerlessness,
weakness, and helplessness." Id. at 49. This second form of innocence is a defense
against responsibility. Id. at 63-64. To May, pseudoinnocence is a profound problem in
American culture. Id. at 50, 56-57. To emphasize this form of innocence may be to
discourage crime victims from taking responsibility for their experiences and lives and to
encourage them to engage in ultimately self-defeating attitudes of helplessness,
powerlessness, denial, or repression.
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from the experience, thereby blocking successful resolution of
the crisis. 1
3
Victims frequently encounter social isolation and an invalida-
tion of their efforts to come to terms with their experience, while
at the same time confronting the existential isolation presented
by the reality of death. 139  Experiencing a violent crime-con-
fronting one's own death-powerfully reminds the individual
that he or she is alone. Although others may commiserate or em-
pathize, they cannot negate the reality of the event.140  But
friends, relatives, and others can help a victim to escape the
dread of isolation. Simply because victims are isolated at one
level does not mean that relationships with others are not funda-
mentally important for them. Indeed, it may be just the opposite:
A sense of relatedness-of belonging to a larger community, of
still being-may be essential to recovery. 1 4 1 As Buber observed,
"[a] great relationship breaches the barriers of a lofty solitude,
subdues its strict law, and throws a bridge from self-being across
the abyss of dread of the universe."'' 42 The inability of friends
and relatives of victims to confront the issues raised by victimiza-
tion-either by "blaming the victim,"'t4 3 minimizing the event, 
44
138. If the victim becomes a sterotype, an "it," to other people, the potential for
relationship is negated; the victim becomes objectified and relationship of the kind that
mitigates isolation is precluded.
139. See l. YALOM, supra note 90, at 353.
140. Id at 356. It may be the common wisdom that "the one thing that victims of
crime would cherish most: to somehow wipe out the moment when assailant and victim
came together;, to turn back the clock 10 seconds before the crime and allow the victim
to walk away .... ." Greene, A Vwlent Stranger Becomes a Lifelong Companion, San Jose
Mercury News, May 7, 1984, at 14B, col. 3. But ultimately victims cannot be free from
the assault until they acknowledge that it happened.
141. "Being" is both internally and externally defined. J.P. SARTRE, supra note 130,
at 303. Even the hermit, who eschews human contact, relates to his environment and
thereby realizes his existence.
142. M. BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND lMAN 11 (1965).
143. See generally W. RYAN, supra note 136 (describing American proclivity for blam-
ing victims for their misfortunes). Blaming victims may serve a protective function for
others: If one can perceive a difference between a victim and oneself, it may be possible
to maintain one's own illusion of invulnerability. A concrete example of this phenome-
non appears in the book The Onion Field, which chronicles the kidnapping of two police
officers, one of whom was murdered. The victims were blamed officially and indirectly
for their fate. J. WAMBAUGH, THE ONION FIEU 235-41, 368-72 (1973).
144. In a perhaps misguided effort to console a person who has been victimized,
friends or relatives frequently make such remarks as "it could have been worse," ".at
least you're alive," "at least they caught the guy," or "its over with; you're safe now."
These statements are less than comforting when one realizes the nature of severe
trauma. See Coates & Winston, Counteracting the Deviance of Depression: Peer Support Groups
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or by withdrawing from the victim's distress145 -may deprive the
victim of the reassurance of relationship to others. Frequently,
like Job's comforters, we are not content simply to console or to
provide victims with the connection to others that they need.
Rather, we tell the victim what the victim should feel or think, or
we blame the victim for his or her plight. In part, nonvictims
tend to blame victims, misunderstand the particular experience
of victims, and expect victims to return to their "old selves"
quickly in order to protect themselves from perceived threats to
their own sense of invulnerability. 146 Even if members of the vic-
tim's family or community are initially responsive and supportive,
tolerance for a victim's feelings of loss, anger, fear, or meaning-
lessness is likely to wane long before the victim has time to begin
to integrate the experience.147
Answers to the questions of death, meaning, responsibility,
and isolation vary from individual to individual, just as behavioral
and psychological manifestations of these existential issues differ
from victim to victim.148 And these questions do not follow each
other in the orderly way in which this discussion has presented
them. They merge, overlap, and differ in saliency at particular
times. The issues of victimization seldom manifest themselves
clearly as "death anxiety" or crisis of meaning: Anger, fear, frus-
tration, loss, grief, confusion, and guilt are feelings that may re-
late to or mask these issues, and the underlying issues may take
years to express or understand.
B. The Implications of the Theory
Common assumptions about crime victims-that they are all
"outraged" and want revenge and tougher law enforcement-
for Victims, 39 J. Soc. ISSUES 169, 174-75 (1983) (summary of studies of reactions of
nonvictims to victims).
145. Id. Our culture places a great emphasis on "happiness" and the absence of
distress. Seeing another's distress makes us uncomfortable, so we often withdraw
contact.
146. See notes 108-109 supra and accompanying text.
147. Coates & Winston, supra note 144, at 175 ("It would appear, then, that when
victims fail to quickly 'snap out of it,' others try to enforce standards indicating they
should do so.").
148. Given the profound nature of the experiences of victims, it would be foolish
to say that there is one "right" way to cope with the experience. Although some gener-
alizations about the effect of extreme trauma on individuals are possible, the resolution
of the crisis depends on an infinite number of external and internal variables influencing
the individual. Moreover, as Bettelheim observes, "[a] survivor has every right to
choose his very own way of trying to cope." B. BErrELHEIM, supra note 90, at 37.
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underlie much of the current victim's rights rhetoric. 149 But in
light of the existing psychological evidence, these assumptions
fail to address the experience and real needs of past victims. The
theoretical outline just presented speaks to the experience of be-
ing a past victim; the prospect of becoming a past victim as the
concern of society is evidenced by the concern for future victims.
In this way, violent crime touches all of us with the reality of the
unpredictable, the threat of death, the dilemma of meaning, the
responsibility for choice, and the reality of isolation. To the ex-
tent that we examine these issues of our own accord-to the ex-
tent that resolution comes through more voluntary reflection and
experience-the concern for future victims is very different than
that for past victims. For future victims, we can seek to prevent
the experience, but for past victims, the experience is already a
reality. For past victims, we can only seek to avoid interfering
with or denying the individual victim's efforts to resolve these
questions.
While questions of existence rarely manifest themselves in a
pure, abstract form, the issues are nevertheless unavoidably pres-
ent for all victims at some level. Past victimization catapults indi-
viduals beyond what nonvictims or future victims can know; the
ontological rules change. What is "good" for future victims-the
prevention of harm, the diminution of evil-is no longer applica-
ble to past victims, who, for at least an instant, have seen the
abyss. The rape victim who becomes hysterical soon after police
arrive provides an illustration of this tension: Hysteria may be a
necessary release of tension and an affirmation of being for
someone who has just seen the prospect of nonbeing. 150 But in
the interests of future victims-apprehension of the culprit
before he creates more damage and punishment of the guilty-
the police necessarily seek rationality, information, and evidence.
A victim's contact with the criminal justice system may hinder
him or her from coming to grips with death, meaning, responsi-
149. See notes 70-71 supra, 266-267 infra and accompanying texts.
150. Ironically, the hysterical reaction is the one most likely to give the victim cred-
ibility in the eyes of the police. Although a lack of a perceptible response or affect is not
unusual, it may lead the police to believe no crime occurred. See Berger, supra note 68,
at 23-24 & n.150; see also Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 89, at 982 (discussing two
forms of immediate emotional response to rape: one, "the expressed style, in which
feelings of fear, anger, and anxiety were shown through such behavior as crying, sob-
bing, smiling, restlessness, and tenseness"; the other, "the controlled style, in which
feelings were masked or hidden and a calm, composed, or subdued affect was seen").
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bility, and isolation in innumerable ways. The criminal justice
system provides a ready set of opportunities for blame and de-
nial, proceeds on the basis of mistaken normative assumptions
about victims, and emphasizes rationality-or the appearance of
it.15' To be of value to past victims of core crimes, victim's rights
proposals ideally ought to assist, rather than interfere with, the
victim's resolution of the experience. The remainder of this arti-
cle examines the meaning of victim's rights proposals in light of
both traditional legal thinking and the existential nature of vic-
timization. Of course, the criminal justice system cannot ulti-
mately answer the individual's questions of death, meaning, and
responsibility because its focus is on the event itself; its concern
is with the narrower issues of identifying the offender and deter-
mining legal responsibility. But insofar as the isolation of past
victims is concerned, the criminal justice system may provide a
social context in which some meaningful "connection" for the
victim exists. Whether or not "victim's rights" provides this con-
nection will be a central part of the remaining inquiry.
III. A COMPOSITE OF VICTIM'S RIGHTS PROPOSALS
One persistent image of the American criminal process is that
it "revictimizes" the victim. The President's Task Force Final Re-
port, 52 for example, portrays the ill-treatment of crime victims in
a particularly apocryphal story. The Final Report describes the in-
sensitive treatment of a widowed 50-year-old rape victim by the
police and hospital personnel. It then details the numerous
abuses that the criminal justice system inflicted upon the victim,
including an indifferent and ineffective attempt at preventing
threatening phone calls to the victim by her attacker from jail, an
inconvenient scheduling of line-ups, unethical activities by de-
151. One study of assault and robbery victims in Brooklyn and Newark found that
the motivations of victims differed from the goals of the criminal process and that vic-
tims were often dissatisfied with the performance of prosecutors, judges, and police. R.
ELIAS, supra note 72, at 83-140. Twenty percent of those surveyed had negative feelings
toward the "system" that manifested a transfer of blame. Typical comments included:
"'The law doesn't protect the citizen,'" and "'I'm frustrated. I won't deal with
the . . . system anymore. Next time I'll just kill him and when they take me to court I'm
going to tell the judge that I want the same treatment as this guy god' " Id. at 134.
Although many of the victims surveyed saw a need for better law enforcement or stricter
sentencing, 26% had no suggestion for improving the situation for future crime victims
because they were apparently satisfied with the way in which their cases were handled.
Id. at 135.
152. TASK FORCE, supra note 71.
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fense counsel, repeated failures by the prosecutor to inform the
victim about her role in hearings and the trial and to promptly
notify her about postponements, the emotional and financial bur-
den of delays in the process on the victim, the enormous pres-
sure and humiliation of testifying, and the short sentence that
was eventually imposed on the rapist. 15
3
The scenario presented in the Final Report is indeed horrify-
ing. It is also somewhat incredible to anyone acquainted with
criminal law practice, and it is insulting to judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and law enforcement officers. It is a compos-
ite of everything that could go wrong in the process, rather than
a chronicle of an actual case.1 - 4 Yet the scenario presented in the
Final Report, and other horror stories like it, have led to numer-
ous victim's rights proposals that purport to remedy the situa-
tion.'55 These proposals typically contain one or more of the
following elements:
(a) that the suspect remain in custody after arrest;' 56
(b) that few, if any, delays exist between arrest and prelimi-
nary hearing, and between hearing and trial;'5 7
(c) that plea bargaining either be eliminated or be victim-
determined;15 8
(d) that there be minimal, if any, cross-examination of vic-
tims by defense counsel;' 5 9
(e) that exclusionary rules be abandoned; 60
153. Id. at 3-13.
154. The President's Task Force admits as much: "Based on the testimony of...
victims, we have drawn a composite of a victim of crime in America today." Id. at 3. It
nonetheless asserts, however, that the composite victim "is every victim." Id.
155. Senator Edward Kennedy heard "horror stories of murder, rape and torture"
from witnesses advocating the abolition of parole in a hearing before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, for example. See Crime Victims' Agony, San Francisco Chron., May 24,
1983, at 8, col. 1. One seldom hears from victims for whom the system has "worked."
But see Silverberg, My Mugging: Justice Is Done, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 13 (arguing
that the press may have overemphasized those instances where malfunctions in the crim-
inal justice system have occurred).
156. See, e.g., WIs. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1981); TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 22.
157. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 57-68, 75-76.
158. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 1983); R. REIFF, supra note 25, at
114-17; TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 65-66; Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargain-
mng: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 90-92.
159. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 21 (recommending that victims not be
required to appear at preliminary proceedings and that hearsay testimony of police or
other law enforcement officers be admissible instead).
160. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 24 (fourth
amendment exclusionary rule only); see also CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY COMM.
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSrION 8, at 9-10, 14-17 (1982).
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(f) that victims be allowed to participate in sentencing;"'
(g) that victims receive full restitution. 162
This composite portrays an "ideal" criminal process, one that
more closely resembles a model produced by crime control ideol-
ogy than by supporters of a program designed to spare victims
unnecessary trauma.' 63 Nevertheless, it may be that these pro-
posals do in fact benefit past victims. The composite victim's
rights proposal just presented has two components: One in-
volves the process leading up to conviction, and the other in-
volves the process of imposing sanctions. Part IV addresses the
relationship of the pre-conviction component to the psychologi-
cal effects of crime on victims; Part V makes a similar inquiry with
regard to the sentencing component.
IV. PRECONVICTION CHANGES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS OF THE VICTIM
A. Denial of Bail and Preventive Detention Statutes
Although the eighth amendment's prohibition against exces-
sive bail would seem to preclude pretrial incarceration of individ-
uals who can pay bail, 164 the Supreme Court has declined to
apply the provision to the states or to address the issue of "pre-
ventive detention" of adults.1 65 "Preventive detention" is the im-
161. See, e.g., note 233 infra.
162. See, e.g., notes 315-317 infra.
163. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 305-06 app., 651 P.2d 274, 319 app.,
186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 75 app. (1982) (reprinting ballot statements); Victim Rights Bill Fuels
Get-Tough Stand, 68 A.B.A. J. 530, 530 (1982) ("George Nicholson, a candidate for Cali-
fornia attorney general and a member of a five-man committee pushing the initiative,
said the move is an effort to counteract liberal decisions by the California Supreme
Court.").
164. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether preven-
tive detention statutes violate the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478 (1982) (vacated as moot); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bai"
Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1982) (arguing that the historical meaning
and development of a right to bail and the intent of the Framers precludes the use of
preventive detention).
165. See note 164 supra. The Court did seem to approve preventive detention of
juvenile offenders last term. See Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). No suggestion
of incorporating eighth amendment concerns appears in the opinion; however, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, may have indicated a broader interest in preventive
detention by emphasizing the existence of a " 'legitimate and compelling state interest'
in protecting the community from crime" while, at the same time, stating that "the harm
to society may even be greater. . . given the high rate of recidivism among juveniles."
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prisonment of a person before a formal determination of criminal
culpability based on an assumption that the individual is guilty,
dangerous, and should be removed from society. 166 Conserva-
tives have supported preventive detention statutes since the
Nixon era, and preventive detention can be viewed as part of the
conservative support of the crime control model. 167
Although preventive detention has slowly gained acceptance
in the law, first in the area of civil commitment,168 then by means
of a specific statute adopted in the District of Columbia,169 the
rate of its acceptance has quickened because of the emergence of
"victim's rights." By using both "past victim" and "future vic-
tim" rationales, conservatives have made substantial progress in
formally legitimizing preventive detention. 70 Both rationales fo-
ld at 2410 (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)). The majority also
concluded that detention of juveniles in a juvenile facility is not "punishment," id. at
2414, a conclusion sharply disputed by the dissenters, id. at 2429 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
166. Thesejustifications are characteristic of crime control ideology, see H. PACKER,
supra note 47, at 210-14, and of conservative ideology as well, see, e.g., Borman, The
Selling of Preventive Detention, 1970, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 879, 881-84, 926-28 (1971); Mitch-
ell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969).
167. See Mitchell, supra note 166 (Nixon's Attorney GeneralJohn Mitchell arguing
in favor of preventive detention); The Case for Pretrial Detention, address by Kleindienst,
ALTA Midwinter Meeting (Jan. 30, 1970), reprinted in Preventive Detention: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
1187, 1190 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Preventive Detention Hearings] ("We in the Depart-
ment ofJustice believe that pretrial detention is essential to any serious effort to reduce
crime in the District of Columbia").
168. For example, the argument of then-Attorney General John Mitchell in sup-
port of preventive detention rested in part on an analogy to civil commitment of the
mentally ill. See Mitchell, supra note 166, at 1233-34, 1241. The analogy is not entirely
appropriate, however, because civil commitment is based on a treatment model rather
than a punitive model. Moreover, subsequent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court and other courts have required the state to prove, by at least clear and convincing
evidence, dangerousness as a result of mental illness. Compare Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979) (clear and convincing evidence required in civil commitment proceed-
ings), with Estate of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1979) (proof
beyond a reasonable doubt required for civil commitment). In O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court indicated that civil commitment of the mentally
ill without treatment might violate the due process clause. Id. at 577. Thus, a purely
preventive detention rationale, even in the context of civil commitment, might not pass
constitutional scrutiny.
169. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (Supp. 1982). The statute provides that defend-
ants accused of crimes of violence can be detained for 90 days if the prosecution certifies
that the detention will "protect the community" or if the defendant has been convicted
of a violent crime within ten years of the current offense charged. Id
170. Past victims who were victimized by someone released on bail are a perfect
symbol of what can happen to the innocent public and are therefore used to raise fears
of future victimization. The fact that some innocent people become victims of persons
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cus on fear: the fear experienced by the past victim that results
from his victimization and the more generalized public fear of
being a future victim. In response to both fears, several states
have passed preventive detention statutes. 17  Congress, having
already approved preventive detention in the District of Colum-
bia, enacted a bill in 1984 that would make the nature of the
charge presumptive evidence that a defendant should be de-
tained in all federal criminal proceedings. 72
1. The use of a "'past victim" rationale.
Supporters of preventive detention have emphasized the fact
that some offenders have threatened or harassed their victims to
discourage prosecution.1 7 3 Three immediate criticisms of this ra-
tionale exist: First, because some defendents threaten victims
does not necessarily justify incarcerating all defendents. Second,
little reliable data on the incidence of victim harassment pres-
ently exist.' 74 Finally, incarcerating the accused does nothing to
released either on bail or on their own recognizance has provided ample symbolic sup-
port for pretrial detention. See TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 22-23.
The Justice Department recently concluded that approximately 16% of offenders
released on bail were rearrested for another offense while they were out ofjail. NAT'L
INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF
PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES (1981). The study does not indicate what type of offenses
resulted in the rearrest of persons on bail, nor does the percentage seem significant as a
raw figure. A 1970 study by the National Bureau of Standards showed that 11% of
defendants released before trial in the District of Columbia were rearrested for subse-
quent offenses, 25%o of those charged with "dangerous" crimes were rearrested for a
second misdemeanor or felony, and 17% of those defendants charged with "violent"
crimes who were released were rearrested for a subsequent felony or misdemeanor.
Borman, supra note 166, at 898-99. Thus, it may not be true that most innocent victims
are victimized by persons who are out of custody awaiting adjudication of serious
charges. But statistics do not respond to the emotions of fear and loathing that are
raised when a person released on bail is subsequently rearrested for a serious offense.
171. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 8(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1 (1980).
172. Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 203, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1985)).
173. See, e.g., G. DEUKMEJIAN, OFJUDGES, JUSTICE, AND CRIME VICTIMS 7-8 (1980);
Graham, Lecture: Witness Intimidation, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 238, 239 (1984) ("[w]itness
intimidation is an extremely serious obstacle in the quest for law and order that is only now
receiving the attention which it deserves") (emphasis added). Cf. TASK FORCE, supra
note 71, at 19 (asserting that "threats and actual retaliation are not uncommon" injusti-
fying proposal that addresses of witnesses not be available to defense absent "a clear
need"). Ironically, intimidation of victims and witnesses was not an issue in the debates
over the enactment of the District of Columbia preventive detention statute. See Preven-
tive Detention, supra note 167.
174. The President's Task Force asserts that "many victims and witnesses are
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prevent his friends or relatives from harassing the victim.
The most important indictment of the harassment rationale
for preventive detention, however, is that it relies on a misappre-
hension of the fear reaction of victims. Even if the defendant is
in jail, the victim may still not feel "safe."' 17 5 Fear reactions to
violent crime can generalize far beyond what the law can address:
The fear reaction, based on existential terror of death, is very
real to the victim, who is likely to be acutely sensitive to possible
danger and may perceive a threat even where no threat exists.
While locking up the accused may eradicate a specific fear, albeit
an often rational one, it does not alleviate the larger existential
fear reaction to victimization.1 76 Although victim harrassment
cannot be ignored when it exists, it hardly serves as ajustification
for wholesale use of preventive detention.
The second argument offered in favor of preventive detention
that uses past victims is that by permitting defendants to be re-
leased on bail, the criminal justice system leaves the victim won-
dering whether there is "any justice in the world." 177 "Justice"
in this context presumably means that the victim should be enti-
tled to have the accused incarcerated without any formal adjudi-
threatened or intimidated by defendants and others," TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 61,
but this conclusion is based on a carefully selected and impressionistic sample. By con-
trast, a careful study of crime victim compensation programs in Brooklyn, New York,
and Newark, New Jersey, found that a total of 30% of the victims participating in the
study had been threatened. However, only 19% had been threatened "sometime" after
the crime had occurred; 11% were threatened at the crime scene. Moreover, 70% of the
victims said that "they had never been threatened." R. ELIAS, supra note 72, at 99
(1983).
George Deukmejian relied on a study by the ABA Commission on Victims that
found "nearly" one-third of all noncooperating witnesses "cited fear of reprisal as the
reason for noncooperation" to justify his conclusion that victim intimidation seriously
impedes law enforcement and prosecution. G. DEUKMEJIAN, supra note 173, at 7-8.
Deukmejian's failure to distinguish between victims and witnesses-the latter category
being broader than the former-weakens his argument. Moreover, other studies contra-
dict the ABA study. For example, Robert Elias found that the release on bail of an
assault or robbery defendant had little influence on whether victims pursued their cases
in court. See R. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 106 (81% of respondents said release had no
effect at all, and 18% said release had an effect; of those affected, about half said release
made them fearful, and about a quarter said it made them angry). Cf W. SPELMEN & D.
BROWN, CALLING THE POLICE: CrrIZEN REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME 181-82 (1981)
(while delay in reporting crimes is largely attributed to inconvenience, fear of reprisal,
and embarrassment and culpability, authors argue that "[o]ffenders do not retaliate
against victims and witnesses very often").
175. See notes 112-116 supra and accompanying text.
176. See note 109 supra.
177. See note 182 infra.
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cation of guilt. Such an egocentric demand might be a normal
reaction for the individual, but personal frustration with the pro-
cess of condemnation and punishment does not justify punish-
ment before guilt is established: Imposition of the criminal
sanction is largely a public response to crime, rather than an ex-
clusively private one. 178 Although proponents of pretrial incar-
ceration do not argue that preconviction punishment is a
legitimate function of the criminal law, they assert that imprison-
ment prior to a guilt determination is not "punishment."'' 79 The-
oretically, this may be true, but practically there is little
difference. Indeed, the distinction between preventive detention
and punishment has become infinitesimal, because most existing
preventive detention statutes authorize detention upon a pre-
sumption of guilt or prior determinations of guilt.'8 0
2. The use of a 'future victim" rationale.
A final rationale in support of pretrial incarceration is that it is
necessary to protect future victims. Under this "public safety"
rationale, '8 ' past victims are relevant to demonstrate the need for
178. See notes 319-324 infra.
179. The House Report on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 states
that pretrial detention does not violate due process nor does it constitute punishment,
because preventive detention "is not intended to promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment such as retribution or deterrence." H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
8-9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 473. Former Attorney GeneralJohn
Mitchell's article in support of preventive detention never discusses the precise issue of
punishment and only gives passing notice to the related problem of the "presumption of
innocence." Mitchell, supra note 166, at 1231-32. But see Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 378-80, 394-96 (1970)
(arguing that preventive detention is unavoidably a form of punishment because it relies
on determinations of moral culpability).
180. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. I, 98 Stat. 1979-1980 (1984) (pretrial
detention includes consideration of nature of offense, prior convictions, and evidence
against accused); CAL. CONsT. art I, § 12 (bail may be denied in felony cases where facts
are evident or the presumption great and clear evidence exists that the accused is likely
to cause great bodily harm to others if released); MIcH. CONST. art. I, § 15 (where proof
is "evident," bail may be denied if a violent felony has occurred and accused has prior
convictions for violent felonies, or if a particular felony, such as robbery, was
committed).
181. Public safety has been the predominant justification for preventive detention
statutes. The preventive detention portion of the Victim's Bill of Rights adopted by
initiative in California bore the headings "Public Safety Bail." Brosnahan v. Brown, 32
Cal. 3d 236, 300 app., 651 P.2d 274, 314 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 70 app. (1982). Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984), a juvenile preventive
detention case, emphasizes the legitimacy of a governmental interest in public safety as a
justification for pretrial detention ofjuveniles.
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preventive detention only if they were victimized by a person who
had been released from custody pending trial.1 2
Preventive detention denies free will or choice and rests on a
deterministic, wicked person theory of crime.8 3 The accused be-
come "criminals," and as such, they may be removed from soci-
ety for society's protection. The transformation of human beings
into criminals justifies incarcerating them whether or not they
have formally been found guilty of an offense.184 Moreover, if
arrest is taken as sufficient evidence of guilt, the question of pun-
ishing the innocent never arises under this rationale.18 5
182. See TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 22-23 ("Victims of violent crime have ex-
pressed with outrage and indignation their dissatisfaction with bail laws . . . . Victims
who have been robbed or raped, and the families of those murdered by persons who
were released on bail while facing serious charges and possessing a prior record of vio-
lence, simply cannot understand why these persons were free to harm them."). Elias
found that, although the vast majority of victims in his study were opposed to granting
bail, the opposition in part was because of confusion about pretrial detention: "Many
seemed to think that pretrial detention was part of the defendant's punishment for com-
mitting the crime, and that by being released, he was 'getting offP from his crime." R.
ELIAS, supra note 72, at 105.
183. This characterization is Kelman's. Kelman, supra note 28, at 216. The Presi-
dent's Task Force embraces this theory: "In deciding issues of bail, the court must ...
balance the defendant's interest in remaining free on a charge of which he is presumed
innocent with the reality that many defendants have proven, by their conviction records, that they
have committed and are likely to commit crimes while at large." TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at
23 (emphasis added).
Despite the Supreme Court's recent acceptance of the notion that psychiatrists can
predict future dangerousness for the purposes of imposing the death penalty, the ability
of anyone to predict future dangerousness with much accuracy is questionable. Compare
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (psychiatric testimony that capital defendant is
likely to commit future dangerous acts if not executed is admissible in penalty phase of
capital trials), with id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (there is no evidence that psychia-
trists can accurately assess future dangerousness; use of such expert testimony in pen-
alty phase is unjustifiably prejudicial to defendants). See also Slobogin, Dangerousness and
Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 109-27 (1984) (clinical and actuarial predictions of dan-
gerousness, while more accurate than random decisions, produce a significant number
of false predictions of serious assaultive behavior); Wilson, Dealing With the High-Rate
Offender, 72 THE PUB. INTEREST 52, 61-63 (1983) (the nature of the present offense and
prior record are not accurate predictors of who is a high-rate offender; factors that do
identify likelihood of person being especially dangerous may lead to substantial errors
when applied to a specific individual).
184. For example, the President's Task Force characterizes the eighth amendment
right to bail as a mere "interest" in remaining free. TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 23.
The transformation of a constitutional right into an interest may be justified because
constitutional rights only attach to "us." Since the accused is seen as a "criminal," not
as a human being, it is relatively easy to treat him differently. Negative labels have long
served the purpose ofjustifying atrocities against others: "Gook," "Nigger," and "dirty
Jew," all have taken their place as labels inescapably linked to atrocity.
185. H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 162-63.
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Preventive detention does encourage efficiency and expedi-
ency in the criminal justice system, a central goal of the crime
control model. In-custody defendants are pressured, directly or
indirectly, to plead guilty to the crimes with which they are
charged. If they are locked up in an overcrowded, vermin-in-
fested, stuffy, dark, and dangerous jail, they may be motivated
primarily by a desire for release, and will be much more amena-
ble to a plea or a "deal."'' 8 6 Moreover, in-custody defendants
frequently are at a disadvantage in developing factual defenses,
and may even be subjected to theoretically impermissible, yet all
too real, pressures from law enforcement officials to confess or to
provide information.18 7 In contrast, a defendant released on bail
may not be as eager to proceed to trial or to plead guilty.
No convincing demonstration exists that preventive detention
statutes will result in victims being harassed less frequently.
Moreover, although proponents of these statutes invoke the sym-
bol of the past victim in their campaigns to get the statutes en-
acted, the statutes do little to assist past victims in resolving the
psychological crisis of victimization. Thus, the proponents of the
crime control model have exploited the past victim to further
their agenda.
B. Rapid Processing
A second major victim's rights proposal gives victims a
"right" to a speedy trial by giving them a right to oppose contin-
uances.18 8  Victim's rights advocates frequently blame defense
lawyers for obtaining continuances that unduly prolong the ag-
186. In 1978, Charles Silberman observed that "a jail sentence constitutes far
more severe punishment than comparable time in prison" because of the terrible con-
ditons in many localjails. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 29, at 351-52. In my experience as a
public defender, clients often preferred "the joint" to the Santa Clara County main jail,
and would plead even if it meant a prison term. Conditions at the jail were seen to be
worse than conditions in the California prison system at that time. This may not hold
true today as prison populations increase, and it may not be true in all jurisdictions, but
the fact remains that many jails are so dreadful that defendants will be anxious to get out
as quickly as possible.
187. In several cases, I had clients who were questioned by police officers while
they were in custody, despite the fact that the officers knew they were represented by the
Public Defender's Office. In one juvenile case, for example, I explicitly informed the
investigating officer that my client did not wish to talk to him, only to find the officer
attempting to interview my client in the detention facility a day or two later. In another
case, an investigating officer persisted in asking an adult client about an offense, despite
the fact that I had told the officer the client was represented by the Public Defender.
188. TAsK FORCE, supra note 71, at 63, 67-68, 75-76.
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ony of the crime victim by rendering it impossible for victims "to
put their experience behind them."'' 9 Proponents of the crime
control model view so-called stalling tactics of defense attorneys
to be an overwhelming block to both efficiency and swift and sure
punishment, two hallmarks of this model.
While defense abuse of continuances occurs, the develop-
ment of both the prosecution and the defense in a serious case
can, and does, take time.' 90 Investigation, forensic tests, inter-
views, and visits to crime scenes, among other things, are often
time-consuming.' And in many cases, motions must be
researched, prepared, and argued. Although many of those ac-
cused of a crime turn out to be guilty, investigation and prepara-
tion in even the most seemingly impossible cases occasionally do
demonstrate that the accused is in fact innocent.19 2 Moreover,
189. Id. at 67-68, 75-76, 99.
190. In the book Helter Skelter, for example, the prosecutor admits that had Charles
Manson insisted on his statutory right to a speedy trial after his indictment on multiple
murder charges, the prosecution would have been "in deep trouble" because it did not
yet have sufficient evidence to convict Manson at trial. V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY,
HELTER SKELTER 279 (1975).
191. Some rapid process advocates argue that Anglo-American criminal law causes
artificiality in guilt determinations and that an "inquisitorial" model would "cure" the
problem of delay. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES (1983);J. LANOBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977). This
is an inaccurate assumption, however. Under continental systems, preparation and in-
vestigation are also subject to the constraints of time.
192. As Packer suggests, the presumption of innocence is honored more in the
breach; the criminal process actually operates on an assumption of guilt. H. PACKER,
supra note 47, at 160, 239. As a result, the rush to judgment can result in erroneous
conviction and imprisonment of the innocent before an error is discovered or admitted.
For example, Lenell Geter, a black engineer tried and convicted of armed robbery, was
sentenced to life in prison in Texas, despite the fact that he had no record and several of
his co-workers had insisted to the prosecutor that Geter was at work at the time of the
robbery. Geter served 14 months in a Texas prison before the efforts of his supervisor,
co-workers, and others induced the District Attorney to acknowledge his error; the ap-
prehension of another suspect probably also helped to convince the prosecutor. See
Applebome, Wedding on Again After Mistaken Life Sentence, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, at
A14, col. 1.
In Seattle, a man was tried and convicted for a rape he insisted he had not commit-
ted. The man contacted a reporter for assistance in proving his innocence, and eventu-
ally, the police arrested another suspect who confessed. The reporter won a Pulitzer
Prize for his investigative work; the innocent man lost his job and his reputation as a
result of the conviction. See Curry, The Wrong Man, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 23, 1983
(Sunday Punch), at 2, col. 2; see also Jones, Drifter's Lies Lead to Nightmare for 2 Innocent
Black Men, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 16, 1983, at A15, col. 1 (drifter lied to police
about having been robbed by two blacks, one of whom was then convicted of robbery;
drifter admitted lying before sentencing). Mandell,Justice System Goes Astray: Victim Loses
975
STANFORD LA W REVIEW [Vol. 37:937
rushing to a judgment because of a presumption of guilt serves
neither the victim nor society, particularly if the real culprit re-
mains at large.193
Victims are likely to want a psychological "resolution" of the
matter, but this kind of resolution does not ultimately depend on
the outcome of the criminal case. It is simplistic to assert that the
rituals of condemnation will erase so profound an experience for
an individual. Continuances and delays may cause a victim to re-
live the event, but a victim is likely to relive portions of the event
whether or not there is a delay.194 Issues raised by victimization
do not resolve themselves quickly: A reintegration and under-
standing of such questions as mortality, meaning, and responsi-
bility take time. Therefore, delay may be of great benefit to a
victim's psychological state, 9 5 and time is necessary to heal the
psychic wounds created by victimization. Only for those victims
who completely deny or repress their experience is a delay likely
to be traumatizing, because in having to recover the experience,
Job, Self-Respect, San Francisco Chron., June 24, 1984, at A2, col. 1 (charges against a
woman accused of embezzling $50,000 were dropped after persistent efforts by defense
lawyers and reporter to point out numerous defects in investigation leading to the
charges).
193. In one well-publicized case involving numerous rapes of women in their
homes in Columbus, Ohio, an innocent man was convicted for two rapes and served five
years in prison, while the real culprit remained at large and continued to attack women
until police noted the similarities in the incidents and apprehended the guilty person.
See Doctor Guilty in Rapes of 21 Ohio Women, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 23, 1983, at 25,
col. 1.
194. The President's Task Force asserts that "[v]ictims. . .are burdened by irres-
olution and the realization that they will be called upon to relieve [sic] their victimization
when the case is finally tried. The healing process cannot truly begin until the case can
be put behind them." TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 75. This assertion simply is not
supported by existing psychological evidence: The healing process begins immediately
after a traumatic experience, although it may easily be interfered with if the victim re-
ceives improper signals from others. See notes 144-220 supra and accompanying text.
Moreover, re-experiencing the event is itself part of the healing process. In re-exper-
iencing the event, the victim can gain perspective andl control over the experience.
195. It is, of course, not beneficial for victims to arrive at the courthouse only to
learn that their matter has been continued to a later time. This problem, however, exists
more because of miscalculations, problems of coordination, and poor communication
than because of fundamental defects in the process. It can be controlled by allowing the
victim-witnesses to be "on-call," see, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 68, or by an effort
on the part of prosecutors to make sure that the victim-witness is aware of possible de-
lays. An explanation of structural problems such as the availability of courtrooms, the
need for preparation, and the nature of the procedural steps that need to be taken is
more likely to be of benefit to victims than is rushing the case through the system with-
out regard for preparation by either side or for the victim's psychological state.
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they will be without defenses or understanding. 196
Sometimes a delay enables victims to be better prepared for
the evidence that will be introduced at trial. In one case, for ex-
ample, a prominent athlete was savagely murdered and dumped
in an abandoned house. The police found drugs and evidence of
a sexual assault at the scene. Many people, including the victim's
father, were unaware that the victim had used drugs, had been
bisexual, and had frequented very rough homosexual bars. The
horror of learning of his son's hidden life, which police believe
had a role in the son's gruesome end, was as hard a blow to the
father as was the loss of his only son. Many of the victim's friends
were also shocked by the information. The police arrested two
suspects, but a writ filed by their attorneys caused a substantial
delay in the case. Nevertheless, the delay helped the victim's fa-
ther and friends recover from their shock. During the delay, they
had accepted the reality of the victim's flaws as well as his truly
great characteristics. If the defense were to pursue "drug-crazed
homosexual panic" as the reason for the homicide, the prosecu-
tion and its witnesses would be able to withstand the accusations
against the victim, and indeed, anticipate and disarm the poten-
tially prejudicial effect of this information on the jury. It would
not be easy for any of the witnesses or for the victim's father, but
it would certainly be better for them than if the trial had pro-
ceeded rapidly.
Endless delays and confusion can harm victims, but rushing
towards a conclusion can be equally harmful. Temporal distance
from the event is important to healing, and treating the victim
with respect may ultimately benefit the victim more than rapid
process.
C. Restrictions on Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining serves a number of pragmatic and instrumen-
tal purposes.1 97 In fact, guilty pleas constitute the major propor-
196. Cf Sales, Baum & Shore, supra note 98, at 130 (study found rapid return to
normal behavior followed by increase in symptoms; further research necessary to clarify
significance); Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 89, at 985 (victims who had not reported
previous molestation or assault and who were subsequently raped had not processed
earlier trauma).
197. There are three general types of pleas bargains: a plea to some charges in
return for the dismissal of others; a plea to a lesser included offense in exchange for
dismissal of more serious charges, with a corresponding reduction in penalty; or a plea
to charges with some sentencing considerations.
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tion of convictions in the United States.1" 8 Plea bargaining can
have a "salutory" effect for the prosecution in some instances, as
when a minor participant in a crime pleads to lesser charges and
testifies against his coparticipants, or has the charges dismissed
in exchange for truthful testimony against more culpable defend-
ants.1 99 It also permits a degree of flexibility in cases where the
application of a rule would produce an unduly harsh result.200
Many crime control advocates and others view plea bargain-
ing in its current form as a nefarious practice that routinely
places muggers and rapists back on the streets to terrorize soci-
ety.20 1 This view of plea bargaining produced a provision in the
198. As high as 90% of the convictions in the United States may be the result of
guilty pleas, a great number of which are undoubtedly the result of plea bargaining. See
S. KADisH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 60, at 154-55 (1983) (empirical
studies show a wide range of guilty plea rates; in one study, New York had a 92.7% rate,
while Pennsylvania only had a 65.5% rate); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1222 (5th ed. 1980) (quoting ChiefJustice Burger's estimate that
approximately 90% of defendants plead guilty);JuDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983
ANNUAL REPORT, 120-21 (1983) (in 1981-1982, 78% of the felony cases filed in Califor-
nia superior courts, other than in Los Angeles County, were disposed of by guilty plea;
Los Angeles had a ratio of 82%); see also H. ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMEN-r 34
(1982). But see Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1037 (1984)
(arguing that Philadelphia courts have largely and successfully abolished plea bargaining
as chief method of disposition of cases).
199. For example, the prosecution offered immunity from prosecution to Linda
Kasabian, an accomplice in the murders of seven people, if she agreed to testify truth-
fully against Charles Manson at trial. See V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, supra note 190, at
342.
200. A prosecutor in Santa Clara County related the following case that he had
been assigned for trial: A mentally ill, but not legally insane, man who lived in his car
apparently was hungry and decided to steal some food to eat. His solution was to enter
a house at night, and "walk past the stereo, the television, and the cameras" to the
kitchen. He opened the refrigerator and took "ajar of Skippy peanut butter and a loaf
of Buttertop bread" and left. The police found him not long afterwards in his car; dur-
ing the search they found a jar of crunchy Skippy peanut butter and a partial loaf of
buttertop bread. The defendant admitted that he had taken them. Although the deputy
district attorney assigned to try the case felt that he would have problems proving ex-
actly whose peanut butter and bread the defendant had, he was more troubled by the
fact that a strict interpretation of case law and the California Penal Code made this of-
fense a first degree burglary, with a mandatory state prison term. The plea-bargaining
policies of the office were very strict; the defendant's choice of private refrigerator in-
stead of a grocery store made him technically guilty of a felony carrying a mandatory
prison term, rather than a misdemeanor petty theft, and the deputy district attorney felt
such a result was unjust. Moreover, court time would be taken up in a jury trial, and
apparently the victim wasn't too upset about the loss of the food. The deputy finally
persuaded his supervisor to allow him to reduce the charge to misdemeanor burglary, to
which the defendant pled guilty. (Confidential communication.)
201. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 305 app., 651 P.2d 274, 319 app.,
186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 75 app. (1982) (reprinting Proposition 8 ballot statements); Y.
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California Victim's Bill of Rights which seeks to abolish plea bar-
gaining in cases charging enumerated "serious felonies" and in
felony driving-under-the-influence cases.2 °2 California law now
prohibits plea bargaining in cases that charge these crimes unless
the prosecution has "insufficient evidence," the testimony of a
"material witness cannot be obtained," or "a reduction or dis-
missal would not result in a substantial change in sentence. 20 3
The California law forecloses any consideration of a victim's will-
ingness or ability to testify at trial as a justification for plea bar-
gaining, unless the language about "obtaining testimony" is read
more broadly than are California's evidentiary provisions regard-
ing unavailability of witnesses.20 4
One commentator supports laws like California's, asserting
that because of plea bargaining, "victims may be deprived of
their opportunity to have the cathartic experience of testifying
against the defendant. ' 20 5 But is testifying against a defendant
really "cathartic"? If the term is used loosely to mean the release
of tension, testifying can be viewed as "cathartic. ' 20 6 In strict
psychoanalytic terms, however, catharsis involves the retrieval of
threatening or painful early life experiences and the process of
bringing those emotions into consciousness to be expressed. 0 7
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 198, at 1224 n.m (quoting statement of New
York Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy attacking plea bargaining and the court sys-
tem and implying that plea bargaining as to felony gun possession leads to many
murders); E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 53, at 157-63, 171-73 (attacking courts and
liberals for making plea bargaining a tool for allowing even serious offenders to go un-
punished, thereby raising the crime rate).
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 1982).
203. Id
204. For narrow interpretations of California's provisions regarding witness availa-
bility, see People v. Enriquez, 19 Cal. 3d 221, 233-37, 561 P.2d 261, 269- 71, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 178-81 (1977); People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 51-55, 155 Cal. Rptr.
414, 419-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 80, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
205. Gifford, supra note 158, at 73. Needless to say, considerable controversy ex-
ists in the psychotherapeutic community as to whether catharsis is helpful or necessary
to recovery from trauma. See, e.g., A. BECK, COGNITIVE THERAPY AND EMOTIONAL DIsOR-
DERS (1979) (cognitive approach to helping relieve emotional distress); F.
FROMM-REICHMAN, PRINCIPLES OF INTENSIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY (1960) ("catharsis" and in-
sight overrated as therapeutic devices; process and relationship more likely to relieve
emotional distress).
206. The lay witnesses and victims I have talked with certainly were relieved after
they testified. Their relief was less related to the tension created by having to think
about the crime than to the tension produced by the mere prospect of testifying,
however.
207. As Yalom points out, Freud saw catharsis as the release of repressed effect
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In this term of emotionally purging the experience of victimiza-
tion, testifying is not necessarily cathartic. Catharsis encom-
passes articulation and expression of traumatic experiences in
appropriate settings. The appropriateness of the setting is essen-
tial because the process of emotionally reliving a traumatic event
can be extremely painful and frightening.208 The victim is un-
likely to feel that a courtroom is the right place for this kind of
emotional experience. Catharsis is also dependent on a number
of variables, including an individual's readiness and ability to face
the emotions raised. Catharsis is not a phenomenon that can be
forced; nor is it the end of the healing process.20 9
Moreover, abolition of plea bargaining does not actually ad-
dress the psychological needs of the victim. Instead, it places a
priority on obtaining convictions for the offenses charged, re-
gardless of the victim's psychological state or preference.210 To
solve the problem of victim alienation associated with plea bar-
gaining, prosecutors could simply provide more information to
victims. Although the prosecutor represents the state, rather
that produced psychiatric symptoms "symbolically provid[ing] an outlet for the ten-
sion." I. YALOM, supra note 90, at 304. Yalom observes "this formulation is so beautiful
in its simplicity that it has persisted. . . . Certainly it is the popular view incarnated in
innumerable Hollywood films." Id. The image of the hysteric rising from her sick bed-
"Sigmund, I am cured!"-persists despite the fact that "psychotherapy is 'cyclother-
apy'-a long, lumbering process." Id. at 307 (footnote omitted).
208. Moreover, simply reliving the experience is not enough-the experience then
must be re-integrated into the person's consciousness in the form of "rewriting" history,
if you will. J. COLEMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND EFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR 405 (1969).
209. One indication that testifying is not cathartic in terms of resolving the experi-
ence of the criminal event is the failure of many victims to experience a strong emotional
reaction when they tell police about the crime and when they testify. See note 150 supra.
This separation of emotion and description is neither unusual nor necessarily harmful.
In fact, "telling what happened" is all that the trial process requires of the witness. De-
scription of the factual occurrences may be of aid to a victim by providing a way of or-
ganizing the cognitive aspect of a criminal event, but this is a highly speculative
observation, because there simply is not enough available information about the exper-
iences of victims who have testified.
210. As is discussed below, see text accompanying note 212 infra, one argument in
favor of curtailing the defendant's right to examine the victim at trial is that such testi-
mony is too traumatic for the victim-witness. Although I dispute the generalization, it is
true that some crime victims indeed may be too psychologically traumatized by their
victimization to be able to testify. The extreme nature of a violent criminal experience
occasionally does produce a psychotic episode or a lasting breakdown of emotional func-
tioning. See, e.g., Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 89, at 985. Abolition of plea bargain-
ing may thus cause the prosecution to lose a conviction of the defendant for any offense
and allow the guilty to go free.
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then the individual victim, 2 11 courtesy and common sense would
seem to dictate that prosecutors treat victims with respect and
explain the plea bargaining options to the extent possible. A vic-
tim who is not notified about a possible plea bargain, particularly
in which the defendant pleads to a lesser charge, may view the
bargain as an invalidation of his or her experience. Consultation
with victims by prosecutors, and explanations of the problems of
the case or the consequences of the plea bargain, would un-
doubtedly help clarify the situation for some victims and lead
some to actively support the particular disposition. Other victims
will remain unsatisfied no matter what the results.
Ironically, the Task Force's view of the value of testifying is
contrary to the "catharsis" theory suggested in support of restric-
tions on plea bargaining. This contrary view asserts that testify-
ing is "too traumatic" for the victim. 21 2 Victims are unlikely to
consider testifying to be an enjoyable prospect. Victims who have
had little or no experience with the courts or testifying cannot be
expected to comprehend the process. They may be understanda-
bly frightened of seeing their assailants. They may experience a
version of stage fright at the prospect of having to speak in pub-
lic. They may view testifying at a public trial as yet another intru-
sion on their lives and privacy. Testifying need not be an
unmitigated disaster, however. Some, if not all, of the anxieties
associated with testifying can be alleviated by prosecutors when
211. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1979) (duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict).
212. See TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 7, 9-10 (composite model). The Task Force
recommends that hearsay be admissible against defendants in preliminary hearings and
grand jury proceedings and that the victim not be required to "relive his victimization
• . . Within a few days of the crime, some victims are still hospitalized or have been so
traumatized that they are unable to speak about their experience. Because the victim
cannot attend the hearing, . . . the defendant is often free to terrorize others." Id. at
21. Ironically, the California victim's rights provision which sharply curtails plea bar-
gaining, and therefore increases the number of trials in which victims must testify, ap-
parently disregards the Task Force's claim that testifying produces undue trauma.
The Task Force seems untroubled by the fact that if a victim attends a preliminary
hearing, she might realize that the police and prosecutor have charged the wrong de-
fendant, or that some victims of allegedly horrible crimes are not telling the truth. The
presumption of guilt, intrinsic to the crime control model, seems especially prominent
here. Moreover, the Task Force seems unaware that an opportunity to testify once
before trial, if there should be a trial, is likely to help the victim familiarize herself with
the process. Finally, the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment might place some
limit on the extent to which the victim's testimony can be introduced through hearsay
evidence or statements not made under oath.
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they prepare their victim-witnesses.2 1 Such common sense law-
yering does not require fundamental changes in the criminal law
or process. It simply requires an awareness on the part of prose-
cuting attorneys that although they and their law enforcement
witnesses understand the law, the courtroom procedure, and the
mechanics of testifying, lay witnesses frequently are not familiar
with the process.
Accordingly, an absolute restriction on the use of plea bar-
gains eliminates consideration of the emotional needs of the indi-
vidual victim altogether, and to restrict plea bargains because
some victims are dissatisfied with the results seems ill-advised.
D. Abolition of the Exclusionary Rule
Perhaps the most cynical manipulation of victim's rights is the
invocation of these "rights" by crime control advocates as ajusti-
fication for abolition of the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule.214 The California "Victim's Bill of Rights" attempted to cir-
cumvent the exclusionary rule in a section titled "Truth in Evi-
dence, ' 2 15  and the President's Task Force recommended
abolishing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule altogether. 16
The exclusionary rule as a mechanism for enforcing the
fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures has been the subject of endless debate.217 Liberals see
213. Preparation of lay witnesses through a mock direct and cross-examination can
help them understand the process. To the extent that we understand something, we are
less likely to fear it and less likely to feel helpless about the outcome. When information
about something can be obtained, anxiety will likely be reduced even if the experience
itself cannot be fully grasped ahead of time. M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS 107-33 (1975).
Explaining how the preliminary hearing, grand jury, or trial is conducted can give vic-
tims a better feeling of mastery and control. I have suggested to several rape victims
that they watch part of another trial, civil or criminal, before they themselves testify in
order to get a picture of what a courtroom proceeding is like. With this experience
behind them, the prospect of testifying is not so intimidating. Those who have tried this
have found it helpful. I have also advised victims to obtain a copy of the transcript of
their testimony at any preliminary hearings to review before the trial, especially if there
has been a long delay between the preliminary hearing and the trial. No reason exists
for prosecutors not to do their best to prepare witnesses in a like manner. Although
many deputy district attorneys have heavy caseloads, they should be able to take the time
to acquaint their lay witnesses with the basics of the process.
214. See note 80 supra.
215. CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 28(d) (West 1983).
216. TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 24-28.
217. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rxv. 349 (1974)
(containing major arguments for and against the exclusionary rule and an analysis of the
historical reasons for the fourth amendment).
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the exclusionary rule as a sometimes troubling, but necessary,
means of preventing Gestapo-like police tactics.21 8 Conserva-
tives see it as a counterintuitive, counterproductive rule that al-
lows "criminals" to go unpunished.219  Liberals may overstate
the case when they argue that the exclusionary rule is the only
thing that stands between the populace and a police state and
that any diminution of the rule is a step towards fascism. But the
knock on the door at night is just as threatening to existence as
the nighttime burglar.
Whether or not the exclusionary rule is the appropriate solu-
tion to the problem of individual security against the state, it has
had a salutory effect on police practices and has promoted effi-
ciency in investigations. 2  Nevertheless, the present Supreme
Court has steadily moved toward abolishing the rule. Doctri-
nally, the Court has narrowed the rule from a general protection
against governmental intrusions to a tool for specific deterrence
of particular police misconduct.221
218. Id. at 400. The German experience, as well as the more recent examples of
Chile, see, e.g., Chavez, Church Says Civil Rights in Chile Are Eroding, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1984, at 13, col. 1, and Argentina, see, e.g., J. TIMMERMAN, PRISONER WrHOUT A NAME:
CELL WrHOUT A NUMBER (1981), should serve as a warning against giving authorities
too much power as a result of fear or economic instability.
The tendency to consider a criminal as an "other" or "it," rather than as a human
being, leads many conservatives to overlook the potential for tyranny. Denying the hu-
manity of offenders is the easiest way to dismiss the problem of human actions that are
evil, and it permits an us-them paradigm to dominate thought and action in response to
crime. Accordingly, the right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures does
not attach to offenders: Offenders are simply not included in "the people."
219. TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 27-28. ChiefJustice Burger has long opposed
the exclusionary rule, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388,416 (1971) (Bur-
ger, CJ., dissenting) ("Some clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule is required to justify it in view of the high price it extracts from soci-
ety-the release of countless guilty criminals."); L. BAKER, supra note 32, at 56-58.
220. For a discussion of immediate reactions to the exclusionary rule, see Kamisar,
Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories, " 53J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
oGy 171 (1962). After the California Supreme Court adopted an exclusionary remedy,
then-Attorney General Edmund C. Brown stated that the police had done better investi-
gatory work and that investigations "are more thorough and within American constitu-
tional concepts . . . . I believe the overall effects of the . . .decision . . . have been
excellent." Id. at 179. The U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia also opined that
the exclusionary rule improved police preparation of cases. Id.
221. See Allen, supra note 32, at 535-37; Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the
Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1982); Mertens &
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and
Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 373 (1981).
In United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421-23 (1984), the majority opinion
emphasized the question of specific deterrence of particular police officers who obtained
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The exclusionary rule has a minimal effect in the vast majority
of cases: The rule affects only a very small percentage of prose-
cutions.222 But opponents of the rule perceive it as interfering
with effective and efficient law enforcement. They have never
abandoned their efforts to abolish it and now have recharacter-
ized their opposition to the rule as an issue of "victim's rights."
Their assertion that "victim's rights" compel the abolition of
state and federal exclusionary rules seems post hoc, and the ef-
forts to define a victim's "right" that outweighs the constitutional
right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures
are strained. For example, the President's Task Force asserts:
It must be remembered that the exclusionary rule is a remedy
only, and not a very good one. It thus rewards the criminal and
punishes, not the police, but the innocent victim of the crime
and society at large for conduct they may not condone and over
which they have little or no control.223
a search warrant from a superior court judge in concluding that the officers had relied
on the warrant in good faith and that the evidence obtained should not have been sup-
pressed, despite the fact that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant failed to
provide enough information to establish probable cause. See also LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment in an Imperfect World On Drawing "Bright Lines'" and "Good Faith, " 43 U. PrT. L.
REV. 307 (1982) (arguing that the good faith exception will encourage police to engage
in conduct otherwise impermissible under the fourth amendment).
222. The empirical studies available contradict the prevailing wisdom that count-
less guilty people go free as a result of the suppression of evidence. See, e.g., Davies, A
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule:
The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 611
(criticizing a National Institute ofJustice study for concluding that the exclusionary rule
had "major impact" on criminal prosecutions in California on the basis of data that
indicates the opposite conclusion; only 2.4% of felony arrests in California are not pur-
sued by the prosecution as a result of unlawful searches and seizures); U.S. CoMPTRoL-
LER GENERAL, REPORT ON IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS (1979) (only 1.3% of all cases studied had evidence suppressed as a re-
sult of a successful suppression motion); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule:
An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 585 (motions to suppress evi-
dence were filed in less than 5% of all cases; of those motions filed to suppress physical
evidence, only 17% were granted; thus only 0.7% of all cases included a successful mo-
tion to suppress physical evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure; only
0.56% of all cases were "lost" because of a motion to suppress physical evidence); see
also Carlsen, California's Appeal Court Reversal Rate, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 25, 1983,
at 12, col. 1 (detailing study by California Judicial Council finding that only 75 of 604
criminal appeals in California resulted in reversal and that over one-fourth of these were
the result of sentencing errors). But see NATIONAL INST. OFJUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982) (concluding that 5% of all felony
cases in California were rejected by prosecutors because of search and seizure problems
and that from 1976 to 1979 30% of all felony drug cases were rejected because of the
exclusionary rule).
223. TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 25.
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After enumerating all the perceived "costs" to the criminal pro-
cess-"handcuffing police," suppression of "perfectly good" evi-
dence, court delays, and the lack of any danger to the rights of
"law abiding" citizens, the Task Force goes on to state:
Victims are adversely affected by the rule's operation at every
turn. When the police fail to solve the crime because of inac-
tion, the victim suffers. When cases are not charged or are dis-
missed and the "criminal goes free because the constable
blundered," the victim is denied justice. When the case is contin-
ued interminably or must be retried, the victim is hurt time and
time again.2 2
4
The Task Force uses the symbols of both past and future vic-
tims as embodied by society's interest in crime prevention to jus-
tify abolition of the exclusionary rule in a confusing way; the
Task Force decries the costs to society of allowing the guilty to
go unpunished and emphasizes the rule's interference with effi-
ciency in the process. Even the Task Force's claims that are more
applicable to past victims are grossly exaggerated, reflecting a
hostility to the rule itself, rather than any particular solicitude for
past victims. For example, the statement that the exclusionary
rule causes police inaction simply does not make sense.225 The
suggestion that the exclusionary rule is the major source of con-
tinuances, delays, and retrials is not supported by available statis-
tical evidence.226 In the vast majority of cases involving core
crime, the exclusionary rule makes no difference to the result.
Indeed, it has become almost a truism in defense circles that,
while courts may grant suppression motions in drug cases, they
invariably deny them in murder cases. 27 The strongest refuta-
tion of the Task Force position, however, is that reversals of con-
victions on fourth amendment grounds appear to constitute only
224. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
225. Because so few cases are "lost" because of the exclusionary rule, see note 222
supra, it is very unlikely that police will be discouraged to the point of inaction. While I
am aware of instances where the police have not asked the district attorney to issue a
complaint because they are aware that the evidence seized during a search would proba-
bly be suppressed, those instances did not involve violent crimes, and they certainly did
not involve "inaction."
226. See note 222 supra.
227. See Nardulli, supra note 222, at 602 & table 13 (of the cases that were "lost"
because of suppression of physical evidence, less than 20% were "serious," involving
unarmed robbery, arson, and burglary); Davies, supra note 222, at 667 ("while there are
not truly comprehensive statistics on the number of arrests rejected or dismissed be-
cause of illegal searches, all the pieces of data we do have show the general effect of the




a tiny fraction of all reversals of criminal convictions by appellate
courts.228
Undeniably, retrials of serious cases necessitated by an appel-
late court reversal may be difficult for past victims. But it seems
unlikely that the degree of difficulty is necessarily related to the
reason for the reversal and retrial, or that having to testify again
because of a reversal resulting from fifth or sixth amendment vio-
lations or instructional errors is less "traumatic." The attitudes
of the police or prosecutor towards the grounds for the reversal
might, however, exacerbate the situation if the prosecutor em-
phasizes to the victim the "needlessness" of having to retry the
case, or criticizes the appellate court's solicitude towards the
guilty "criminal."
A second argument offered by the Task Force in opposition to
the exclusionary rule is that it denies the victim justice. This ar-
gument appears to assume that a victim has a right to a convic-
tion of the accused or, perhaps, a right to revenge.229 But the
history of the criminal process does not support a finding of such
a right.230 Whether victims have a right to a conviction should be
examined in terms of whether they have a cognizable interest in
participating in the sentencing of offenders and whether they
have a "right" to recovery from the wrongdoer, the subjects of
the next section.
V. VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN SENTENCING
Ironically, the most politically visible activity in the victim's
rights movement focuses on the end, rather than on the begin-
ning, of the criminal process. Advocate groups such as MADD
attend the sentencings of defendants; 231 formalized victim partic-
ipation at sentencing frequently appears in victim's rights pro-
228. Of 75 criminal writs and appeals decided by the California courts of appeal in
both published and unpublished opinions between January 1, 1981 and February 28,
1981, only 12.47o resulted in a reversal. Of the reversals, only nine cases, or 5.1% of
the total appeals, involved errors in motions to suppress evidence, and a few of those
were reversed for improper suppression of evidence; one of the nine cases involved a Mi-
randa issue. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1983); see also
CarIsen, supra note 222.
229. See notes 262-373 infra and accompanying text.
230. See notes 13-23 supra and accompanying text.
231. See Rios & Yeochum, Making Sure Drunk Drivers Pay, San Jose Mercury News,
Dec. 18, 1983, at 1A, col. 4 (reporting the effect of MADD monitoring on sentencing
judges in Santa Clara County, California); cf Magagnini, Drunk Case Judges Mad at
'Monitors, 'San Francisco Chron., May 16, 1983, at 1, col. 2 (San Francisco Countyjudges
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posals;232 and many states have recently adopted provisions
allowing victims to participate in sentencing proceedings.2 33
Leaving aside the question of restitution for the moment, the fol-
lowing discussion evaluates the desirability of such participation
in terms of the justifications for imposing the criminal sanction
and in terms of whether or not the justifications promote the in-
terests of the victim.
A. The Relevance of Victim Participation to the Justifications for the
Criminal Sanction
The classic justifications for the criminal sanction are deter-
rence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. At different
times, different justifications are in ascendancy, but one single
justification never entirely determines the imposition of the crim-
inal sanction. Since each justification is analytically different,
however, this part discusses each justification separately to deter-
mine whether each supports victim participation in sentencing.
1. Deterrence.
The essentially utilitarian foundation of deterrence theory is
the premise that punishment has the socially useful function of
preventing crime.23 4 Deterrence theory has two components:
general deterrence, where the punishment meted out for a crimi-
nal act discourages others from engaging in the specific wrong-
found MADD monitoring inappropriate; MADD advocate quoted as saying, "There are
judges ... who failed to get re-elected because MADD is all over their tails.").
232. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 76-78.
233. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(F) (1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1
(West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91c (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
§ 921.143 (Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1257 (Supp. 1983); MASS.
ANN. LAWs ch. 258B, § 3(h), ch. 279, § 4B (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-28-4 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-35-209 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-2 (1984).
234. Cesare Beccaria repeatedly emphasized deterrence as the justification for
punishment of offenders in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, published in 1819; the
purpose was social betterment: "The degree of the punishment, and the consequences
of a crime, ought to be so contrived as to have the greatest possible effect on others,
with the least possible pain to the delinquent." C. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS 75 (1819 & photo. reprint 1953) (emphasis deleted). Jeremy Bentham is
probably the most well-known spokesman for the utilitarian theory that punishment is
an evil in and of itself and only is justifiable if it serves the greater social good of
preventing "some greater evil." J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1876), reprinted in S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN,
supra note 60, at 189. See generally H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 39-45 (summary and
critique).
April 1985] VICTIM'S RIGHTS 987
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
doing,2 and specific deterrence, where punishment of the
individual wrongdoer dissuades him from engaging in further
wrongdoing. General deterrence seeks to educate others; spe-
cific deterrence seeks to educate the individual offender.
General deterrence requires that the penalties for crimes be
sufficiently severe-and certain-to prevent people from com-
mitting those crimes; it assumes that a rational person will "trade
off" the benefits of engaging in criminal conduct for the benefits
of escaping punishment. 236 But despite increased penalties for
crime, the rising crime rates of the past few decades seem to con-
tradict the assumption that general deterrence is effective.237 In-
deed, complete general deterrence appears to be an
unmanageable ideal, and the theory has fallen out of popular
favor as a justification for the criminal sanction.238 Nonetheless,
the educational function of the criminal sanction remains a con-
sideration, if only sub silentio, in criminal sentencing literature and
in practice. 239 For general deterrence purposes, the participation
of the individual victim seems to be of negligible value in deter-
mining sentences because this theory concentrates on the moral
beliefs and behaviors of the community. It holds that the imposi-
tion of the criminal sanction deters crime, regardless of who the
victim is. The focus of general deterrence is public and
235. H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 39; E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 53, at 181-83.
236. Kelman characterizes this premise as a "variety of economic theories that cor-
respond in the philosophical literature to arguments justifying punishment as necessary
to deter crime" and notes that "[p]olitically, the central method of the economic view of
crime has focused less on optimal criminality than on the observation that we can reduce
crime by upping its price." Kelman, supra note 28, at 214, 216.
237. The rise in crime, including violent crime, might have been attributable more
to an increase in the population of people at a crime-prone age than to anything else,
but fear has caused a shift in thinking from deterrence to incapacitation and retribution.
See, e.g., An Eye for an Eye, TIME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 28, 28-29 (discussing the influence of
rising rate of violent crime on reemergence of capital punishment); Currie, supra note
29, at 32-33 (failure of deterrence has caused a shift in focus from deterrence theory to
incapacitation theory).
238. This is true despite efforts of conservative criminologists to demonstrate that
the threat of increased incarceration can affect the behavior of marginal individuals. See
note 235 supra; Currie, supra note 29, at 32.
239. As Packer notes, "the symbolic richness of the criminal process is a powerful
deterrent" that serves to reinforce societal values. H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 44. The
stigmatization of guilt and social condemnation still exerts a powerful force on behavior.
Consider, for example, the transformation in social attitudes about driving under the
influence currently being undertaken by the media, MADD, and insurance companies.
At one point, driving under the influence was not a crime taken seriously, and a convic-
tion carried little stigma.
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nonindividualized; victim participation is not necessary to edu-
cate the community.
Specific deterrence is aimed at preventing the individual of-
fender from engaging in future criminal activity.240 Achieving
specific deterrence does not require victim participation at sen-
tencing, rather it requires a calculation of the appropriate level of
punishment to teach the offender to abstain from wrongdoing in
the future.241
2. Incapacitation.
Proponents of the incapacitation approach believe that the
best way to prevent a particular offender from committing future
crimes is to remove him from society. 42 This belief is based on
predictions or assumptions of future dangerousness or propen-
sity to commit crimes that are not necessarily related to the actual
crime for which the offender is sentenced.2 43 In fact, the rela-
tionship between the actual offense and future dangerousness
may be attenuated at best.2 44 Although the manner in which the
offender committed the crime might intuitively seem relevant to
a determination of dangerousness, it may be of limited useful-
ness. 245 The factors examined in determining whether to inca-
pacitate an offender are related to the characteristics of the
240. See id. at 39, 45-48.
241. Id. at 45. The common wisdom is that, by putting an offender in jail or
prison, we demonstrate to him that his behavior will not be tolerated. He should conse-
quently learn not to repeat that behavior. Recidivism rates would seem to deny the
efficacy of special deterrence, however, i&! at 46, but as Packer notes, "we are certainly
not in a position now to say that the concept has no utility," id- at 47. Special deter-
rence, or "intimidation," may be very effective on some individuals, or on some types of
crime, and its efficacy may depend in part on the level of brutality of the prison experi-
ence. Id
242. Id. at 48. Incapacitation is enjoying renewed popularity. See note 237 supra;
see also Wilson, supra note 183, at 52, 61 (selective incapacitation is the "most rational
way to use the incapacitative powers of our prisons").
243. See Wilson, supra note 183, at 61-62. But see Cohen, Selective Incapacitation: An
Assessment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 253, 281 & n. 67 (data in a Washington, D.C., study
indicated that 15.3% of auto thefts were committed by specialists, 19.8% of burglaries,
and 28% of robberies).
244. Cf Slobogin, supra note 183, at 119-23 (1984) (comparing usefulness of
clinical assessments to predict future dangerousness that rely on nature of present of-
fense and psychological variables with usefulness of predictions based on demographic
variables that have been statistically demonstrated to correlate with violent behavior).
245. See id. at 119-23, 153-54 ("The fact that a homicide is committed in a particu-
larly vile manner does not necessarily mean that its perpetrator is more likely to commit
a second violent act than a more fastidious murderer .... ").
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offender, rather than to those of the victim.246
3. Rehabilitation.
The rehabilitative goal of the criminal sanction has not re-
ceived widespread support. But unless we are to incapacitate all
offenders for all time, rehabilitation cannot be dismissed entirely
because of our longstanding interest in reforming offenders in
order to prevent them from committing future crimes. Rehabili-
tation, like incapacitation, is "offender-oriented," rather than
"offense-oriented." It concentrates on the offender, his nature,
and what is needed to correct his undesirable behavior.247 To
the extent that the offender's past behavior offers a clue about
what rehabilitative steps are necessary, the nature of the crime
committed may be relevant to a sentencing decision. Yet unless
the victim knows the offender, it is unlikely that he or she can
supply the sentencer with helpful information about the crime or
the offender that is not already available from other sources.
In a few instances, rehabilitation-oriented sentences may
seem to depend upon, or benefit from, victim cooperation. For
example, the successful rehabilitation of perpetrators of domestic
violence or child abuse appears to necessitate therapeutic inter-
vention that requires both victim and offender participation.248
This is quite different, however, from giving the victim a role in
determining what sentence to impose. Instead, it gives the victim
a role in implementing the sentence.
4. Retribution.
One meaning of retribution is associated with a theory of
moral blameworthiness that justifies punishment. Although what
constitutes appropriate punishment is both morally and cultur-
246. Wilson, supra note 183, at 62-63, 65 (predictive factors for high-rate offenders
include, among other things, a prior criminal record, a history of drug or alcohol abuse,
and a documented inability to secure a job).
247. As Packer observes, however, "we do not know how to rehabilitate offenders,
at least within the limit of the resources that are now or might reasonably be expected to
be devoted to the task." H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 55. In a general sense, this is true,
although knowledge about the relationship of substance abuse and criminal activity, for
example, does provide some direction for "rehabilitative" efforts.
248. If an agency or organization is willing to work with a child abuser, it may be
preferable to maintain the family unit and have all family members participate in therapy
if they are willing, rather than to send the offender to jail. Parents United, for example,
has been successful in counseling sexually abused children and the abusing parents.
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ally determined,249 the guiding notion is that defendants must
pay a "debt" to society to make amends for their wrongs. 250 The
other, perhaps more automatic meaning of retribution is simply
that of revenge: Society has a right to retaliate against those who
have hurt it or failed to follow its rules.
The moral blameworthiness, or "moral retributionist," view
subdivides further into two general components: One view, asso-
ciated with Kant, is that crime merits punishment simply because
it is wrong;251 the other view, identified by Herbert Morris, holds
"that society's members implicitly agree to an allocation of bene-
fits and burdens, '"252 and "punishment serves the purpose of re-
storing the equilibrium of benefits and burdens" 253 upset by the
wrongdoer. Both of these approaches embody a proportionality
principle-a correspondence between the wickedness of the act
and the suffering to be inflicted upon the actor. The arguments
for this side of the retributionist thesis gain strength by using an
"innocent" victim to illustrate graphically the offender's blame-
worthiness. But importing the victim into the blameworthiness
calculus logically requires courts to call into question the victim's
relative blameworthiness-to measure the offender's actual
249. See Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YAE L.J. 987, 990-94 (1940).
H.L.A. Hart argues, for example, that
a person may be punished if, and only if, he has voluntarily done something
morally wrong; . . . his punishment must in some way match, or be the
equivalent of, the wickedness of his offence, and . . . the justification for pun-
ishing men under such conditions is that the return of suffering for moral evil
voluntarily done, is itselfjust or morally good.
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILrr 231 (1982). Normative words and
phrases haunt this formulation: What referents exist for determining "wickedness" or
"moral evil voluntarily done"? A moral code in one culture may be vastly different from
that in another. Similarly, the "wickedness" of a given act may be greater in one society
than in another. Lloyd Weinreb has found the concepts of "deserts" and "moral re-
sponsibility" to have normative components; he is, however, unable to find other con-
cepts to replace them. See Weinreb, The Complete Idea ofJustice, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 752
(1984).
250. Punishment of those who deserve it is, under classic retribution theory, self-
justifying. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 249, at 231 ("suffering for moral evil volun-
tarily done, is itselfjust or morally good"). But the infliction of pain is not something
that we can universally agree is "good," so we seek other justifications as well. Some
have argued that punishment for wickedness is a means to "atone" for the wicked deed.
See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 47, at 38. Others see the punishment as a "payment" of a
"debt." See, e.g., H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 34-36 (1976).
251. See I. KAcr, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-102 (J. Ladd trans.
1965), quoted in S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 60, at 187-88.
252. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 75 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds.
1975).
253. Id.
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moral culpability requires examining whether the victim "de-
served" what he got and whether "[t]he harm the criminal does
to society by taking the law into his own hands could be insignifi-
cant in comparison to the benefaction. . . that would otherwise
be left undone. ' 254 Although the substantive criminal law does
occasionally shift blame to the victim, as illustrated by the justifi-
cation of self-defense, it does so only in a very narrow sense.255
Considering the victim's blameworthiness at sentencing, rather
than at adjudication, may act to distort the substantive law gov-
erning the initial determination of guilt.
A related question is whether "victim precipitation" should
be taken into account at sentencing. "Victim precipitation" re-
fers to victim conduct that induces or provokes another to com-
mit a crime and is a broader concept than that of victim
culpability.256 One commentator has argued that certain types of
victim precipitation should be considered at the sentencing stage
because they "make the crime more understandable and in many
instances lessen the [offender's] moral culpability. ' 257 While this
may follow logically from an attempt to calculate the extent of
someone's moral blameworthiness, it does result in a difficult in-
quiry as to "relative badness."
A determination of "relative badness" at the sentencing
phase closely resembles the concept of contributory or compara-
254. Commentary, Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty: A Critique of the Philosophical
Bases Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for Its Justification, 34 OKLA. L. REV.
567, 594 (1981). Criminal activity may be a self-help device to impose social control. See
Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 34, 36 (1983) ("Like the killings in tradi-
tional societies described by anthropologists. . . .most intentional homicide in modern
society may be classified as social control, specifically as self-help, even if it is handled by
legal officials as crime."). And there may be a tendency for legal officials to respond less
harshly in the self-help situtation where the victim arguably "deserved" his or her vic-
timization. Id. at 40, 42. One recent, and extreme, example of this form of social con-
trol/self-help involved the fatal shooting of a man who had bullied residents of a small
town in Missouri. Investigation of the homicide was stymied by the refusal of any of the
town's citizens to identify the killer or to admit that they had seen anybody fire at the
victim. The case received a great deal of media attention and dramatically illustrates the
use of self-help by a community that believed its existence to be threatened. While it
may very well be that the person or persons who shot the victim would legally be guilty
of murder, the behavior of the victim-carrying a gun and terrorizing the community-
seems to be equally "blameworthy." See Widow of Slain "Town Bully" Seeks $11 Million for
Death, San Jose Mercury News, July 11, 1984, at 9A, col. 1.
255. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 855-75 (1978) (discussing ten-
sions in the law of self-defense created by theoretical and pragmatic concerns with
choice, culpability, and rights).
256. Gobert, Victim Precipitation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 511, 514 (1977).
257. Id. at 535.
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tive negligence. These concepts may already explicitly or implic-
ity influence sentencing determinations, 258 but formal recognition
of the victim's presence can produce unpredictable results. In a
recent case, the defendant, convicted of driving under the influ-
ence and of manslaughter, received a minimal sentence for kill-
ing two drunken pedestrians, despite the arguments by the next
of kin at sentencing for a harsh penalty. The sentencing judge
observed that the pedestrians were "more to blame" than the
driver for their deaths.259 Presumably, some explicit standards
for measuring victim blameworthiness or victim precipitation
could be devised to guide sentencing judges, but adopting such
standards is ill-advised. No self-evident source for the develop-
ment of these standards exists. An inquiry into comparative
blameworthiness could increase the appearance of capriciousness
in the criminal process. Such an inquiry could create a normative
nightmare for both victims and society, because it necessarily
would consider how the victims should have acted. The proto-
typical example of this problem is the crime of rape, where both
law and society have traditionally "judged" the victim on the ba-
sis of who she was, where she was, how she was dressed, and
whether or not she resisted.260 Finally, despite its fall from grace,
258. Id- at 539-40. A 19-year-old man, who shot and killed his father, was found
guilty of voluntary manslaughter following a court trial in California. Apparently the
victim had beaten his wife and sexually abused his daughters; the morning the victim was
shot, he beat his wife and threatened to kill his 19-year-old son. In sentencing the de-
fendant to five years' probation, the judge commented that the victim was "the scum of
the earth" and "a man the planet Earth can rotate without quite nicely." Father-Killer
Sentenced to 5 Years' Probation, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 25, 1984, at 5, col. 4;Judge Seeks
Sentencing Ideas, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 29, 1984, at 12A, col. 1. On the other
hand, Richard Jahnke, a 17-year-old who shot his abusive father and was convicted by a
jury of manslaughter, was sentenced to serve five to fifteen years in prison by the trial
court, which refused to take the victim's behavior into account in imposing sentence.
The Governor of Wyoming subsequently commuted the sentence to three years in a
juvenile detention facility, noting that "the court record characterized the father as a
cruel, sadistic man." Jahnke was protrayed as a victim. Father Killer's Sentence Reversed,
San Francisco Chron., June 15, 1984, at 30, col. 4.
259. See Cohn, Oakes Gets 90 Days in Driving Deaths, San Jose Mercury News, Aug.
13, 1983, at IA, col. 5.
260. T. BENEKE, supra note 115, at 6-33 (language and cultural symbols influencing
beliefs about rape); Berger, supra note 68, at 7-32 (1977) (summary of the history and
rationale of the law of rape); Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment That a Crime Has
Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 277 (1968) (reflecting the old
common law assumption that rape is a charge easily made and hard to defend, and rec-
ommending that police consider time between occurrence and report, physical appear-
ance of "complainant," medical evidence, the complainant's conduct prior to the
offense, evidence of weapons or struggle, information derived from a record check on
993
STANFORD LA W REVIEW [Vol. 37:937
general deterrence remains a goal of the criminal justice system.
Taking the victim's blameworthiness into account weakens the
educational value of the criminal sanction and thus lessens its
general deterrent effect. 261
Recent victim's rights proposals appear to be driven more by
the retaliatory view of retribution than by the moral aspect of ret-
ribution. The victim who participates in sentencing might fur-
ther the ends of the retribution-as-vengeance theory by
providing specific and graphic information about the crime-in-
formation that will provoke outrage.
Despite its popularity among victim's rights proponents, re-
taliation has received relatively little support from philosophers
or social scientists. 262 Vengeance is uncivilized, 26 and it cer-
tainly cannot be said to appeal to the "higher nature" of man, yet
the "romantic version of the vindictive theory . . holds that the
justification of punishment is to be found in the emotions of hate
and anger, these emotions being those allegedly felt by all nor-
every complainant, the opinion of the complainant's husband or parents as to the truth-
fulness of her allegations, and the results of a polygraph examination of the complain-
ant). See generally S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 43.
261. Although principles of comparative or contributory fault may justify the re-
duction of damages in intentional tort cases, see Dear & Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and
Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1,
26-32 (1984), we may not be willing to incorporate notions of comparative fault in de-
termining criminal penalties. The notion of general deterrence in tort is slightly differ-
ent from the general deterrence justification in criminal cases; the state may be unwilling
to weaken the educative effect of punishment by explicitly making criminal sentences
dependent on the behavior of the victim.
On the other hand, California has provided that certain types of victim precipitation
may be considered by a judge in determining what sentence to impose under the deter-
minate sentencing law. A sentence may be mitigated if "[tihe victim was an initiator,
willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident," or if the defendant was re-
acting to "an unusual circumstance, such as great provocation .... "CAL. RuLES OF
COURT Rule 423(a)(2), (3) (1985).
262. Revenge or retaliation is enjoying a renaissance, however. For example, a
recent book advocates the use of revenge as a legitimate justification for the criminal
sanction. See S. JACOBY, WILD JUsTICE (1983). Conservative columnist George Will
writes that "[t]he element of retribution-vengeance, if you will-does not make punish-
ment cruel and unusual, it makes it intelligible." Will, The Value of Punishment, NEws-
WEEK, May 24, 1982, at 92. Advocates of the retaliation model of retribution tend to
advocate its use for utilitarian reasons, however. See notes 264-276 infra and accompa-
nying text.
263. To the extent that vengeance is associated with vigilantism, barbarity, lynch-
ing, and other pejoratives, the tendency has been to reject it as a justification for punish-
ment. Similarly, to the extent that it is associated with historical punishments such as
drawing and quartering and other forms of torture, it seems reflective of a less enlight-
ened state.
mal or right-thinking people." 264 The retaliatory view of retribu-
tion ultimately is a utilitarian view, because its justifications are
that it prevents mob violence, channels society's outrage, and
preserves the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by paying
heed to the community's sense of justice.265 But none of these
rationales adequately support retaliation, even from a utilitarian
perspective. First, except in unusual or highly publicized cases,
the likelihood of mob violence is almost nonexistent. Second,
most crime-even core crime-does not provoke strangers to re-
taliate directly against the criminal. Third, although it may be
proper to be angered by evil acts, it is not at all self-evident that
vengeance or retaliation is the only available or appropriate re-
sponse for channeling society's outrage-another perfectly ap-
propriate response to outrage would be to renew efforts to
prevent violent crimes. Finally, some crimes transcend even out-
rage and any response may be futile in an instrumental sense.
Nor is it a simple task to determine what constitutes the com-
munity's sense of justice, and to ascertain whether that sense
comports with the retaliatory view of retribution in most, if not
all, instances. Whatever community feeling does exist could be
reflected in ways other than vengeance-for example, through
jury condemnation, police and prosecutorial discretion, and leg-
islative determination of penalties. In general, only a very nar-
row category of crimes raises the issue of the community's sense
of justice, and even in these cases the community may not agree
on what is just. The controversy in New Bedford, Massachusetts
during and after a rape trial indicates that sharp divisions in a
community's sense of justice exist even in serious cases.266
264. Feinberg, Punishment, in PUNISHMENT, supra note 252, at 8.
265. See Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Con-
duct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1508-14 (1974).
266. The New Bedford case involved a sexual assault that polarized the largely
Portuguese-American community. The issues included age-old beliefs about rape and
ethnic prejudices. See Rangel, Thousands March to Protest Bar Rape Convictions, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 24, 1984, at 7, col. 1; Friendly, Naming of Victim in Rape Trial on TV and in Newspapers
Prompts Debate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1984, at 7, col. 5; Beck & Zabarsky, Rape TriaL"
justice Crucified'?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 2, 1984, at 39.
Another justification for retaliation is that it is necessary to ensure public respect for
the law: The "law has an expressive function, expressing and thereby sustaining certain
values." Will, supra note 262, at 92. By deferring to "a common sense ofjustice," retali-
atory punishment maintains respect for the law. See Schulhofer, supra note 265, at 1513.
This is really no more than a general deterrence argument in retributive clothing, how-
ever, and it is not altogether clear that public, ritualized retaliation serves the function of
enforcing respect for the law: Recall the public executions of pickpockets in England,
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The utilitarian justifications for the retaliatory view of retribu-
tion are inadequate. But what of the individual's desire for ven-
geance? Although few people would suggest a return to the
blood feud, many would argue that the victim is entitled to his
"pound of flesh." In this way, the victim may be entitled to tell
the judge what he or she thinks should be done to the offender.
The first and immediate criticism of this type of participation is
that the victim's desire for vengeance conflicts with two princi-
ples that apply even to retributive sentencing: proportionality
and equality. In an extreme example, while a victim may believe
that an auto thief should be hanged and may muster a variety of
moral arguments in support of his position, proportionality re-
quires a rejection of the victim's position. Second, the equality
principle requires similar treatment of similarly situated offend-
ers in order to eliminate capriciousness in outcome.
The underlying assumption that anger and vengeance are dif-
ferent aspects of the same phenomenon and that vengeance is
the necessary and appropriate response to the anger many vic-
tims experience also does not withstand close examination. A
victim may direct anger at the offender, at the offense, at herself,
or at a combination of these elements. Although anger is ajusti-
fiable response to crime, vengeance as a formalized manifestation
of anger is of questionable psychological value to the victim. The
anger experienced may therefore have little relevance to retalia-
tion. Second, while anger is a normal and understandable re-
sponse to all kinds of harms, anger does not inexorably lead to
retaliation as an appropriate response to harm. Even if we can
distinguish intentional harms from accidents, we still react with
anger to hurt. We may even retaliate. But direct retaliation to-
wards the perceived source of the harm is only one of many pos-
sible responses to the anger engendered. Finally, retaliation may
be the victim's first impulse but not the last or the definitive
one.2 67 While the passage of time may not end a crime victim's
where the brethren of the condemned circulated in the crowds, picking pockets. See also
M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 58-65 (1979) (public executions used to solidify
authority of sovereign more than to express "common" sense ofjustice).
267. The wife of a Stanford University mathematics professor who was murdered
observed: "'My own personal philosophy based on my spiritual beliefs and on my psy-
chological beliefs is that there is no point in hanging on to hatred and fear .... "
Madison, No Hatred for Killer, Widow Says, Peninsula Times Tribune, Jan. 24, 1984, at 31,
col. 1. George Wallace has stated that he has forgiven the man who tried to assassinate
him. Wallace: Bremer Is Forgiven, San Jose Mercury News, May 15, 1984, at 3A, col. 4.
Relatives of victims, on the other hand, frequently do become intensely involved in seek-
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anger, it may diminish the retaliatory impulse. Thus, what peo-
ple choose to alleviate their feelings of anger, particularly after
the initial shock of the harm has passed, can vary enormously
from physical retaliation to withdrawal, to efforts to prevent fu-
ture harms, to forgiveness of the offender.2 68
Anger and its manifestation as blame certainly are normal re-
sponses to violent crime, but they are not necessarily tied to a
desire, need, or justification for retaliation. Disaster victims
often try to assign responsibility for an evil, many times in a way
that relieves them of responsibility for the outcome. Thus, vic-
tims of crimes often blame the perpetrator, "the system," the po-
lice, the district attorney, the defense lawyer, or all of them for
the victim's agonies.269 But blame does not relieve a victim of
responsibility for the criminal act, if any, and for what he or she
chooses to do about it.270 As discussed earlier, victims who as-
sume a degree of responsibility for a crisis or disaster may suffer
less stress and may reduce their sense of vulnerability and loss of
control more successfully than those who do not.2 7 1 Assigning
responsibility to others may also help the victim to find an expla-
nation for the victimization. The victim's question "why" may be
ing vengeance. See, e.g., Burress, Angry Son Tries to Attack Mother's Killer in Court, San Fran-
cisco Chron., Feb. 11, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (son of murder victim tried to attack defendant
after judge overruled jury verdict to impose death penalty); Foley, "Trailside" Trial to
Begin in LA., San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 9, 1983, at IA, col. 4 (mothers of victims
expressing rage at criminal justice system and supporting death penalty).
268. Compare Bilby, Maximum Drunk-Driving Term Given, Denver Post, June 6, 1984,
at 9A, col. I (mother of victim of drunk driver "said her feelings for the man who killed
her son have turned from hate to pity"), with Anderson, Missing Children's Center Gets
Funding, San Jose Mercury News, Apr. 19, 1984, at 2A, col. 5 (John Walsh, father of
murder victim, became "crusader on behalf of missing kids" and lobbied for legislation),
and sources cited in note 267 supra.
269. A man who survived a murder attempt, but whose fiancee was killed during
the attack, remains outraged at the criminal justice system. The outrage has generalized
to anger at defense lawyers in general. See Mandel, Crime Victim, Legal Victim, Turns
Crusader, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 16, 1983, at A2, col. 1.
270. See notes 129-136 supra and accompanying text. At the time of this writing, a
considerable amount of controversy surrounds the shooting of four black teenagers on a
New York subway by Bernhard Goetz, a man who had been mugged by three blacks
several years before. Did Goetz shoot the four young men because of rage, an urge to
retaliate, or fear produced by the prior incident? It would be foolish to speculate on the
effect of his prior victimization at this time; the shooting of four people in a subway
appears to be an extreme response, particularly if it is true that Goetz fired a second shot
into an apparently disabled youth. Stengel, A Troubled and Troubling Life, TIME, Apr. 8,
1985, at 35.
271. See text accompanying notes 129-135 supra; cf Miller & Porter, supra note 122
(acknowledging that their own behavior may have contributed to assault enabled victims
to reassert control and autonomy).
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answered by blaming the parole officer of an offender who com-
mitted the crime while on parole,272 or by blaming a judge for
releasing an offender on bail.273 But such explanations ulti-
mately do not provide a lasting or sufficient answer to the
broader question of meaning.274 Indeed, the opposite of ven-
geance-forgiveness-is more likely to enable the victim to re-
cover. As Hanna Arendt observes:
[F]orgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which acts in
the form of re-acting against an original trespassing, whereby
far from putting an end to the consequence of the first misdeed,
everybody remains bound to the process. . . . In contrast to
revenge . . . the act of forgiving can never be predicted; it is
the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus re-
tains. . . something of the original character of action. Forgiv-
ing, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely
re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the
act which provoked it and thereby freeing from its conse-
quences both the one who forgives and the one who is
forgiven.2 7 5
Forgiveness alone retains the uncontested authorship essen-
tial to responsibility and resolution. Forgiveness, rather than
vengeance may, therefore, be the act that eventually frees the vic-
tim from the event, the means by which the victim may put the
experience behind her.
Emphasizing individual vengeance and blame can undermine,
rather than facilitate, recovery from a violent crime. This is not
to say that victims can or should be indifferent to the sentence
imposed; the rare disproportionately light sentence disaffirms the
victim's experience and undoubtedly causes the victim more
pain.2 76 But even a harsh sentence does not end the matter for
the victim. In a sense, sentencing does provide a recognizable
272. See, e.g., Crime Victims'Agony, supra note 155 (detailing testimony at SenateJu-
diciary Committee subcommittee hearing by victims and relatives of victims advocating
abolition of parole).
273. The bail issue has also led to the adoption of preventive detention statutes.
See notes 170-172 supra.
274. See notes 119-137 supra and accompanying text. The questions of good and
evil are not easily answered; indeed, most explanations fall woefully short of providing
any lasting understanding. Each individual is ultimately responsible for answering his or
her own "why."
275. H. ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION 240-41 (1958).
276. Compare Cohn, supra note 259 (daughter of a man killed by a drunk driver,
who was "on the verge of tears" after apparently lenient sentencing, was quoted as stat-
ing, "He'll never, ever realize what he did"), with Bilby, supra note 268 (mother of the
victim said the judge "'did all he could do' ").
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event and possible opportunity for completion of a phase of the
recovery process. But to say to a victim that after sentencing he
or she can now put the experience to rest denies that any remain-
ing questions of meaning, fears of death, or feelings of helpless-
ness exist.2 77 While the sentencing may signal the end of public
concern with the crime, it surely cannot be expected to signal the
end of the victim's recovery process.
If the harm to the victim is determinative of a particular sen-
tence, then victim participation in sentencing would appear to be
of use to the criminal process. But none of the rationales that
underlie the criminal sanction are necessarily furthered by con-
sidering the individual harm in imposing a sentence. Moreover,
concentrating on the harm to a specific victim may increase,
rather than decrease, capriciousness in sentencing.
B. The Relevance of Harm
The Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act provides that
the presentence report "shall contain. . . . information concern-
ing any harm, including financial, social, psychological and physi-
cal harm done to or loss suffered by any victim of the offense. ' 278
Although the record of the hearings before the Criminal Law
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee indicates that a
major reason for including this information was for purposes of
determining restitution, 9 the appendix to the hearings empha-
sizes that statements concerning the actual harm caused are "use-
ful tools in determining equitable penalties during the
sentencing of a convicted offender. 28 0
Often the substantive law defines the criminal offense and the
sanction to be imposed by the actual harm that has resulted. The
definition of an offense frequently depends on the result of the
conduct-simple battery, aggravated assault, and murder all en-
compass particular results within their definitions. And legisla-
tures provide for penalties that correspond in severity to the
harm associated with the prohibited behavior.2 8 ' This emphasis
277. See notes 146-148 supra and accompanying text.
278. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (amending FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(c)(2)).
279. Omnibus Victim's Protection Act: Hearing on S. 2420 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
280. Id. at 171.
281. Within wide limits, the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unu-
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on outcomes makes some sense, both intuitively and philosoph-
ically: The principle of proportionality requires us to punish
murderers more severely than petty thieves, as does the principle
of relative moral blameworthiness. Beyond these rather general
formulations, however, the justifications for emphasizing the par-
ticular harm inflicted in determining the sanction to impose be-
come more problematic.
One commentator has countered many of the arguments of-
fered in support of taking the particular harm into account at
sentencing by showing how this approach is inconsistent with the
moral retributionist rationale for the criminal sanction,28 2 how it
does not necessarily further deterrence,28 3 and how it does not
influence the incidence of jury nullification or reduce the
problems of discretion in the criminal justice system. 4 More-
over, the "frugality principle"-the notion that punishment "can
be justified only by necessity and should be no greater than nec-
essary to achieve its goal" 2s---cannot support reliance on the
particular harm as the exclusive reason for imposing punish-
ment.2 8 6 Thus, the only rationale for the criminal sanction with
which emphasizing the particular harm is consistent is that of
retaliation.28 7
Focusing on the particular harm caused emphasizes retalia-
tion. This appeal to personal vengeance may be necessary to
elicit the victim's cooperation with the prosecution in some cases,
but not all: Victims may cooperate because of feelings of social
duty or altruism as well. And whether formalizing individual re-
taliation at the sentencing stage is beneficial either to victims or
to society is questionable. 8 Explicit encouragement of a victim's
urge to retaliate does not necessarily aid the victim's recovery
and, as noted earlier, may foreclose the possibility of taking re-
sual punishments may require legislatures to maintain the relationship between harm
and punishment. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life sentence without
possibility of parole under habitual offender statute disproportionate when underlying
offenses are not serious or violent); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death pen-
alty is grossly disproportionate punishment for rape).
282. Schulhofer, supra note 265, at 1515.
283. Id. at 1519-22.
284. Id. at 1522-62.
285. Id. at 1562 (citing J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 194 (1876)).
286. Id. at 1562-85.
287. Id. at 1508-10.
288. See notes 264-276 supra and accompanying text.
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sponsibility for the experience. From society's perspective, the
state attempts to mediate among individuals in order to prevent
vigilantism and runaway vengeance, and a greater focus on indi-
vidual retaliation may thwart this goal.
Thus, while retaliation is the only rationale for the criminal
sanction with which victim participation at sentencing and an em-
phasis on the particular harm are consistent, this rationale is
problematic for both the victim and society. And ironically, while
victim's rights advocates have urged victim participation in sen-
tencing for the purpose of apprising the sentencer of the specific
harm caused, mandatory or determinate sentencing laws may
render the information provided largely irrelevant. 28 9 Nonethe-
less, the victim may have an interest in being heard independent
of the reasoning behind the criminal sanction.
C. Other Possible Justifications for Victim Participation
Although the individual contribution that a victim can or
should make to the determination of the criminal sentence may
be minimal at best, other justifications for victim participation
may still exist. These justifications for a "right" to participate fall
loosely into three categories: "fairness," "due process," and
"recognition."
1. Fairness.
Victims of core crime are individuals, while the criminal jus-
tice process is an amalgam of public agencies and courts with
their own agendas, bureaucracies, and rituals. Yet the criminal
justice process appears to ignore the concerns, wants, and needs
289. Although judges may have a range of sentencing options, that range is be-
coming increasingly narrowed by the legislatures. The change in focus from rehabilita-
tion to retribution as the primary justification for the criminal sanction has led to the end
of indeterminate sentencing. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note
60, at 205; O'Leary, Criminal Sentencing: Trends and Tribulations, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 417
(1984); see also Casper, supra note 62, at 233-37. Legislatures now set minimum
mandatory penalties, often with precise detail, to limit judicial discretion in imposing
sentences. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 1005-5-3(2), 1005-8-1 (1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.05, 70.00, 70.02 (McKinney
Supp. 1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9712-17 (Purdon Supp. 1984); I. SCHwARTZ,
NEW YORK SENTENCE CHARTS 6-7 (1985). See generally Casper, supra note 62.
Indeterminate sentencing and discretionary probation thus have been replaced by
determinate sentences and mandatory prison provisions. As more and more statutes
sharply circumscribe the judge's discretion, the issues of the specific harm to the victims
and victim participation become increasingly irrelevant.
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of victims while it simultaneously relies on victims to function.29 °
Sacrificing individuals to society's goals seems "unfair" to many;
the treatment of victims as a means to an end seems wrong.29 1
Victim participation in sentencing ostensibly cures this inequality
by giving the victim "equal time." But if fairness or equality are
the goals served by participation, waiting until sentencing to rec-
ognize the victim does not seem to cure the perceived evil of us-
ing the victim as a means to an end. If the real reason for
encouraging victims to speak at sentencing is the desire for har-
sher sentences, the process continues to use the victim for an in-
strumental purpose. The use of the victim can be more subtle,
however, because in many cases the victim participates either to a
limited extent, or not at all, after reporting the crime and agree-
ing to press charges.292 At best, it may be several months before
a sentencing proceeding occurs, assuming that there is a convic-
tion.293 Thus, the victim may continue to be "used" without fair
treatment for an extended period, because sentencing occurs at
the end of the criminal process.
Symbolically, the defendant does appear to have an advantage
in the criminal process: He has a lawyer, while the victim does
not; he enjoys the protection of specific constitutional provisions,
while the victim does not; he frequently is the focus of attention
and concern-even if that attention and concern are entirely neg-
ative in orientation-while attention paid to the victim is typically
nonexistent or dependent upon the victim's usefulness to the
prosecution. The perception that defendants are somehow ad-
vantaged is thus difficult to dispel. The reality, however, is that
most defendants have little or no real advantage either substan-
tively or procedurally. And the fact that the defendant has one
person ostensibly supporting and advocating his interests-his
290. See Senate Hearings, supra note 279, at 83 (statement of Marlene A. Young, Ex-
ecutive Director of the National Organization for Victim Assistance); id. at 187-92 (state-
ment of Deborah P. Kelly, Department of Government and Politics, University of
Maryland).
291. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 60, 64. The Task Force's Final Report
recommends that victims be allowed to participate throughout the process. In its rec-
ommendations for prosecutors, the report emphasizes a victim-centered prosecutorial
model. Id. at 63-71. See also Goldstein, supra note 72.
292. Although some have argued that the victim should have a greater role
throughout the process, see note 291 supra, and some victims or relatives of victims have
also wanted a more active role in prosecution, see Foley, supra note 267, it is not self-
evident that all, or even most, victims want to be so involved.
293. This is a rough figure, as each state has different provisions for speedy trials,
sentencings, and other criminal procedures.
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lawyer-may be considered an advantage by some,294 but viewed
another way, representation is less an advantage than a necessity.
Without counsel, the defendant is at a distinct disadvantage in
the system; having counsel lessens, but does not obliterate, that
disadvantage.295
Another possible argument that can be made in support of
victim participation in sentencing is that such participation ren-
ders the sentencing process more democratic and thus will make
the sentence imposed more reflective of the community's re-
sponse to a crime. But the fact that democratic legislative bodies
set sentences detracts from this argument. Nevertheless, the de-
mocratizing function may arguably be better served by allowing
the victim and her friends and relatives to participate in sentenc-
ing in order to provide the judge with a sense of the community's
norms and values in a particular case. The legislature is probably
a better measure of those norms and values than is a judge, how-
ever, particularly when the judge is faced with a self-selected
group of individuals who do not necessarily represent the norms
of the community. In fact, if ensuring that community norms
prevail is the goal, jury sentencing would be more representative
than victim participation.296
294. One victim is quoted as saying: "Why do criminals have more rights than
victims? They get to choose counsel and have these continuances. . . .You are stuck
with a lawyer they give you, you are left out of what's going on .... ." Senate Hearings,
supra note 279, at 189. In many instances, however, it is a total misperception that the
"criminal" got to choose his or her own lawyer: An indigent defendant is assigned
counsel by the court, and has little to say in the matter. Even though an accused has a
right to counsel, the Supreme Court has made it clear that that right does not include
the right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14
(1983). Indeed, I found that asking defendants if they had an attorney in a prior case
usually produced the response, "No, I had a PD (public defender)."
295. The majority of defendants have no reason to perceive themselves as ad-
vantaged, especially if they remain in custody or are represented by public defenders-
often referred to as "dump trucks" by clients who see their lawyers as only wanting to
strike a quick deal. And when an indigent defendant does not meet his public defender
until the day of his trial or has appointed counsel who does not know how to conduct a
trial, "having a lawyer" is more illusory than real. Cf Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1163-74
(1982) (discussing adversary model as undermined by failure of courts to assure effec-
tive representation for indigent defendants).
296. The jury trial is unique to Anglo-American criminal procedure. It is a way of
presenting at least the appearance of democratic, rather than hierarchical, decisionmak-
ing. Cf Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J.
480, 492, 532-42 (1975) (comparing "liberal" English criminal procedures to hierarchi-




The "due process" rationale focuses on the victim's natural
law rights to "life, liberty and property" and suggests according
some procedural due process protection to victims. 297 The argu-
ment proceeds as follows: When an individual becomes a victim
of a violent crime, that person's right to life or liberty (defined as
security from harm) has been invaded. Although the due process
clause is a check on government power, the government uses vic-
tims as witnesses, and victims can therefore claim a private inter-
est in the outcome of a criminal matter. In this view, the
government and the courts should provide procedural due pro-
cess for victims. 2
98
If the victim does have some right cognizable under the due
process clause-natural, fundamental or substantive-that enti-
tles him to a hearing, the question remains what kind of hearing.
The procedural side of the due process clause arises in cases in-
volving government attempts to deprive an individual of a consti-
tutionally protected or legislatively granted right, or to burden
this right in some way.299 Procedural protections are generally
required as safeguards against erroneous decisionmaking 00 But
the victim suffers no deprivation at the hands of the government
during the sentencing process. The sentence does not formally
foreclose any civil action for damages caused by the crime unless
the victim agrees,301 the sentence has no bearing on whether the
victim's property will be returned,0 2 and the sentence does not
now, it has become custom or habit in the United States-there is an overlay of belief
that a jury better reflects community values than does a judge.
297. Cf M. FLEMING, supra note 40 (arguing that the proper focus of criminal law is
protection against crime, not protection of criminals).
298. Id; see also R. REIFF, supra note 25.
299. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
719-46 (1983).
300. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Friendly, "Some Kind of Heafing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1278 (1975).
301. A sentence might, however, practically preclude recovery. See notes 316-324
infra and accompanying text. A plea bargaining arrangement might ease recovery in
somejurisdictions, however. California, for example, permits the use of a guilty plea or
a "no contest" plea in a subsequent civil suit to prove that the defendant committed a
felony. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1300 (West Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (West
Supp. 1985).
302. For example, the Santa Clara County, California, District Attorney's Office
had a general policy of photographing the property of victims and returning the prop-
erty to them whenever possible. By contrast, the San Mateo County, California, District
Attorney's Office would retain property until after a conviction was affirmed on appeal.
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determine whether the state will restrain the victim's physical lib-
erty.A Only the restitution context involves the adjudication of
some cognizable claim belonging to the victim. 0 4 Thus, inquiry
into the protection of a victim's due process rights because of an
erroneous determination by the sentencing judge is unnecessary
simply because the victim has no rights or entitlements at stake at
sentencing.0 5 To seek a justification for the incorporation of
procedural due process rights for victims, despite the lack of
identifiable governmental interference with an individual right, far
exceeds the scope of even the Supreme Court's most expansive
procedural due process applications.3 0° And cluttering up sen-
tencing hearings with additional procedures is not really what ad-
vocates of the crime control position seek. The protraction of
sentencing proceedings runs contrary to the desire for efficiency
and swift and sure punishment.
3. Recognition.
"Recognition" is somewhat distinct from fairness or due pro-
cess concerns. In one form, it may be defined as permitting the
victim to speak in response to the appearance of unfairness of the
present criminal process,3 0 7 but it is largely a symbolic gesture.
This type of recognition of the "individual dignity" of the victim,
might have some merit in a utilitarian calculus. By giving victims
303. The President's Task Force seems to imply that a victim's physical safety and
liberty may be affected by the release of an offender, at least in the context of parole.
TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 30, 84. Again, however, the Final Report vacillates confus-
ingly among past victims who have a "deep and real" fear of retaliation and may want
"to take precautions," and society's "responsibility for protecting the innocent." Id. at
84.
304. See notes 311-318 infra and accompanying text.
305. In a few instances, the release of an offender may pose a direct danger to the
individual victim, but those instances will be rare. Even if we had criteria for determin-
ing general dangerousness-e.g., the likelihood that the interest in protecting future
victims dictates that a given offender be incapacitated-general dangerousness is decid-
edly different from dangerousness to a specific individual. The difficulty of separating a
victim's understandable fear of, and perception of threats from, the offender from actual
threats to the individual would make rational sentencing very difficult, if not impossible,
in the vast majority of cases. In cases involving domestic violence, where the offender
has clearly directed his behavior toward a given individual or individuals, dangerousness
may be more predictable.
306. Perhaps this is why the President's Task Force recommended amending the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution to provide explicitly for victim's
rights. See TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 114-15.
307. This basis for recognition could be characterized as an "individual dignity"
argument. As Jerry Mashaw has observed:
State coercion must be legitimized, not only by acceptable substantive policies,
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a voice, this type of recognition could increase the social welfare
by encouraging victims to report and prosecute crimes. But
whether or not victims are encouraged to help the police and the
prosecution may depend more on whether victims have been
treated with dignity earlier in the process, or throughout the pro-
cess, than on whether they participate at sentencing. Moreover,
although recognition of the individual's experience in a formal-
ized setting is theoretically possible, great care must be taken to
insure that any existing problems of victim alienation are not ex-
acerbated by perfunctory treatment, or alternatively, by unin-
formed responses such as blaming victims for their predicaments
or telling them that now they should "put it all behind them."
Finally, because both practical and theoretical considerations
may preclude the sentencer from implementing the victim's
wishes, some victims may discover that their opinions are mean-
ingless to the outcome and become more embittered.
Recognition also ensures some public validation of the vic-
tim's experience-the lending of a sympathetic official ear-but
validation may not be a workable justification for victim participa-
tion, and it suffers from some of the same flaws as the symbolic
gesture form of recognition. Moreover, public validation may
not be very useful to many victims who are more interested in
obtaining validation from a more specific reference group, such
as their friends or family. Overall, there appears to be little justi-
fication for victim participation in the determination of the crimi-
nal sanction. However, victims may have a more limited role to
play-that of helping the court to determine "restitution."
Although determining the amount of restitution that an offender
should pay may not necessarily mandate the victim's actual pres-
ence at sentencing, it certainly requires some victim involvement.
The next section discusses victim participation in determining
restitution, and observes that participation only serves to empha-
size the problematic nature of "victim's rights."
but also by political processes that respond to a democratic morality's demand
for participation in decisions affecting individual and group interests.
To accord an individual less [than a hearing] when his property or status is
at stake requires justification . . . because a lack of personal participation
causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that society properly
deems independently valuable.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalulusforAdministrative Adjudication in Mathews v.




D. The Riddle of Restitution
While many propositions advanced on the behalf of past vic-
tims may be of marginal concern to them, compensation for inju-
ries can be of central importance. If crime victims have "rights,"
the right to recover from the wrongdoer is the most tenable indi-
vidually based right. Restoration of the victim to the status quo
ante is what the tort system is supposed to accomplish, and its
failure to do so in instances of criminal harm has led many com-
mentators and politicians to advocate grafting tort principles
onto the criminal law, typically at the sentencing stage.30 8 Both
the California Victim's Bill of Rights, 30 9 and the Federal Victim
and Witness Protection Act have made restitution an issue at the
sentencing stage.3 10
1. Restitution as paradox.
Few would quarrel with the proposition that, in an ideal
world, the person who does harm should compensate the victim.
This premise is the basis of the tort system, which in theory pro-
vides victims of crimes with compensation for their injuries.3 '
As a theoretical matter, the civil courts are the proper forum for
victims to claim damages.3 12 The current emphasis on restitution
has blurred the theoretical separation between crime and tort,
although restitution is not a complete substitute for a tort action.
Usually defined in terms of actual damages and restoration of
property, 1 3 restitution generally does not encompass broader
tort concepts such as damages for pain and suffering.3 14 Nor do
victim's rights laws expand restitution to include these broader
damages.3 15
308. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 (1982); ALA.
CODE § 15-18-67 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1191.1, 1191.2 (West Supp. 1985); IowA
CODE ANN. §§ 910.2, 910.3 (West Supp. 1985). See generally Harland, supra note 72, at
69-75.
309. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
310. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 (1982).
311. See, e.g., note 26 supra.
312. Many advocates of mandatory restitution have asserted that requiring the vic-
tim to pursue a civil remedy is unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, and have dis-
puted the historical distinction between criminal and civil law. See, e.g., S. SCHAFER supra
note 36; Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History, in READINGS, supra note 36,
at 19-28; Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HAsv. L.
REv. 931, 933-37 (1984).
313. Harland, supra note 72, at 60-64.
314. Id at 86-89.
315. The federal restitution provision, enacted as part of the Victim and Witness
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The Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act provides that
the sentencing judge "may" order restitution and "shall" state
his or her reasons "on the record" if he or she does not do so.316
The California Victim's Bill of Rights goes further, stating that
"[r]estitution shall be ordered . . . in every case, regardless of
the sentence or disposition imposed. . . unless compelling and
extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary. 3 1 7 The wording of
both the federal and California provisions seems to suggest that
the victim's right to restitution "trumps" the state's right to im-
pose the criminal sanction.3 1 8 But a fundamental tension exists
between the imposition of the criminal sanction and access to
monetary remedies for victims-frequently the use of one ne-
gates the use of the other. If restitution is to be more than a
symbolic but empty promise to past victims and an assurance for
future victims, either the private interest in recovery has to pre-
vail, or an accommodation between public and private interests
has to be created.
When serious crimes are involved, the public interest will al-
most inevitably foreclose either allowing private interests to pre-
vail or accommodation. As the criminal law has evolved, its
nature and function has become increasingly social and public,
and the criminal process now serves the frequently interrelated
public tasks of preventing crime and punishing offenders. The
justifications for the criminal process and the characteristics that
distinguish criminal law from all other law focus on these two
tasks. 319  The increasingly public nature of the criminal law is
Protection Act of 1982, provides for restitution of noncompensated costs, including
damage or loss of property, payment of medical and psychiatric care, funeral expenses,
and lost income. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b), (e) (1982). But see ALA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-65,
-66 (1982) (all perpetrators of criminal activity are to compensate for "pecuniary loss,"
damage, or injury; "pecuniary loss" is defined as "all special damages which a person
shall recover against the defendant in a civil action"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-603(c)
(Supp. 1984) (requiring restitution "in the full amount of economic loss as determined
by the court and in the manner as determined by the court after consideration of the
economic circumstances of the convicted person"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 1322(6) (1983) ("restitution" defined as monetary or in-kind reimbursement for "eco-
nomic loss").
316. 18 U.S.C. § 3579a(2) (1982).
317. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b). It further provides that victims be heard at sen-
tencing for the purpose of determining restitution. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West
Supp. 1985).
318. Cf Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE Mount.rAI 113, 136 (S. Hamp-
shire ed. 1978) (preservation of a true liberal system requires that individual rights occa-
sionally trump the economic market and political democracy).
319. Deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation are all aimed at crime preven-
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largely a result of our acknowledgement that many crimes have
profound effects not only on individuals, but also on the commu-
nity as a whole. While the distinction between public and private
rights is not a particularly satisfactory one, in the instance of core
crime, the distinction seems worth preserving.320 The commu-
nity has interests in its security and continued existence that are
fundamentally affected by war, disasters, and violent crimes. If
individual victims are permitted to dictate the choice of sanc-
tions, the community will be virtually excluded from protecting
itself from the disruptive impact of crime.
The criminal sanction is the community's response to crime.
Because core crime transcends the interests of the harmed indi-
vidual, the criminal event "belongs" to others as well. Accord-
ingly, the larger community protects its interests by prohibiting
private settlements of criminal cases 3 2 1 encouraging community-
wide participation in crime prevention,322 and defining the ap-
tion, a public function. Retribution also serves a public function, either as a utilitarian
means of handling public outrage or as an irreducible, morally good public response to
wickedness. See notes 251-253, 262-264 supra and accompanying texts.
320. In fact, the University of Pennsylvania found the subject vexing enough to
publish an entire symposium on the public/private distinction. The Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). It may be of note that none of the participants in
the symposium addressed the public/private distinction in the area of criminal law; on
the other hand, Duncan Kennedy acknowledged two critiques of criminal law in his com-
ment on Paul Brest's contribution. Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 & n. 2 (1982). Perhaps we are all so accultur-
ated into believing that criminal law is public that we don't really think of it automati-
cally when we think of attempts to distinguish "private" from "public." Or at least I am
so acculturated that I am convinced that criminal law is inescapably collectivity oriented
rather than individually oriented. Nozick's argument that compensation to one person
does not reassure others who are frightened and does little to stabilize the environment
in which individuals live is a good one insofar as it recognizes the importance of the
distinction. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 57-87 (1974); see also H. AR-
ENDT, EICHMANN INJERUSALEM 260-61 (rev. ed. 1965) (crime is a wrong against the com-
munity whose law is violated).
321. Many criminal codes forbid such things as "misprision" or "obstruction of
justice," often in broad terms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-1512, 1515 (1984); ARIz.
REv. STAT, § 13-2409 (Supp. 1984); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 264, § 4, ch. 268, § 13B
(1970); cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 (West Supp. 1985) (compounding or concealing a
crime).
322. One frequent criticism of the Uniform Crime Index is that it fails to reflect the
"true" rate of crime because of nonreporting, among other things. Linked to the prob-
lem of nonreporting is the belief, if not the certainty, that crimes that go unpunished
lead to an increase in the crime rate. Thus, studies are conducted to determine how to
increase citizen reporting, see W. SPELMAN & D. BROWN, supra note 174, and victim's
compensation has been justified in part because of a posited incentive to increase re-
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propriate sanctions or range of sanctions for particular crimes. 32 3
The community's protection of its right to exist, as manifested by
its imposition of the criminal sanction, will therefore often negate
the interest of the victim in recovering from the offender. This is
the case, for example, when the community chooses to imprison
someone on retributive or incapacitative grounds.
Any unspoken hesitancy to allow the victim's right to recover
from the offender to dominate the sentencing determination may
explain the attempts to define restitution concepts in terms of the
traditional justifications for the criminal sanction in an effort to
resolve the paradox created. Proposals for restitution or state
compensation for injuries have existed for centuries and these
proposals have drawn heavily on the traditional justifications for
the criminal sanction. Bentham's utilitarian scheme, for exam-
ple, called for "satisfaction," a combination of restitution and
compensation: reparation for past injury and assurance to soci-
ety, in order to promote a feeling of security, that suffering will
not go unrecognized. 24 Garofalo argued that mandatory restitu-
tion would deter criminals by raising the crime tariff, save money,
and lead to reformation of some criminals.3 2 5 Thus Bentham and
Garofalo suggest that even in the narrow sense of reparation,
compensation to victims is not a good end in and of itself. It also
must serve the public purposes of the criminal law, particularly
those of deterrence and rehabilitation.
In spite of the critiques of rehabilitation, some liberal sup-
porters of restitution have stressed its value as a rehabilitative
tool. Some have argued that restitution personalizes the context
porting of crimes and to increase victim cooperation, see R. ELms, supra note 72, at 254,
259 n.24.
A relatively recent development that encourages public participation in crime pre-
vention is the "Neighborhood Watch" program, in which members of the community
monitor suspicious activity. But neighborhood watch programs, citizen patrols, and
other community-based, public responses to the crime rate do not appear to have sub-
stantially reduced crime, although they "can at the very least help pull a neighborhood
together and improve its sense of security." Currie, supra note 29, at 23.
323. Thus, the Supreme Court has granted legislatures wide latitude in determin-
ing what sanctions to impose for what crimes. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-76
(1980) (reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment under eighth
amendment). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (while courts should grant
"substantial deference" to legislatures, no penalty is per se constitutional).
324. Bentham, Political Remedies for the Evil of Offenses, in READINGS, supra note 36, at
29.
325. Garofalo, Enforced Reparation as a Substitute for Imprisonment, in READINGS, supra
note 36, at 43.
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of a criminal sentence, keeping the offender in contact with the
victim, so that he or she can see the consequences of the criminal
acts. Restitution arguably personalizes the sentence and in-
creases the offender's awareness of responsibility and remorse,
thereby aiding his rehabilitation.326 Whether restitution orders
under the threat of imprisonment do serve a rehabilitative func-
tion is an open question. Other variables, such as availability of
work and other sources of financial support for the offender un-
doubtedly influence the effectiveness of restitution as a rehabili-
tative device.
The deterrence argument for restitution is based on a "crime
tariff" model that assumes that if the price of crime is high
enough, potential offenders will refrain from committing
crimes.3 27 Perhaps offenders would be more deterred by the
prospect of having to suffer financially rather than physically, but
this hardly seems likely. Most offenders given the choice be-
tween making restitution and going to jail would probably opt for
restitution. 28
The retributionist impulse touched off by conservatives has
taken the form of mandatory imprisonment for offenses, longer
prison terms, and determinate sentencing. None of these en-
hance the likelihood of the offender making the restitution that
conservatives also demand.3 29 For example, although the Senate
hearings on the issue of restitution reveal some recognition that
the desire to punish offenders and the desire to compensate vic-
tims are frequently contradictory, the Senate ignored the contra-
326. See, e.g., L. FORER, supra note 72, at 299 (1980). Forer also points to the
debilitating effects of prison and the expense of imprisonment as further reasons to
adopt restitution schemes. Id at 136-38, 307.
327. Kelman, supra note 28, at 215-16.
328. Restitution has been used most frequently as a condition of probation. See
Harland, supra note 72, at 57, 69-75. But it might also be used to escape criminal liabil-
ity altogether under a so-called "civil compromise" statute. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1378 (West 1982) (victims may "compromise" misdemeanors by acknowledging satis-
faction for injury); see also Harland, supra note 72, at 65. Most offenders, given the choice
between jail and probation, probably prefer probation and restitution. Although I
found no empirical evidence on this subject, my own clients almost always chose restitu-
tion over jail.
329. At present, a person in prison has no opportunity to earn the money neces-
sary to make restitution. Even where prisoners do work, the profits are used primarily to
defray the expense of feeding and housing inmates, and prisoners' wages are minimal.
Moreover, private industry and labor resent the competition of prison industries.
"[N]obody wants to see prison shops opened in their market." See Schilling, Prison Shops
Have 'Edge,' Foes Say, Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 25, 1983, at 97, col. 1.
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diction in enacting the Federal Victim and Witness Protection
Act.330
On the liberal side, some advocates of restitution have advo-
cated using restitution as a fine-like punishment imposed instead
of imprisonment, because restitution provides a direct method of
reminding the criminal of the wrong and forcing an acknowl-
edgement of moral responsibility. 33' At first blush, this seems
ideally suited to moral retributionist goals, but in instances of se-
rious crime, it is unworkable. As a society, we want the rapist,
mugger, or robber imprisoned on proportionality and incapacita-
tion grounds;33 2 in many instances, the victim does also.333 In
cases in which we are indifferent about punishing offenders
through imprisonment or fines, restitution through fines may
make sense. But restitution is not so much a "punishment" as it
is an amends for wrongdoing. Punishment, by definition, should
be an unpleasant "extra" that serves no purpose other than to
inflict pain or suffering.33 4
330. A submission to the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Judiciary
Committee by Ronald A. Zweibel, Chairman of the New York State Crime Victims Board
and President of the National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards, pro-
vides a good example of this tendency. The submission noted the problems of both civil
and restitutive recovery but utterly failed to acknowledge that restitution is often no
more than an unrealistic goal: "[T]he realities of recovering losses from a criminal of-
fender, who may be judgement proof, incarcerated or indigent, are not particularly
promising. .. . Although encumbered by some of the same practical problems as en-
countered with civil recoveries, restitution at least provides an alternative avenue for
securing this basic right." Senate Hearings, supra note 279, at 172.
331. See L. FORER, supra note 72, at 303. But see Dittenhoffer & Ericson, The Victim!
Offender Reconciliation Program: A Message to Correctional Reformers, 33 U. TORONTO LJ. 315,
346-47 (1983) (community program in which offender and victim meet and agree on
restitution amount and terms is not a clearly better alternative to jail).
332. There are other problems with restitution as well. For one thing, many of-
fenders lack legitimate means to pay restitution, and may resort to other methods of
providing for the money to meet restitution payments rather than go to jail. Second, if
an offender legitimately lacks the means to make restitution, it may not be possible to
incarcerate him. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983) (state may not
imprison probationer who has made "all reasonable efforts" to pay fine or make restitu-
tion as condition of probation "without considering whether adequate alternative meth-
ods" of punishment are available).
333. Given a choice between receiving restitution or seeing the offender punished
or incapacitated, the victim of a core crime is likely to want both, but will settle for some-
thing less. Given the cultural association of crime with punishment, many victims will
arguably prefer punishment; some victims may want the offender incapacitated for more
"altruistic" reasons such as the protection of the community. Thus, even from a pure
"victim" orientation, restitution may not be as important as is often assumed.
334. Although physical torture has largely been replaced by deprivation of rights
and wealth, M. FOUCAULT, supra note 266, at 7-15, the deprivation is still punishment,
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2. California's attempt to resolve the paradox.
The California legislature explicitly recognized the paradoxi-
cal nature of restitution in 1983 when it had to reconcile the Vic-
tim's Bill of Rights amendment to the state constitution requiring
restitution in all cases with California's constitutional and statu-
tory requirements of increased and mandatory prison terms.335
Conservative Republicans insisted that individual offenders be
required to make restitution regardless of imprisonment or abil-
336ity to pay. Where necessary, they were willing to require pay-
ment of restitution as a condition of parole, essentially taking the
position that the offender, and only the offender, is responsible
for providing the victim with a financial remedy.33 Under the
reaffirming power relationships and social control, and inflicting pain. It is a negative
stimulus. As such, pain or suffering, however short, is a part of punishment.
335. The Victim's Bill of Rights made restitution mandatory, see CAL. CONsT. art. I,
§ 28(b), and lengthened sentences in cases where an offender had a prior conviction for
a felony, no matter how old the prior felony conviction, see id. at § 28(f); cf. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1985) (requiring a five-year sentence for each prior "serious
felony" conviction to run consecutively to sentence for new "serious felony" convic-
tion); see also CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON CRIMINALJUSrICE, ANAL-
YSIS OF PROPOSION 8, at 28, 31-32, 42-43 (1982) (arguing that "[s]ignificantly [l]onger
[s]entences" would result under Proposition 8). The California Determinate Sentencing
Law, together with individual provisions requiring mandatory prison sentences for a
number of offenses, already existed when Proposition 8 passed. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170 (1977).
336. Paul Gann, a co-author of the Victim's Bill of Rights, stated that "he favors
just about any effort to get restitution money from convicted felons, including confiscat-
ing money or property," and went on to observe: "'If they commit a heinous crime, like
rape or murder, as far as I'm concerned they can get the money selling their blood if
somebody will buy it.'" Norman, Traffic Tickets May Help Pay the Bills for Victims of Crime,
Peninsula Times Tribune, June 4, 1983, at Al, col. 1, A8, col. 1. Republican legislators
"introduced legislation that would require convicted adults and juveniles to repay their
victims, either directly with money or goods, or indirectly through community service,"
Stanton, A Proposal to Pay Victims of Crime, Peninsula Times Tribune, Mar. 23, 1983, at A4,
col. 1, but they ultimately agreed to Democrat-sponsored legislation, see notes 340-343
infra and accompanying text.
337. Senate Bill 593, introduced by Senator Dolittle and co-authored by Republi-
can Assemblyman Nolan, would have provided that courts impose a mandatory "restitu-
tion penalty" of between $50 and $100,000. S. 593, 1983 Cal. Legis., Regular Session,
at 5 (June 17, 1983) (amended in assembly, July 15, 1983). If the offender were sen-
tenced to prison, the Director of Corrections would have been required to withhold
50% of the prisoner's income and transfer it to the State Board of Control to be placed
in a restitution trust account. Id at 8-9. The Board of Prison Terms, in considering
parole, would have to determine a payment schedule for "remaining restitution pen-
alty"; parole could be revoked if the restitution payments were not made, and parole
terms could be extended up to 15 years in order to assure payments. Id. at 8. The
majority leader of the Assembly referred to the Republican proposals as "unworkable"
and "hoax-like," concluding that the Republican package "offers a false hope that every-
body will get restitution for a crime." Demos Would Make Criminals Pay 'Tax'for Restitution
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conservative plan, and in light of California's existing mandatory
sentencing structure, a victim who suffered serious bodily injury
as a result of a forcible rape in which the perpetrator used a
deadly weapon would have to wait a minimum of approximately
ten years, eight months, before the assailant would be eligible for
parole338 and, perhaps, be able to earn money to make restitution
payments. Such a "resolution" of the restitution paradox is no
resolution at all.
Liberal Democrats sought to increase the amount of funds
available to victims under the California Victims of Violent Crime
Compensation program339 by recharacterizing it as a victim's res-
titution fund, financed by penalty assessments charged in addi-
tion to fines in all criminal cases.340 The Democrats additionally
proposed changes in the law involving tort suits for damages, in-
cluding extending statutes of limitations, providing for punitive
damages in wrongful death suits, and increasing the civil liability
of parents whose children commit a crime.34 '
The "restitution fund" places a tax on all criminal activity: a
mandatory payment to the restitution fund of $5 assessed for
every $10 of criminal fines in misdemeanor cases, a mandatory
assessment for felony convictions ranging from $100 to $10,000,
and a $20 assessment imposed on those convicted of driving
Funds, San Francisco Examiner, Mar. 23, 1983, at B 12, col. 1, 3; accord Should a Restitution
Penalty Be Assessed in Criminal and Juvenile Cases to Be Paid into a Separate Account for the Benefit
of the Victim?, Memorandum by Byron D. Sher, Chairman of the California Assembly
Committee on Criminal Law and Public Safety (1983) (on file with author).
338. This is based on the maximum, "aggravated," eight-year term, see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1985), for violation of the statute, see id. at § 261 (West Supp.
1985), a five-year consecutive enhancement for great bodily harm, see id. at § 12022.8
(West 1982), and a three-year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon, see id at
§ 12022.3. The maximum sentence is thus 16 years. With one-third of the sentence
reduced by good time/work-time credits, id. at §§ 2931, 2933 (West Supp. 1985), 10
years and 8 months would be the minimum sentence the offender would have to serve.
339. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13960-13974 (West. Supp. 1985).
340. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 13959, 13960.1, 13967 (West Supp. 1985); H.R.
1485, 1983-1984 Cal. Legis., Regular Sess., 56-68; Ashby, Assembly Passes Bills on Restitu-
tion to Crime Victims, L.A. Daily J., June 10, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
341. See Press Release by California Assemblyman Byron Sher (Sept. 12, 1983) (on
file with author) [hereinafter cited as Sher]. In the press release, the sponsors of the
"Crime Victim Restitution Program of 1983" stated: "The Restitution Fund would be
financed by doubling current fine limits, ordering a restitution fine in every criminal
case, and imposing heavy fines on drug offenders." Sher, id. at 1. California law now
provides that restitution fines may be paid by withholding 20% of a prisoner's wages, a
peculiar blend of the Republican's direct restitution idea and the Democrat's compensa-
tion fund model. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2085.5 (West Supp. 1985). See also Lynne, Of Park-
ing Violators and Victims of Violence, Peninsula Times Tribune, Mar. 31, 1983, at A2, col. 1.
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under the influence. 42 Although conservatives initially opposed
the plan in which traffic violators "subsidized" rapists and mur-
derers, the proposal eventually gained bipartisan support and be-
came law. The program that emerged was thus more like
California's preexisting victim's compensation program, with in-
creased funds to be supplied essentially by a tax on well-to-do
offenders, 43 rather than a program of restitution by offenders.
3. Some unanswered questions.
In those cases in which direct restitution by the offender to
the victim is possible and is a sentencing issue, neither federal
nor state provisions offer much guidance on the procedures for
determining the appropriate amount of restitution. One com-
mentator has recently argued that once a person is convicted, his
or her rights "are merely conditional,"3 44 and therefore no for-
mal trial is necessary to determine the amount of restitution re-
quired.34 5 The argument uncritically accepts that restitution is
compatible with the justifications for the criminal sanction. 46
Because this article asserts that restitution is analytically differ-
ent, the problem of procedure cannot be so lightly dismissed.34 7
The Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act recognizes
due process questions associated with restitution by placing the
burden of proving the amount in question by a preponderance of
the evidence on the prosecution and the same burden of proof
342. See CAL. GOV'T CODE j 13967 (West Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1463.18, 1464 (West Supp. 1985); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 729.6 (West Supp.
1985).
343. One author has argued that this type of funding scheme furthers the goals of
punishment and rehabilitation, see Friedsam, Legislative Assistance to Victims of Crime: The
Florida Crimes Compensation Act, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 859, 872 (1984), presumably be-
cause it is a form of quasi-restitution. But the distinction between payment of a restitu-
tion "fine" and other "fines" seems nonexistent. Moreover, it is not clear that
restitution functions either as a rehabilitative device or as a punishment. Nor does "tax-
ing" well-to-do offenders, primarily white collar criminals or drug dealers, seem to add
to general deterrence.
344. Note, supra note 312, at 944.
345. Id. at 944-46.
346. Id, at 937-41.
347. I take issue with this argument for two reasons. First, as I have argued, see
notes 324-334 supra and accompanying text, restitution is not supported by any of the
rationales for the criminal sanction. Second, this argument ignores the fact that if a
convicted offender is sued in tort, he does not sacrifice the procedural and evidentiary
benefits that other tort defendants have. To treat him differently in the criminal context
undermines the purpose of the safeguards in the civil context.
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on the defendant to show his or her inability to pay. On the
other hand, it leaves the burden of "demonstrating such other
matters as the court deems appropriate upon the party desig-
nated by the court as justice requires. '" 49 The reference to "ap-
propriate matters" in this latter provision creates virtually
complete judicial discretion in restitution proceedings. More-
over, the Act applies to harms resulting from "the offense" with-
out defining whether the offense means all the offenses with
which the defendant was charged, or simply the offense for which
he or she was convicted.35 ° Thus, the defendant could have to
pay restitution for crimes of which he or she is not guilty.35 '
The situation on the state level may be worse than it is on the
federal level. A recent article surveying restitution provisions
throughout the United States found that many state plans failed
to provide for due process protections for criminal defendants
comparable to those available in civil actions against the criminal
offender.352 The option of restitution, either instead of ajail sen-
tence or at least with the promise of a lesser term, makes it diffi-
cult for offenders to object to the amount of restitution awarded,
however unfounded. 53 Moreover, many states have shifted the
burden of proving the amount of reasonable restitution from the
person seeking restitution to the offender.3 5 4 The lack of proce-
348. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(d) (1982). For an argument that the determination of resti-
tution should take place in the adjudicatory phase of the criminal process in order to
protect the rights of defendants, see Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for
Fixing the Offender's Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 505, 516-17 (1984). The courts have also been
unwilling to dispense with due process protections in the restitution area, although they
have disagreed on what process is due. Compare U.S. v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D.
Ala. 1983) (restitution order under Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act violates
due process clause, seventh amendment right to jury trial, and eighth amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment, because it might result in imprisonment
for debt), with In re D.G.W., 70 NJ. 488, 361 A.2d 513 (1976) (due process encompasses
a right to be heard at the sentencing hearing), and State v. Pope, 107 Wis. 2d 726, 321
N.W.2d 359 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (due process requires notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and a right of confrontation).
The procedures for determining restitution that have been developed by courts and
legislatures are not as protective as are existing procedures for civil cases. See Harland,
supra note 72, at 99-108.
349. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(d) (1982).
350. See Note, supra note 348, at 509-11.
351. Id. at 517.
352. Harland, supra note 72, at 99-108.
353. Id. at 73-74, 105.
354. Id. at 100-08. Similarly, California's Victim's Bill of Rights did not address
any substantive or procedural questions, but simply left it up to the legislature to deter-
mine how the restitution provisions should be implemented. Although the legislature
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dural protection is troubling because it is symptomatic of a gen-
eral willingness to treat offenders as "others" and not as persons
entitled to the same consideration the law provides other wrong-
doers who cause harms. 355
4. A final note on victim's compensation programs.
The California compromise led to increased funding for the
already existing victim's compensation program. 356  Victim's
compensation statutes exist in almost every state357 and are
largely the product of a liberal, social welfare ideology,35 8
has created the Crime Victim's Restitution Fund, it has yet to provide a procedural
framework for reaching a restitution decision at sentencing.
355. Harland's thesis is that the use of restitution is grounded more on conven-
ience and practicality than on any particularly "profound reconsideration of the funda-
mental purposes of civil versus criminal courts or tort-crime differences." Id. at 120.
356. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13974 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
357. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.010-.180 (1981 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 960.01-.28 (West 1985); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 258A, §§ 1-9 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1980 & Supp. 1985). In 1984, Congress established a federal victim compensation pro-
gram. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 473, 98 Stat. 2170 (1984). The
federal law enacts a tax on offenders-$25 for individuals convicted of a misdemeanor,
$50 for individuals convicted of a felony-similar to the "penalty assessment" scheme
used in California. Id. at § 1405, 98 Star. at 2174-75. The fines are to be distributed to
state victim's compensation programs.
358. See, e.g., Yarborough, S.2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress-The Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act, 50 MINN. L. REv. 255, 256-57 (1965). English penal reformer Margaret
Fry argued, for example, that the state, having taken on the responsibility of controlling
crime and adjudicating guilt, also had the responsibility to compensate those injured
when the state failed to control crime. See Fry, supra note 36; cf. Mueller, Compensation for
Victims of Crime: Thought Before Action, 50 MINN. L. REv. 213, 216-17 (1965) (characteriz-
ing victim's compensation as "compulsory government insurance, comparable to work-
men's compensation, social security, or medicare"); Schafer, Restitution to Victims of
Crime-An Old CorrectionalAim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REV. 243, 249 (1965) (emphasizing
the need for the state to fulfill "an important social welfare function" through victim's
compensation). But see R. ELIAS, supra note 72, at 27-29 (victim's compensation is moti-
vated by the desire to "buy off" civil unrest); Weeks, The New Zealand Criminal Injuries
Compensation Scheme, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 107-09 (1970) (victim's compensation was a
politically convenient way to offset objections to liberalization of penal system).
Although inspired by liberalism, several statutes did incorporate conservative val-
ues, such as requirements that the victim be "blameless" and cooperate with law en-
forcement officials. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13961 (West Supp. 1985) (State Board
of Control empowered to promulgate eligibility rules); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, Rr.
648.3, 649.9 (1985) (for claims arising beforeJuly 1, 1974, victims could be required to
cooperate with law enforcement in the apprehension and conviction of the criminal in
order to recover; for claims arising July 1, 1974 or thereafter, applicant has burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence to Board's "satisfaction" that injuries or
death arose "from a crime of violence which was promptly reported" to law enforcement
agency, and that victim did not, "by his acts, contribute to his own injuries," among
other things); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.53(2) (West Supp. 1985) (reparation unavailable
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although some have argued that compensation should be consid-
ered a right.359 Still, no satisfactory explanation exists for treat-
ing victims of crime as more entitled to state-funded
compensation than victims of other insolvent or governmental
tortfeasors. Several compensation advocates have argued that
because the state has taken responsibility for crime prevention, it
has a duty to compensate individual victims when it fails to pro-
tect them.3 60  This argument, however, does not explain why
crime victims are "special." Under this analysis, the state is
equally under a duty to compensate victims of uninsured motor-
ists because it controls the licensing of drivers and "requires"
insurance.361 Moreover, according victims of crimes a special
status in society above victims of governmentally inflicted
harms- for example, civilians who are injured because of the
dumping of toxic wastes by the government, or who get cancer as
a result of government testing of nuclear weapons-seems to be
insupportable.3 62
An argument that the state needs a victim's assistance to en-
force the criminal law, and therefore should reward victims for
their cooperation, is problematic under most existing statutes.
Many victim's compensation programs provide only for victims
if victim failed to report the crime to the police within five days, "failed or refused to
cooperate fully" with law enforcement, or is related to the offender); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.08 (West 1982) (compensation unavailable if victim "engaged in conduct which
substantially contributed to" injury or death, "has not cooperated with law enforce-
ment," is related to the offender, or committed a crime himself or herself).
359. R. ELIAS, supra note 72, at 237, 252-53 (social welfare model may increase
victim discontent); Elias, The Symbolic Politics of Victims Compensation, 8 VICTIMOLOGY 213,
217-20 (1983) (compensation should be based on a theory of rights).
360. See, e.g., Fry, supra note 36; Wolfgang, Social Responsibility for Violent Behavior, 43
S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 6 (1970); Yarborough, supra note 358, at 256.
361. See generally Starts, A Modest Proposal to Insure Justice for Victims of Crime, 50
MINN. L. REV. 285 (1965) (criticizing special treatment of crime victims inherent in state
compensation schemes and advocating private insurance as a remedy). I am unaware of
any proposals in which states compensate victims of uninsured motorists; the farthest
that states seem willing to go in this direction is to require that drivers be insured. See,
e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16020, 16021 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
99 324.011-.021, 627.733 (1984 & Supp. 1985). The sanctions imposed on uninsured
drivers who are involved in accidents, see CAL. VEH. CODE § 16070 (West Supp. 1985);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.051(2) (West Supp. 1985), typically suspension or revocation of a
driver's license or vehicle registration, do nothing to compensate victims.
362. For an excellent attempt to find a theoretical and practical justification for
government compensation to victims of toxic waste dumping, see Note, The Inapplicabil-
ity of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution
Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1983).
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of violent crimes,363 and frequently require that the victims be
"innocent"-exduding those who arguably precipitated the
crime or are otherwise "blameworthy, ' 64 or those who do not
cooperate filly with law enforcement._65 This substantially nar-
rows the field of victims encouraged to aid the system and pro-
vides few incentives to aid law enforcement. Further, with
normative language such as "innocence" in the statutes, those in
charge of deciding which victims receive compensation have
enormous discretion. Finally, one of the major complaints about
victim's compensation programs has been that few victims know
or are told of such programs.3 66 As a practical matter, compensa-
tion falls woefully short as an incentive for many victims to help
the state enforce laws.
Another less instrumental approach to victim's compensation
programs might justify treating crime victims differently from
other victims. The state has an expectation that crime victims
will report crimes and assist in the prosecution of offenders, but
this expectation does not extend to victims of many kinds of in-
solvent tortfeasors. Indeed, the state may punish a crime victim
for noncooperation by holding him or her in contempt for refus-
ing to testify, or the state conceivably could prosecute victims for
the obstruction ofjustice3 67 Although crime victims can and do
choose not to report crimes, once they report a crime, they must
accept the intrusion of the larger community into their experi-
ence. Victim's compensation may provide a symbolic recognition
of the victim's contribution to the general welfare of the commu-
nity. Perhaps by demonstrating our collective opposition to vio-
lent crime by compensating victims, the system gains moral
363. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.03(3),(7) (West 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 142.3(13) (West 1983); WXs. STAT. ANN. §§ 949.01, .03 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
364. See note 358 supra.
365. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 648.3 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61 1A.53(2)(b) (West Supp. 1985); Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(G) (Page Supp.
1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 142.10(c) (West 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.08(d)
(West 1982); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-14(d) (Supp. 1985).
366. See R. ELIAS, supra note 72, at 111-12, 180. Elias, supra note 359, at 218.
367. In 1982, the Santa Clara County courts held two minor victims in contempt
for their refusal to testify in sexual abuse cases. Both victims were confined in juvenile
hall. Despite the negative publicity, the District Attorney's office supported the impris-
onment of the victims. See Letter from William Hoffman, Chief Assistant District Attor-
ney for Santa Clara County, to Lynne Henderson (May 25, 1982) (on file with author);
see also Nakao, 12-Year-Old-Girl Held in Solitayy for Not Testifying Is Freed, San Francisco




credibility for its position against noninstrumental violence. But,
to compensate such victims lacks coherence, and to characterize
victim's compensation as symbolic of an opposition to noninstru-
mental crimes is to accept responsibility to contribute to the fund
generally, rather than to tax offenders in order to compensate.
The unwillingness of most advocates of compensation to aban-
don the premise that the wrongdoer should directly or indirectly
pay the victim weakens the interpretation of victim's compensa-
tion as a community response.368
A final observation on restitution and compensation is appro-
priate before concluding. Neither compensation nor restitution
provide for nonmonetary loss. The secondary costs of victimiza-
tion-pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of status and
security-are not easily quantified. And, except perhaps for loss
of status, these "costs" are not ultimately expunged by money,
although as the common wisdom would have it, money certainly
helps. But increased understanding of the meaning of the expe-
rience and willingness to overcome the ambivalence about vic-
tims might be of more value to them in the long run, particularly
because of the reality of limited monetary resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has briefly touched upon the complex issues
raised by the victim's rights movement and the psychological
phenomena resulting from victimization. It offers an outline of
the current state of the law and does not discuss victim's rights
proposals that do not relate directly to changes in the criminal
law or process. 369 Rather, the concern of this article is to increase
the understanding of the experience of victimization, and the
manner in which the anguish of victims has been reformulated or
mistranslated into support for a particular ideology. The coopta-
tion of victim's concerns by crime control proponents has created
a new mythology of victimization that fails to hear those con-
cerns. The following exchange, taken from the Senate Subcom-
mittee Hearings on the Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection
Act, both exemplifies the inability of nonvictims to hear past vic-
368. See notes 137-147 supra and accompanying text.
369. For an article that discusses changes in the law of evidence as a result of the
California Victim's Bill of Rights, see Mendez, California 's New Law on Character Evidence:




tims and demonstrates the resulting translation of the anguish of
victimization into a condemnation of the offender:
Senator Heinz. Do you have any thoughts on how prosecutors
can be more sympathetic or more understanding, more humane
in their treatment of people such as yourself?
Mrs. X. I certainly do have a lot of opinions. When I talked to
the police-I did a series of workshops in the Montgomery
County Police Department-the first thing I emphasized was
that whether a person is a prosecuting attorney, a judge, or the
President of the United States, I would urge him to examine his
own feelings about crime. In my particular case, about rape.
What I feel is that most people are so afraid of being victims
themselves that when they are dealing with a victim they treat
us as anathema. Our very existence makes them uncomfortable. I
imagine I look like someone you know. Maybe I look like some-
one you love? I might make you feel uncomfortable just by my
existence. Rape happened to me. It wasn't nice. It wasn't mid-
night, and I wasn't alone or in a bar. I didn't ask for it.
This makes people uncomfortable. I would ask prosecuting
attorneys not to hide behind sarcasm here, nor employ the
games of the law, not to be afraid of being somehow compas-
sionate, not to confuse cold with professional.
Senator Heinz. In other words, what you are really saying is that
although the criminal may have every step of the way explained
to him by his lawyer or, if he can't afford his own lawyer, by a
court-appointed lawyer-paid for by the taxpayer, there was no
one in your case who ever had the courtesy or the simple de-
cency to explain the process and sit down with you and let you
know, no matter how uncertain the process was, what it was
comprised of.a
7 0
To whom, or to what, is he responding?
370. Senate Hearings, supra note 279, at 65-66 (emphasis added).
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